

PRS-UIA-88-015
5 SEPTEMBER 1988



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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

International Affairs

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International Affairs

JPRS-UIA-88-015

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Results of Moscow Public Opinion Poll on INF Treaty

18070139 Moscow AGITATOR in Russian
No 6, Mar 88 pp 43-45

[Article by V.S. Korobeynikov and Ye.I. Bashkirova under the rubric "The Modern World": "The USSR-United States Dialogue: What the Soviet People Think"]

[Text] *The active foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state and the realization in practice of the principles of the new political thinking are evoking the lively and interested reaction of Soviet people, as testified to in particular by the public-opinion polls conducted of late by the scholars of the Institute for Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V.S. Korobeynikov and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Ye.I. Bashkirova familiarize AGITATOR readers with the results of the polls.*

On the Eve of the Summit

A research project called International Barometer of Peace was recently created at the leading sociological institution in the country. One of its missions is to give a picture of public opinion on the problems of nuclear disarmament and reinforcing peace and trust among peoples.

The participants in the project had to work actively during the period of the preparations and holding of the Washington summit meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan. Over the course of three months—October, November and December—they conducted three current-opinion polls of public opinion. The information that was collected helps us to uncover more completely and concretely the opinion of Soviet people on the ways and means of decreasing the threat of nuclear war and improving Soviet-American relations.

The summit meeting, as is well known, was preceded by a period of difficult negotiations and mutual concessions and compromises. All have seen how difficult it is to take even the smallest step on the road to disarmament. An analysis of the results of public-opinion polls in our country in recent years shows that opinion is ridding itself of simplistic "black-and-white" concepts and is becoming more competent, restrained and realistic. Out of 500 people polled in Moscow on November 20 of last year, just 13 percent felt that "great results could be expected" from the upcoming meeting, and 40 percent supposed that it was more realistic to expect "moderate results" and three out of ten were inclined toward "insignificant results."

It is instructive that profound interest among Soviet people toward the problems of peace and disarmament, Soviet-American relations and the new proposals of the USSR on ways of reinforcing trust has increased overall. In November, on the eve of the summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan, 41 percent of those polled, answering a questionnaire, noted that the problems of international life interested them very much, 53 percent said they were interested in them and only 4 percent had no interest. The testimony of a majority of them (63 percent) was that their interest in international problems had increased in recent years.

After the Summit

How much did expectations coincide with the actual results of the summit? Some 60 percent of the Muscovites polled asserted that they coincided, and one in three felt that they exceeded expectations, while 5 percent felt the opposite. Some 42 percent therein regarded the results of the Washington summit as "very good," 44 percent as "good," 12 percent as "satisfactory" and only one percent as "very bad."

What do people think about the INF treaty and how the implementation of the treaty will be reflected in the security of our country? These and other questions were posed to many Muscovites during a telephone interview. Overall they supported the signing of the INF treaty: 37 percent feel that its realization will strengthen the security of the USSR, 43 percent believe that it will not harm the security of the country and only 8 percent had the opposite opinion.

The People Say We Must Go Further

The first step on the road to disarmament has been taken. The next is to agree to and sign a treaty to reduce the strategic and offensive nuclear weapons of the USSR and the United States by 50 percent with the observance of the ABM treaty. It is assumed that the treaty will be agreed upon during the reciprocal visit of President Reagan to Moscow. What is the probability that it will be agreed upon? "The probability is great" was the answer of 16 percent of the residents of Moscow that were polled. The answer of 18 percent of Muscovites was that "the probability is small." A considerably greater number of those polled (39 percent) felt that the probability was moderate, and 27 percent could not answer the question. As we see, the evaluations of the Muscovites are realistic and reflect an understanding of how difficult the path to signing a strategic and offensive weapons treaty will be.

**Distribution of 500 Muscovites Polled on the Degree of Agreement with Various Viewpoints on Nuclear Weapons
(in percent of those polled) %**

Statement No. 1	Viewpoint 2	Agree 3	Disagree 4	Cannot say 5
1	The accumulation and improvement of nuclear weapons raises the risk of their accidental use	84	3	13
2	The complete elimination of nuclear weapons is an important cause	55	14	31
3	The possession of nuclear weapons by the USSR facilitates the maintenance of peace	52	25	23
4	As soon as nuclear weapons are acquired, they cannot be completely eliminated	27	41	32
5	Insofar as there has not been a major war between East and West since the USSR and the United States acquired nuclear weapons, these arms have averted it	23	36	41
6	The possession of nuclear weapons by the West facilitates the maintenance of peace	11	58	31

What Troubles Them Today?

An overwhelming majority of Muscovites answering the questionnaires (93 percent) are troubled on the score of the current state of international relations, of whom 29 percent have defined this anxiety as very strong, 43 percent as strong, 21 percent as average and just 5 percent answered that international relations troubled them little or not at all.

The anxiety over the current state of international relations is directly linked to evaluations of the dynamics of tension in international relations. Some 43 percent feel that tension in international relations has grown stronger in recent years, 31 percent that it has remained the same and 12 percent that it has lessened.

Sentiments regarding relations between socialist and capitalist countries are somewhat more optimistic. More than half of those polled (58 percent) feel that they have improved (5 percent even say considerably), 17 percent that they have not changed and 13 percent that they have worsened.

Viewpoint	in the world (%)	in Europe (%)
in the next 5 years	5	8
by 1995	2	7
by the year 2000	15	19
in the distant future	30	22
cannot say	48	44

Whereas before the meeting just 7 percent of the residents of the capital polled expressed the opinion that the danger of armed conflict between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO was practically nil, after the meeting 47 percent felt that the danger of world war did not and would not exist for at least the next 10 years. This is the first positive reaction of public opinion to the reports on the Washington meeting.

The majority of those polled (69 percent) are in favor of a parity of military forces between the USSR and the United States, 5 percent feel it is not necessary for the USSR to be as strong as the United States and 19 percent feel that the USSR should be stronger than the United States.

People are especially troubled by the possibility of unleashing a third world war. Before the Washington summit meeting, only 16 percent noted the impossibility of a world war arising in the contemporary world, and the majority acknowledged to this or that extent the probability of its being unleashed. Some 77 percent therein share the opinion that progress in the realm of improving military technology increases the threat of war.

In evaluating the prospects for eliminating nuclear weapons, 39 percent of Muscovites expressed the opinion that their complete elimination on earth was possible, while 49 percent thought it was possible in Europe. Their feelings that they could be eliminated (in percentages) therein were:

At the Center of Attention

The growth of popular interest in the problems of international life has led to a lag in "supply and demand." Our mass media is not able to meet the needs of the audience. Almost half of those Muscovites we polled expressed dissatisfaction with domestic information on international problems to this or that extent.

When speaking of the qualitative aspects of this information, the replies of Muscovites to the question of how faithful a depiction of the United States is given to the Soviet people by the mass media are instructive. One out of six of those polled felt that it gave an "unfaithful" or "more unfaithful than faithful depiction" of the United States.

The USSR and the United States are the leaders in world politics, and it is completely natural that Soviet-American dialogue would be at the center of attention of our people. A poll done in Moscow in October of 1987 showed that 8 out of 10 people are "very interested" in relations between the USSR and the United States. Only half a percent said they had "no interest." This interest is partly connected with the dissatisfaction of Muscovites with the current state of Soviet-American contacts. Three quarters of those polled evaluated them as such.

The majority cited the following on the eve of the summit meeting as being among the problems on which there exist basic and irreconcilable differences between the USSR and the United States (in percentages):

- deploying weapons in space—72;
- the situation in Afghanistan—69;
- tensions and conflicts in global "hot spots"—66;

- the complete elimination of nuclear weapons on earth—66;
- a complete halt to nuclear testing—62;
- human rights—53.

A smaller portion felt that there exist basic and irreconcilable differences on the following problems (in percentages):

- the situation in the Persian Gulf—48;
- the protection of the environment—31;
- a 50-percent reduction in the strategic offensive weapons of both countries—33.

The results of the Washington dialogue have made serious corrections in the judgments of Soviet public opinion, especially in their evaluations of the dynamics of Soviet-American relations. The answers of participants in a poll conducted in October-December 1987 on the nature of relations between the USSR and the United States are of interest (in percentages):

Viewpoint	October	November	December
Relations have improved	40	40	29
Relations have not changed	24	26	6
Relations have worsened	14	11	5
Cannot say	21	23	0

The sharp changes in evaluating the state and prospects of Soviet-American relations in December are thus the positive reaction of the Soviet people to the results of the summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan.

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MFA Conference on Foreign Policy, Diplomacy
18120098 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 32, 14-21 Aug 88 p 6

[Interview by Vladimir Brodetsky with Vladimir Petrovsky, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR]

[Text] A scientific-practical conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the topic "The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy" was held in Moscow. Vladimir Petrovsky, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, shares his thoughts with "MN" correspondent Vladimir Brodetsky.

MN: The reports and discussions at the conference aroused a lively response among Soviet and foreign experts and journalists. The main features of the forum were, probably, the openness and boldness of judgments. How did this come about? What helped and what hindered?

V.P.: Perestroika has shown the need for broader links between the diplomatic community and science, journalism and the public. This idea has been clear for several years now, but it was the 19th Party Conference that provided an impetus for its realization.

Diplomacy's task is to play a new role in a law-governed socialist state which is being shaped anew. This is realized very well by us, by professionals, and so there were no serious difficulties in preparing for the conference. Possibly certain people were, by tradition, unreceptive to democratic discussion. However, such a stand did not exert a principled influence either on preparations for the forum or during it. What dominated was an understanding of the need for change, for joint reflection.

MN: What, in your opinion, were the main clashes of opinions, of debates at the conference? What are your personal conclusions?

V.P.: I would call the conference a major "brain attack" on all the problems which an interdependent world puts before Soviet diplomacy today.

The report given by E. A. Shevardnadze, Politbureau Member and the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, set the mood. It was a combination of ideas and considerations of a politico-philosophical and practical-diplomatic nature.

The discussions that developed were notable for their innovative quality, and for the realization on the part of all the participants of their role in the restructuring of Soviet diplomacy.

Take the debates concerning our foreign policy priorities. Questions arose about the full implementation of the idea of peaceful coexistence as the highest universal principle of international relations, and of the corrections this might entail, right up to making changes in the USSR Constitution.

One of the acute issues raised was that of ecological security as one of the main components of overall security and peace.

There were serious disputes over bringing to light and erasing the "blank spots" in history. Voices were raised against "rummaging in the past"—for the sake of concentrating on the problems of today. Others, including myself, came out in favour of a full—without any editing—list of historical facts, which would include our accomplishments as well as failures. This is necessary not only in order to create a complete and truthful picture of history, but also to learn lessons for the future.

During the personality cult and the stagnation period diplomacy, as participants in the conference emphasized, frequently lost touch with its true role and turned into a mouthpiece for propaganda, when in fact, the role of diplomacy is quite a definite one—to serve as an instrument for expanding mutual understanding and reaching accords.

There were discussions regarding the theory and practice of carrying out negotiations. The traditional concept of haggling at negotiations was criticized. This concept provides for the use of several reserve approaches before actually taking that which meets the true national interests; it no longer responds to current needs, and reduces the pace of negotiations. Also mentioned was the need for creating an alternative model for holding negotiations, when the pace of the dialogue would outstrip the speed with which problems pile up, when the point at stake would be not a "gain," but a radical solution to the problem, the attainment of a generally acceptable balance of interests.

Personally I discovered a whole host of ideas at the conference, which, if implemented, will make it possible to impart to diplomacy a new qualitative change.

MN: So, the conference did a great deal for the practical work of diplomats, experts on world affairs. But what about journalists?

V.P.: I think a fair appeal was made to journalists writing on world affairs to be less inhibited, to show people the colour rather than just the black-and-white of our life in a world full of contradictions but, at the same time, integrated. Journalism must also become a source of alternative proposals for foreign policy and a system of early warning about the problems on the horizon.

MN: But quite often a lot depends not on journalists, but on diplomats who keep their secrets under lock and key...

V.P.: The conference demonstrated that diplomats intend to stimulate their contacts with journalists. An Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry has already been set up, a BULLETIN OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY is published twice a month, and regular press briefings are held. Now we're thinking of switching over to a system of daily briefings. We really are opening the doors of our ministry to journalists, and proof of this is this meeting of ours, which you requested only a few hours ago.

MN: How do you see the formation of a constitutionally plenipotentiary mechanism of discussing and adopting crucial foreign policy decisions in the USSR, which Comrade Shevardnadze touched upon in his report?

V.P.: The point is to introduce a legislative procedure under which all departments dealing with the foreign political sphere (including military and military-industrial) would be subordinate to the highest elective body—the USSR Supreme Soviet. It's the Supreme Soviet which must discuss such issues as the use of force outside national territory, plans for defence development and the military budget, attended by the problem of ensuring national security.

MN: Does this mean that we intend to utilize the best features of bourgeois democracy?

V.P.: Why shouldn't we use positive experience? But what we are doing is not a mechanical transfer of foreign experience onto our soil. We're creating our own standard of democracy and glasnost, and outstripping the

West. In what other country are enterprise managers elected? In what other country are ministries and departments obliged to answer to the criticism of newspapers?

MN: Is the West already coming to the conclusion that new political thinking in the Soviet Union is not a mere formula, but an actual change in the basic foundations of the USSR's foreign policy?

V.P.: Our new way of thinking is also confirmed by a new way of action. Proof of this are the signing and ratification of the INF Treaty, the agreement on political settlement in Afghanistan, the recent proposal by the Warsaw Treaty countries on a joint search for the solution to world ecological problems, the Soviet concept of world economic security, the bringing of our domestic legislation into keeping with international law....

All this is a catalyst of the further process of perestroika in the system of international relations. Although it stands to reason that the picture is far from one-sided. The influence of old thinking, with its stereotypically forcible methods of action, is still strong in the behavior of some countries.

Nevertheless, it is being recognized more and more clearly in the West that Soviet foreign policy is a reflection of the radical internal changes in the country which, for the success of perestroika, needs a new kind of peace, characterized not only by an absence of war, but also by the development of a wide network of mutually beneficial cooperation in politics, economics, science and culture.

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Impact of EEC, European Unity Viewed

18120101 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 34,
28 Aug-4 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by Sergey Karaganov; "Europe: Looking into the Future"]

[Text] The year 1992 is the target date for a single market of twelve West European countries, all members of the EEC.

The plans call for a free flow of goods, services, capital, and workers throughout the multi-national market which should boost their economies, science and technology of the individual countries while giving the EEC a firmer hold in the world economy. The view in Western Europe is that one market would also promote the rapidly expanding political cooperation between the major Old World countries.

A single market has its disadvantages, too. Less efficient industries will be driven out of business costing people from all regions and walks of life their jobs. Many aspects of the possible impact of 1992 on the European dozen are not clear. There still isn't any final consensus on whether the single market should be launched in 1992 or some other year. I'm only certain that it will be launched sooner or later.

For those of us in the other part of Europe it is important to know about the impact of the coming integration on the continent, ourselves and the common European home we are offering to build jointly.

Clearly an economically stronger and more united Western Europe would benefit the world climate. A stronger economic base and broader political cooperation would give Western Europe more confidence and independence. The stronger voice of the twelve—if not aimed at promoting the preservation of a militarily, politically and economically divided Europe—would be a stabilizing force in East-West relations.

The 1992 project also makes me worry.

A single EEC market, the spread in Western Europe of shared standards of technology, information and environmental protection could also affect our interests. The

process could deepen the structural differences between the East European and West European economies, hampering future economic relations and the international division of labour on the continent. An expanded EEC market might make member-countries less interested in East European markets. This would eventually erode the powerful economic stimulus to bridge the European military divide.

Even if West European integration isn't consciously aimed at deepening the divide, it could still lead to this. Of course, a further divided Europe would hardly be in the best interests of West Europeans. What can be done today to prevent the deepening of this division?

Despite the current hardships in the Soviet economy, contacts with the EEC market should be strengthened. We should work to firmly establish ourselves there through trade, investments from West European companies in the USSR and investments from Soviet enterprises in EEC countries. It is also important that we vigorously expand relations between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the EEC.

But the main answer to the 1992 challenge is not in the sphere of economics. The integration of Western Europe is yet another argument (if another is needed) for radically reducing the level of military confrontation in the Old World, for building reliable systems of security in Europe, including economic security.

Only the dismantling of the mechanisms of military confrontation could prevent a negative impact on East-West relations given the proposed single 12-country market.

It may seem unjust to expect the Soviet Union's dynamic foreign policy to be even more dynamic and full of initiative. But exploration for new ways to reconcile the existing differences cannot be stopped. The fluid situation in the world means that we cannot afford to relax efforts. One should bear in mind that conservatives—who principally shape the West's approach to disarmament today—don't want disarmament and will hinder it. They are not deterred by the possible widening of the gap between the two parts of Europe as a result of a greater economic division. If anything, it inspires them. Thus the concept of a European home is that much more urgent: it can still be built today.

Bogomolov on Ideological-Political Diversity Under Socialism

18070154 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 12 Jul 88 p 3

[Interview with Academician O. Bogomolov, director of the Institute for the Economics of the World Socialist System Under the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Ongoing Modernization"; interviewer, date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [Question] In recent years, not only in our country but throughout the socialist world, one can clearly note different ideological and political currents. How can one explain such a demarcation and even popularization of positions?

[Answer] I feel that first of all this is due to the establishing of the new thinking in which the concept of the freedom of choice holds the key position. Let us turn to the report of M.S. Gorbachev at the party conference. "We," emphasized the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in speaking about the concept of free choice, "are convinced in the universality of this principle for international relations, where the very survival of civilization has become the main, general universal problem. This concept has been caused by the unprecedented and growing diversity in the world." And further: "We are witness of such a phenomenon as the active involvement in world history of a billion people who for centuries remained outside it...." World socialism, as was pointed out in the report at the conference, is going through a difficult, changing period. Here it is essential to point out that the contradictions in the socialist world are not developing into antagonisms, although some clashes are rather acute. Objectively inherent to a socialist society is a multiplicity of interests. For a long time this pluralism has been ignored or artificially suppressed and now it is emerging on the surface. Obviously, much must be cooked in the kettle of changes.

[Question] The picture of ideological and political life in the socialist countries is becoming very variegated. In some it is difficult to find other viewpoints except the official while in others there is a whole spectrum of positions developing, even up to the point of extreme and breaking with socialism. Is it possible to isolate any basic currents?

[Answer] I assume that one could. I would designate the strongest current as modernizing. It is gaining force, in bringing together those who realize the necessity of a radical restructuring in all social relations, the ascribing of a new quality to socialism, the forming of a new model of it, having rid ourselves of the Stalinist distortions and having restored and developed the Leninist concept of socialism. The supporters of modernization are working to make glasnost, realism and high morality the basis of policy and for each citizen to be a free and active participant in social life. In the modernizing current there are

present, certainly, also shadows of opinions and differences in views from the moderate to the radical. Moreover, in the ideological and political life of the socialist world, one can note a gradual "stirring": the realization is growing that half-measures do not provide the desired results; revolutionary changes are essential. The very logic of the reforms and the struggle for their manifestation will lead to more radical views and programs.

But just as clearly one can also see the trend of preserving and guarding the previously established way of management and life.

In recognizing the necessity of improving socialism and at times even utilizing the phraseology of restructuring, the representatives of this current emphasize the maintaining of succession and the previous order-giving methods of management, albeit in truth, in a slightly embellished form. Here they cling to shabby dogmas and stereotypes and principles, in concealing themselves behind a concern for the purity of Marxism-Leninism. A distinguishing feature of this direction is a reticence to recognize miscalculations, mistakes in theory and policy or to "stir up the past" as they call the restoring of historical truth and elementary justice. There is no doubt that this direction expresses the interests of the bureaucratic apparatus fearful that modernization could assume a revolutionary scope.

In addition to these trends, in the socialist world there is also a number of others which differ in terms of ideological tint: in some ecological concerns prevail and in others it is the defense of law, nationalistic or clerical....

[Question] You always emphasize the diversity of the socialist world and the absence in it of uniformism, national specific features in the ways and forms of socialist construction. At the same time, you rather frequently use the terms Stalinism and Neo-Stalinism, speaking about the ideological and political life outside our country. Is this valid?

[Answer] I speak about Stalinism in addressing the Soviet reader. As sociological research has shown, the idea of many foreign political terms is not clear to us. As for the concept of "Stalinism," the 3 years of glasnost in the USSR have invested it with such a definite political content that the risk of it being misunderstood is minimal.

In the other socialist countries this concept is also employed but with caution: in the first place, without wanting to unnecessarily offend us and secondly, considering their own historical realities. There are "parallel" terms. In Hungary, for example, "sectarian-dogmatic policy." In China they speak and write about "leftist leading ideas," having in mind here not only the blind imitating of Stalinist models but also their own Chinese roots in the distorting of socialism. The terrible excesses of the Cultural Revolution brought the great country "to

the left" of Stalinism and for a decade plunged it into chaos. According to official data, at least 10 million persons were tortured and more than 100 million persons were subjected to political persecution. Chinese comrades themselves define the power of Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four" as a feudal-bourgeois fascist dictatorship.

[Question] In others words, regardless of national particular features, Stalinism to a greater or lesser degree was felt in the ideology and policy of the various parts of the socialist world.

[Answer] In my view, it is correct to speak not only about the single social nature of societies in the socialist countries but also that their organization historically is ascending to a common model formed under the influence of oversimplified theoretical concepts. And these were in part erroneous as seen from today.

At that time, at the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's, in the group of European states and later Asian ones social changes were commencing. The guide for them was the concept of a new society as this prevailed at that time in our country and the 20-year practical experience of the USSR. At that time it was felt that labor in Soviet society had already assumed a directly social nature, commodity-monetary relations were alien to socialism and the national economy should function as a single gigantic plant. The market was restricted and regulated in every possible way, and management was organized not on material interest but rather on commands "from above." As a result, the Center was excessively strengthened while the work style of the economic, state and party apparatus rather quickly was afflicted with the harsh foe of bureaucratism.

With all the national specific features, the economic mechanisms were subordinate to a common inner logic. Similarity was spread also to political structures and culture.... The Stalinist model left its imprint not only on the style of thought and the morality of an entire generation of party-state, economic and military personnel but also on the psychology of the masses.

Stalinism turned out to be vital. This created "a general impression of slowness and resistance on the question of returning to Leninist standards" and "overcoming of the regime of constraint and the suppression of democratic and personal freedoms which had been introduced by Stalin," a phenomenon which P. Togliatti had reflected on its causes in his "Memoir Note."

[Question] In one of your last works you wrote that in our days there is a collective search underway for a new model of socialism which corresponds to the modern age with its revolutionary changes in technology, culture and the level of information among the people. This is a search along

the lines of new thinking, democracy and the necessity of a new level of international contact. However, in our nation the concept of a "model of socialism" seems odious to many....

[Answer] The time is still fresh in our memory when the use of this "seditious" phrase was branded as revisionism.... Those who think this way are the prisoner of inertia or do not fully understand what is had in mind.

There was a time that bourgeois political scientists widely used the idea of "national models of socialism" or "national communisms" in order to discredit the assertion of the universality of certain traits of USSR experience. The political sense of such appeals was completely obvious. This was subjected to sharp criticism and since then there has been a steadfast prejudice against the very concept of a "model" as it supposedly has been "taken" by bourgeois ideology.

However, the wave of unmasking the idea of "national models" has run to the other extreme and has led to an outright apology for the experience of the USSR. It became irrelevant and, in addition, ideologically and politically harmful. As our country sank into stagnation, there was a distorting of many socialist principles and values and the gap between the desired and the actual was widened. Moreover, the debate dating back to the 1920's over the question of "national models" was marked by speculativeness. It passed over in silence many "unpleasant" facts from the history of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies at the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's. How could there not be a mechanical copying of Soviet experience when along with the actually positive they were also given our mistakes and distortions of socialism. The lamentable result of this campaign was suspicion in terms of the attempts by scientists from the fraternal countries to examine the specific national features in socialist construction. There were ever-fewer persons who sought to study this complicated and necessary problem.

In setting out on revolutionary restructuring, the CPSU leadership has stated clearly and unambiguously that each communist party bears full responsibility for its policy before its own people, not one of them, including our own, can claim the possession of absolute truth. The USSR is not imposing its policy on anyone. On the contrary, we are endeavoring to employ the successful findings from the practice of other socialist countries. And their public, in turn, is following the changes in the Soviet Union with vital interest. The times are passed when you were branded as degenerate for deviating from the Soviet model.

[Question] For a long time it was felt that only one model of socialism could exist, for it has one nature as an integral and united social organism. You have asserted that the main traits of the new society have not only been anticipated logically but also confirmed by life.

Does it not seem to you that the construction of socialism in accord with theoretically-set rigid model concepts could be fraught with severe consequences? For instance, technocracy and voluntarism. Certainly, the arbitrary advancing of goals "from above" inevitably leaves its impression on policy. Propaganda degenerates into moralizing or, even worse, into the manipulating of human conscience while social sciences become doctrinairism.

[Answer] I agree. The attempts to anticipate life in all its details are fraught with many dangers. The ossified notions of the new system and various prejudices are certainly the result of such theoretical dictating of terms. To follow again the path of working out detailed ideas about the future—would this not mean to preprogram obstacles for future generations? It would be much more reasonable to seek out guidelines in generalizing actual practice and the lessons of the past. Then the model of socialism would be mobile and open for everything new. Only the "bearing supports" should be unshakable: the overcoming of man's alienation from the means of production and power, the management of society in accord with the interests of the workers and with their direct involvement, social and national justice and the cultivating of the creative forces of the individual. We do not need social utopias, pointed out M.S. Gorbachev in his report at the party conference, but rather clear guidelines and objective criteria for socialism in all stages of the changes in order to clearly see the trends (emphasis mine—O.B.) in social development in order that routine and sham did not sweep all before them as they did in the past. The current course of the CPSU and the restructuring confirm the vitality of Marxist-Leninist teachings which scientifically established the possibility of constructing a society of social justice and a civilization of free and equal people. Marxism-Leninism remains the method of activity for the ruling party and state. I feel that the sense of the slogan "More Socialism!" consists precisely in the practical realization of these ideas.

[Question] Do you share the viewpoint voiced recently in official documents of the Bulgarian Communist Party that the possibility of the previous model of socialism have been exhausted in many countries?

[Answer] Lit. has shown that the existing mechanisms for managing social production have not proven to be sufficiently effective and receptive to the demands of developing modern productive forces. At the end of the 1970's, a majority of the socialist countries encountered serious economic difficulties. But it was not merely a question of economics. On the basis of the previous model it had not been possible to establish a system of self-regulation and self-improvement of the socialist society. Hence, the exacerbation of contradictions which even developed into outright crises. But previously difficult situations arose sporadically, at one time in one and then another state; in recent years, virtually all of them have been confronted with complex economic and social problems.

At the start of the current five-year plan, steps were taken to change the dead-end trend and accelerate development, having strengthened labor discipline, having gotten rid of certain "bottlenecks" in the economy and so forth.

Seemingly in 1985-1986 we had succeeded in achieving the desired effect, but then the economic indicators again deteriorated. Here is what statistics shows on this score. In 1981-1985, the annual increase in the national income of the CEMA member countries averaged 3.3 percent and in 1986, this indicator rose to 4.2 percent in order to drop in the following year to 2.8 percent. And this indicator is not free of the influence of inflationary price increases in a number of countries. This already unfavorable process is occurring against a background of increased external debt for a majority of the listed countries. This means that the economic difficulties are not accidental. The countries have entered a transitional period when it is essential to seek out new solutions although this task has not been recognized equally in all places or carried out consistently. Here a great deal depends upon the specific conditions, the past experience and the burden of piling-up problems.

[Question] Conflict situations and crises have erupted in the development of the socialist world, as is known, since the 1950's. How do you explain this?

[Answer] The previous concepts and practice of socialism contained a number of over-simplified and incorrect notions. For example, the role of the market, the relationship of democracy and centralism, the importance of cooperative property, the role of the individual and his interests. The link between the authorities and the masses was broken and the required glasnost was lacking... It is impossible to justify these erroneous notions by a lack of experience and knowledge. Even during the war years, certain leaders of the fraternal parties even in emigration were in favor of the co-existence in the economy of three sectors: state, cooperative and private. They put forward new ideas on the political organization of society. At one time these were even carried out, but in 1948, after the rupture of relations with Yugoslavia, they were viewed as a manifestation of nationalism and rightist deviation.

[Question] For a long time, the "optimistic" view has been supported that the crisis is a one-time phenomenon, an accidental failure and the result of unforgivable mistakes by one or another leader. The acuteness of contradictions and conflicts was also ascribed to acute class struggle, the influence of imperialist propaganda and other external factors. Of course, these cannot be completely ignored. But the raising of them to an absolute does not obviate the fact that there is a need for an early warning system of tension growing in society. The Polish sociologist E. Wiatr has christened such a system the "Cassandra seismographs"....

[Answer] Yes, and also because in a number of the socialist countries, the search for a way out of precrisis situations has commenced, as a rule, with great tardiness when the carrying out of reform was now much more complicated. Painful situations arose which the conservative forces endeavored and do endeavor to blame on restructuring.

The search for a new model of socialism in our times is a search for the ways for progress. This has not only commenced but has assumed an international character. One can say beforehand that it will be complicated and

protracted. It will scarcely be possible to avoid mistakes and individual extremes. The new solutions must be immediately tested and retested in practice. For this reason it is so important that the view become established in society that reform is an ongoing process of the self-renewal of society in which the new struggle against the old. This is a view of socialism as an open system, open to everything new and ready for constant creative search.

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Vladivostok Initiatives Evaluated

18070165a Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN
in Russian No 7, Jul 88 pp 140-155

[Roundtable discussion: "The Vladivostok Initiatives:
Two Years On"]

[Text] *Attention to the problems of the Asia-Pacific Region in our country is not idle. We have an enormous but not fully recognized national interest in its boundless reaches. Meanwhile, for many decades perhaps without wanting to we have been standing at positions of Eurocentrism and Americanism, and have looked at the Asia-Pacific region—that dynamic and rapidly developing region of the world—only from case to case.*

Things started to change following the promulgation in July 1986 by the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary of the Vladivostok program, which formulated new and creative approaches for the Soviet Union toward the Asia-Pacific region. However, both the nature of these changes and even more the scale of them could scarcely be called satisfactory.

Why?

This question was dealt with at a regular meeting at the MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN Guest House between Soviet diplomats and scholars. The following attended that meeting:

From the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

I.A. Rogachev, deputy minister; L.A. Chizhov, chief of the Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asian Countries Department; A.I. Fialkovskiy, chief of the South Asian Department; V.P. Lukin, deputy chief of the Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asian Department, doctor of economic sciences, professor; V.M. Kulagin, deputy chief of the Scientific Coordination Center.

From the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of U.S.A. and Canada:

G.A. Trofimenko, department chief, doctor of historical sciences, professor; B.N. Zanegin, leading scientific associate, doctor of historical sciences; A.A. Nagornyy, senior scientific associate, candidate of historical sciences; M.G. Nosov, sector chief, candidate of historical sciences.

From the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations:

V.I. Ivanov, department chief, candidate of economic sciences; V.K. Zaytsev, department chief, candidate of economic sciences.

From the USSR Academy of Sciences Institut of Oriental Studies:

K.O. Sarkisov, department chief, candidate of historical sciences; A.I. Chicherov, department chief, doctor of historical sciences, professor.

From the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Far East:

D.V. Petrov, department chief, doctor of historical sciences, professor.

From the USSR Academy of Sciences Far East Department Institute of Economic Studies (Khabarovsk):

Ye.B. Kovrigin, sector chief, candidate of historical sciences; P.A. Minakir, deputy director, doctor of economic sciences; V.G. Smolyak, department chief, candidate of economic sciences.

From the USSR Academy of Sciences Far East Department Institute of Economic and International Problems of Exploitation of the Oceans (Vladivostok):

N.N. Gagarov, department chief, candidate of juridical sciences.

From the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission Scientific Research Institute of Foreign Economic Ties:

M.A. Khaldin, department chief, doctor of economic sciences, professor.

MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN. Habits and stereotypes in politics, and even more in political thinking, are especially persistent. It seems to us that in the broad, mass perception and consciousness the dominant views and approaches to the problems in the Asia-Pacific region are those based on experiences that we have acquired in European and U.S.-Soviet affairs. There is no doubt that there are indeed some common problems and correspondingly some common approaches. However, it seems that there are more differences than similarities. Is this so?

A. Fialkovskiy. Like any other region in the world the vast Asia-Pacific region has its own distinguishing features and peculiarities. In my opinion, one of them is the relative separateness of the individual subregions in the Asia-Pacific region (determined not only by the vastness of the territory but also historical circumstances). This distinguishes it significantly from for example, "compact" Europe. It should also be borne in mind that whereas on the European continent we are in fact dealing with a bipolar system, in the Asia-Pacific region it is polycentrism. It seems that this all determines, or at any rate justifies the kind of approach to the problem of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region in which, along with comprehensive and universal measures, it makes sense to engage in purposeful actions

applied to individual subregions. In other words, in parallel with the search for broad approaches to the establishment of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region it is necessary to seek to ease individual centers of tension in this extensive region of the world.

It is obvious that it would be premature to assert that the Asia-Pacific region has already occupied the place it should in Soviet foreign policy. A turn toward the Asia-Pacific region has undoubtedly been initiated. But this is manifestly not enough. In our foreign policy work we unfortunately still have not overcome the practice of regarding Asia as a secondary sphere for the application of effort, compared with our priority interests westward.

M. Nosov. I, and if I am not mistaken, everyone gathered here has an interest in and is concerned about the question of why is there a certain amount of skidding in the realization of well-known Soviet initiatives with regard to the Asia-Pacific region despite the fact that definite shifts have taken place in the development of bilateral relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. We are advancing a set of fine initiatives. But are we setting forth clearly enough what it is we want and what the aims of our foreign policy are? We are well aware of what needs to be done but we evidently do not quite know how to do it. No matter what our successes in Europe and in relations between the USSR and the United States, we shall not maintain a balanced policy without successes and moves in the Asia-Pacific region.

Apart from anything else this assumes that we must formulate our military doctrine in the Asia-Pacific region more precisely. There should be a certain glasnost in military affairs. Sources in the West assert that our military potential on the Kurile Islands is being built up. For some reason, however, we are not saying that this need not be linked to Japanese statements on their intention to blockade and mine the straits around the Japanese islands, "hem in the Soviet navy," and so forth. If we tell the Japanese side that our actions are a response to their actions then this will be understandable to the Japanese man in the street, who has become accustomed to the "intrigues of the Soviet Union" in everything. If we want to break down the stereotype that has been created in Japan of us as "the enemy" we must talk more candidly and directly about what is happening in military policy.

G. Trofimenko. In my view, the difficulties in realizing the concept of Asian security have really come about largely because we have transferred the European scheme to Asia. While transferring the concept of European security to Asia we have not given due consideration to the fact that even as applied to Europe this concept is inadequately developed. And in Asia the situation is more complex. In Asia there is no clear-cut confrontation between two blocs. The Americans devise their own bipolar scheme and we do likewise. In Asia there is multipolarity. Is a security system possible in such a colossal region whose boundaries it is difficult to

define? The boundaries of the region can be defined in different ways: South Asia can be included or excluded. However, despite the fact that it is very attractive rhetorically, a general scheme for Asian security is not taking shape. Of course, confidence-building measures and measures to guarantee the safety of marine navigation are important and efforts must be made to realize them. At the same time, either bilateral relations or mutual relations with regional organizations that promise more and have greater prospects than attempts to create an enormous Pacific scheme are more effective on the general Asian scale.

MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN. In the public awareness, not only in particular strata of our country's population but even more abroad, the conviction prevails that our country's positions in the Asia-Pacific region are quite weak and based exclusively on Soviet military might. Accordingly, it is reckoned that no rapid and fundamental change in the situation in a direction favorable for us will occur. In the broader perspective of the development of cooperation and the expansion of ties with countries in that region, factors of military might play an extremely specific and limited role. It is a question of augmenting, or rather replacing, the factor of military might with factors of an economic, cultural, scientific and technical and other nature.

V. Lukin. The question is quite proper and it must be resolved. First of all I think that it is important to determine what must be done to include the range of military-political problems of the Asia-Pacific region in the structure of perestroika, the structure of democratization of our entire public life, and the structure that will define our life over the long term. What will be the place and proportion of the military-political factor in our influence in the region and what will the evolution be on this plane? These are perhaps the key questions that are being considered by everyone working in this field. Analysis of these questions is extremely, extremely difficult, mainly because we still do not have objective data and do not know specifically what the real situation is.

Our opponents, however, assert that they have at their disposal specific and serious data on matters concerning the military-political balance of forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Here they are relying on an extensive literature and statistics where, as they emphasize, the balance of forces is presented with a high level of accuracy. But we do not have this kind of opportunity and therefore our work in this direction is seriously hampered.

I would like to make one other remark in this connection. In the perception of the Soviet Union and our positions and intentions, there is a certain dark sphere in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, a sphere of uncertainty, guessing and assumptions. It is born out of our traditional dread of clear-cut, specific information and it leads to a situation in which we seem somehow secretive, unreliable and dangerous people. And I would say that our highly significant secretiveness with regard

to the situation in the Asia-Pacific region now seems particularly strange against a backdrop on which we have proposed to make available the maps in Europe and are insistently suggesting to the Americans that we exchange basic data on our armed forces on a mutual basis. And if we delay much longer in the Asia-Pacific region then the impression may be created that despite the Vladivostok program we nevertheless regard the Asia-Pacific region as secondary and unworthy of our constant and active attention. I think that this question must be approached very seriously.

For quite a long time we have looked at the Asia-Pacific region not very favorably. The Soviet Union has been perceived as a country with very great and very serious military potential and very limited economic potential. And if this situation is true for our global image, then in the Asia-Pacific region this contrast is an order of magnitude greater. Economic development in the Far East economic region and our ties with the Asia-Pacific region in various spheres and the level and quality of life for our people is far from what has been achieved in the European regions of our country. And against this backdrop our military potential seems particularly noticeable.

In recent years the problem of using military levers to influence the political situation in the world has been raised very acutely. Let me just list the main milestones in the buildup of this problem: Vietnam, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and finally the Persian Gulf. I have the impression that after the departure of R. Reagan, the next administration will have a certain "allergy" following the "euphoria" based on the conviction that the U.S. Navy can be an effective means for resolving political problems. The present situation in the Persian Gulf is obviously giving rise to a situation in which serious doubts may arise in America regarding whether everything that is happening in the Persian Gulf is worth the assets being spent to maintain an enormous navy there and will lead to the desired political effect. No effect can be seen yet. And the Persian Gulf is only a link on the long road of discrediting military levers to influence a political situation under the conditions of an interlinked world. Military methods and military levers have been, are, and will be a major factor of national power. But their influence declines in an interdependent world, first and foremost because of the increasing importance of economic and other non-military levers.

Of course, our security cannot be placed in question. However, when talking about the weight of our military factor in the Asia-Pacific region it should be remembered that it was created at the turn of the Sixties and Seventies proceeding from the prerequisite of worst-case scenarios stemming from the situation during that period. Now the version of the coalition of "everyone against us" seems unrealistic for the foreseeable future. And how does this viewpoint jibe with a reasonable military adequacy as applied to the Asia-Pacific region? Are there reserves for enhancing our economic and other

influence in the region through a partial reduction in military influence? These questions demand a specific and clear-cut response for it is on them that the possibility of moving rapidly ahead in the economic and social development of the Soviet Far East depends.

When defining reasonable balance between economic and social development on the one hand, and our military factor, on the other, the program of openness and human mobility in the Pacific regions of our country plays an enormous role. Two years ago it was stated in a speech by the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary that in the event of improvement in the situation in the world and the region, specific steps would be taken to open up Vladivostok. The time for concrete decisions in this direction is now. Interesting proposals exist concerning the creation of special economic zones close to the border regions. They include a whole series of issues: expanding contacts between people and their freedom of movement, and considerable activation of ties with countries of the Asia-Pacific region by sea and air.

In order for the economy really to grow and gain in strength its development must be on a modern, interdependent level. It is naive to suggest that it can be developed on the principle of enclosed enclaves. Our interdependent world excludes this. We have created a solid fence on our far eastern borders. But our house there is not in order. Much is needed in order to bring it into good order. Inter alia, it is essential to make the fence impenetrable only for those who are really trying to encroach on our house. For the rest the road to us and staying with us should be open, simple and easy. Defense interests must be considered henceforth also, but mobility in the movement of people and comradely contacts between the Soviet Far East and the countries of the Asia-Pacific region must be absolutely increased. Things now are sometimes absurd. Thus, in order to visit neighboring Japan, workers from the USSR Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Department must first journey to Moscow to arrange their travel documents. The return home must be via Moscow. This can hardly assure people that we have a sound mind. But that is how it is. It is essential to review such matters.

V. Kulagin. The military aspect of our presence in the Asia-Pacific region is limited mainly to naval forces. Therefore it is quite natural that at the Soviet-U.S. negotiations our side has raised the question of naval arms. It has been proposed that a special conference be held on naval forces, and a special session of the Security Council. Thus, under present conditions and at the present stage of negotiations to limit and reduce the entire complex of arms, the problem of naval arms is being given priority.

The Soviet Union has put forward a number of initiatives to limit and reduce naval activity in the Asia-Pacific region. Obviously it is essential to regard the naval aspects of disarmament in that region from the standpoint of the progress in our initiatives in other

regions. Much that is useful can be taken from work on our initiative in the region of North Europe where our proposals were more developed, more detailed and more specific.

D. Petrov. Among the problems that we are dealing with in the Asia-Pacific region I would number among the priority ones the serious gap between our very high level of openness in the foreign policy field and the lack of glasnost in the military field. We must understand that we shall make no advances in the political field if we fail to guarantee a certain level of openness in the military field. All of our latest successes have been associated with advances in this direction. This applies to medium-range and shorter-range missiles, chemical weapons, and on-site inspections. And things have moved ahead. Otherwise they cannot. Obviously, the same can be done with respect to the Asia-Pacific region.

Today there are three main difficulties in relations with Japan. At the bilateral level there is the so-called "territorial problem." At the regional level it is the "threat from the Soviet Union," as it is called. At the global level the problem is associated with the Japanese-U.S. alliance. In relations with the United States there is some movement, but in relations with Japan we are still in the same place. What is needed is action. It is essential to wash away this "image of the enemy" that has penetrated quite deeply into the consciousness of the Japanese. Opportunities do exist for this. If we look at the public opinion polls we see that the overwhelming majority of Japanese say, yes, there is a threat from the Soviet Union but the USSR is not about to attack Japan. Pacifist attitudes run very deep in Japan. Due consideration should be given to this.

The question of the militarization of Japan. Our task is to prevent progress and development in this process. How can this be done? I would like to offer several suggestions, proceeding from the real situation that has taken shape. For example, why not study the question of the possibility of declaring unilaterally our steps in the field of military activity in the region? If we return to the question of confidence-building measures, why not propose to Japan (and possibly also the United States) that it examine some of our proposals? Both the old ones and the new ones. It must be said that some movement can be observed in the American position. In particular, last year our institute held a symposium with scholars from Stanford University. As a result it was possible to sign a document entitled "A Program for Strengthening Security and Reducing the Risk of War in the Asia-Pacific Region."

MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN. The opinion is often expressed that without the United States and without its participation it is impossible to resolve the problem of security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region in a way that is satisfactory for everyone. Up to

now, judging from everything, Washington is not showing enough readiness even to think about serious dialogue on the Pacific question. What are the conclusions and decisions in this connection?

B. Zanegin. Let me try to define some of the features of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and offer my ideas on how these features should be considered in our foreign policy activity.

Let me start by reminding everyone of a well-known reality: the United States occupies a special place in the region. No matter what Japanese experts or Americans journalists may say, in terms of its force economic and military parameters the United States far exceeds any country in the Asia-Pacific region, and this exerts a practical effect on U.S. political influence in the region. This statement of the reality means that the fate or success of any major initiative in the field of security and cooperation depends ultimately on the position taken by Washington. In my opinion this is axiomatic and does not need discussion. Second, the following circumstance also cannot fail to draw the attention: during the last decades the U.S. interest in the region has been growing steadily. American strategy here has acquired a firm, active and emphatically aggressive nature. Everyone knows, including American sources, of a whole series of major, long-term strategic decisions made by the United States: the reorganization of U.S. military forces in the region and their quantitative increase, equipping a Pacific bridgehead, creation of an infrastructure for waging nuclear war, and so forth.

I would like to touch on yet another aspect of U.S. foreign policy strategy to which until recently inadequate attention was being paid. What I have in mind is the different direction and different degree in the dynamics of U.S. foreign policy in Europe and in the Pacific. In Europe the United States is participating in collective measures to reduce the level of confrontation. In the Pacific it is quite clear that an extensive American program is being implemented to strengthen and expand military bases, and that a strategy of confrontation is being pursued. The impression is created that in the Asia-Pacific region the United States is, as it were, compensating for its losses in confrontation strategy that have resulted from U.S. participation in the process of reducing tension and confrontation in Europe. It is precisely this that also determines the importance of the Pacific region for the United States, and, as a consequence, the United States' lack of receptivity to Soviet initiatives.

It seems to me that even in a favorable combination of circumstances the process of reducing confrontation and demilitarization in the Asia-Pacific region will proceed slowly. The Soviet Union must act in an unfavorable foreign policy environment, overcoming the resistance of the United States and of the forces that support the American policy of confrontation.

MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN. During the past 3 years the Soviet Union's diplomatic activity in the Asia-Pacific region has noticeably increased: what we have in mind is the visits of Soviet leaders to countries in the region and return visits by the leaders of those countries to our country. As they say, the change has been noticeable. The following question arises: is this process not being developed too slowly? Are our steps in this direction not too modest? For the potential for developing our relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region is immeasurably greater than the way it is being expressed in our practical actions.

A. Chicherov. Why is it difficult to move to a resolution of the problem of security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region? To no small extent because it is a complicated matter to transplant the main patterns of cooperation that we have developed in Europe to Asian soil. It is absolutely different. Hence many of our difficulties. The very structure of international relations in Asia is changeable and unstable, which it is not in Europe. There, we can clearly see our allies, and the forces that oppose us. In Asia we have a qualitatively different situation. In the Asian countries—and this can also be seen within the framework of the Nonaligned Movement—a critical attitude is widespread with regard to the "two superpowers" policy, even though this formula is also unacceptable to us. To this we must add the growing nationalism in Asia.

A few words about the practical realization of general Asian security. In my view, it is extraordinarily complicated to solve general Asian tasks all at once. Obviously a start must be made with bilateral, regional agreements. Following the agreements in Washington we should perhaps be thinking about a return to the Soviet-U.S. talks on limiting the military presence of the Soviet Union and United States in the Indian Ocean. There are indications that the steps that we have taken in Europe, where we find an opportunity to hold talks with the United States and reach compromises, are regarded by certain circles in Asia as a prelude to the USSR and United States reaching some agreement behind the backs of the Asians, taking into account only their own great-power interests. This must be convincingly refuted. In this connection it is important to think about how in one form or another to include the developing countries of the region in possible talks to limit the military presence of the United States and the USSR in the Indian Ocean.

K. Sarkisov. How should we advance the idea of Asian security? It may be possible to criticize what we are doing. But I think that we must nevertheless do whatever is needed to move things in the right direction.

Let us consider the main factors.

The economic factor. I doubt that we shall be able to achieve much in the immediate future on the plane of our participation in the economic life of the Asia-Pacific region. Even though our economic participation in the regional structure that is taking shape there is extraordinarily important.

The political factor. Paradoxical though it may be, there is a stereotype of thinking that in the Asia-Pacific region, we are as weak politically as we are economically. But I think that it is precisely in the political sphere that the main opportunities lie for movement, for example, in our relations with Japan. What is primarily needed for this is to conceive a clear and precise concept from which it would be understood what we want in our relations with it. To outline short-term, medium-term and long-term prospects. But it is not essential to lock ourselves in this scheme. It is essential to proceed from the premise that it can be changed, and to be ready for those changes. The concept itself should be worked out primarily on the basis of a review of our stereotypes with regard to Japan.

We must take inventory and see what works and what does not. And in my opinion, there is much that does not work. The viewpoint that Japan as it is, and the dynamic of its development as it is will be the same for that country for 5 or 10 years does not work. We have already missed the moment when the Japanese moved into second place in the world, overtaking us in terms of economic potential.

In principle our position with respect to the Japanese-U.S. military-political alliance is outdated. This alliance is aggressive and is directed against us. It intensifies elements of confrontation in the region. But our attitude toward it, formulated in the Sixties, is obsolete and is not in line with present-day political realities.

And finally, the psychological factor. We can benefit where there is no particular need to expend anything. I have in mind the style and form of diplomatic dealings with the Japanese. I often meet and talk with them. I have the impression that what confuses them most of all is the form in which our position is set forth, how we behave with our partner in negotiations. Here, in my view, there are many opportunities for achieving major changes for the better.

L. Chizhov. If I have understood it correctly, some statements have contained suggestions indicating that we have no concept for an Asian-Pacific policy and that we must make haste to work one out.

Permit me to disagree with this opinion. If we take everything that was said in the Vladivostok speech and in the interview in the newspaper MERDEKA during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to India, there is every justification for asserting that we have a well developed and in-depth concept for our Asian-Pacific policy. Moreover, it is obviously possible to say that it has been worked out more carefully and comprehensively than for any other region in the world, with perhaps the exception of Europe. But of course, I fully agree that it is necessary to work on the further development and deepening of this concept and to fill it with specific substance.

The opinion has also been expressed that the proposals put forward by our side on questions of security in the Asia-Pacific direction have not been adopted in the region and essentially they offer no benefit for us. I cannot agree with this either. I can state with a proper sense of responsibility that over the last 18 months a change for the better can be clearly traced in the attitudes of the countries in the region toward the Soviet Union and our foreign policy. A trend toward switching from the attitude of "keeping them at arms length" to closer relations can be discerned quite clearly with many countries. This is the concrete result of the effect of our concept of Asian-Pacific policy. Of course, no radical crossroad has yet been reached. I would compare the situation to a flywheel that has just started to pick up speed. It seems that the task now is to seek out ways that would impart even greater speed to this flywheel.

And there is one more problem. I am a Nipponese scholar and I cannot let pass questions concerning our relations with Japan. I do not know what impression other comrades have, but in my opinion Japan's place in our policy can be seen quite clearly. I can say quite definitely that on our side there is a firm understanding that relations with Japan are of great importance for us and that we must make every effort to establish with this country good, and if possible, truly good-neighborly relations. But, as they say in the East, one cannot clap with only one hand. The status of Soviet-Japanese relations depends equally on the Japanese side and on the Soviet Union.

MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN. Notwithstanding, is not the impression being created that both in general state approaches and in specific foreign policy steps we are not paying proper attention to economic, military-political and geostrategic factors in the region, which is becoming an increasingly influential force in the entire system of international relations on the threshold of the new millennium? What is needed to increase our potential in developing relations with the Asia-Pacific region?

V. Ivanov. We must recognize honestly that our presence in the region is insignificant and in recent years has declined even more, not only relatively against the backdrop of rapid growth in the foreign economic ties of Japan, China, South Korea and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, but also in absolute terms. In particular, this trend has continued even over the past 2 years. It seems to me that the reason for this should be sought first and foremost in the fact that our foreign trade is oriented on the notorious barter. The activity of our ministries and departments has been directed toward this as they placed the emphasis on exporting raw materials from the Far East as if from a quarry or a large aquarium.

The level of the orientation of the Soviet Union's foreign trade on the Pacific region, including China and other socialist countries, is about 8 percent of all foreign trade turnover, 9 percent of exports and 8 percent of imports.

For most countries in the region, including our neighbors, this percentage varies between 50 percent, as for the United States, Canada and Japan, to 80 percent for South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, the ASEAN countries and certain other countries. Our main trading and economic partners are socialist states in the region, to which we annually export goods worth R4 billion to R5 billion, and have imports of R2 billion.

If we take the capitalist countries, excluding the United States and Canada, which are our trading partners mainly from across the Atlantic, our total exports amount to about R1 billion, while imports total R3 billion. Thus, each year our debt increases by another R2 billion and unresolved issues deepen. Moreover, there is no basis for asserting that the billions that are spent in convertible currency are being used according to some well-considered plan.

A very serious problem is arising. Our political initiatives rest on very weak economic positions in the region.

At the same time, in order to strengthen our economic positions it is necessary to develop the economy of our Far East not only to build up our export opportunities and enhance our export potential. Ultimately foreign economic ties are the natural continuation of economic development. If we regard them as something self-sufficing we shall not resolve foreign and domestic problems. In a given period foreign economic ties must be considered on the consumer plane in order to resolve our domestic problems.

We must distinguish between security questions—for today and tomorrow—and the country's geopolitical interests. And the country's geopolitical interests demand primarily openness. Without this there is not and cannot be any question of developing the economy and foreign economic ties and using foreign economic factors to resolve our urgent problems, which in the Far East are much more acute than for the country as a whole. Speaking in Vladivostok, M.S. Gorbachev said the following: "By tradition the Far East is called the outpost of the country in the Pacific. This is undoubtedly true. But today this view can no longer be considered adequate. The maritime region and the Far East must be transformed into a highly developed national economic complex."

If we talk about foreign economic ties we must seek out new forms, new ways to establish these ties with the region. I think that we must talk about participation by foreign firms in improving our littoral infrastructure. We can also talk about containerization, not only for export and import cargoes but also in general in the sense of introducing modern forms into our transport communication; which would improve labor productivity and reduce pressure on available resources. We can talk about the tourist industry. This is exactly the field that is capable of providing the greatest return in the shortest time if it is treated appropriately. It is even possible to

talk about using sport fishing. In Canada, for example, licenses for salmon fishing cost \$150 while a salmon itself is worth \$6 or \$7. These are the resources that must be used and brought into circulation.

The Far East as the most enormous and remote region of the Soviet Union can and must become a zone for joint-venture entrepreneurial activity on more favorable conditions, according to clear-cut, well-considered directions with properly assigned priorities.

And the last thing that I would like to say is that it is essential to create a political-administrative mechanism specially for the Far East, and this mechanism should be the motive force in all the transformations that must be made there. The search for such a mechanism must become one of the avenues of activity for our scientific and practical organizations. It is also necessary to think about how to eliminate interdepartmentalism. And this is possible only on condition that there are no rigid inter-kray and inter-oblast barriers. There will be one master and a unified strategy, policy and so forth.

It is essential to solve the problem of manpower shortages in the Far East. It must be given priority in training for specialist at VUZ's, and also on the plane of sending experts abroad to gain the necessary experience, study languages and understand how and where it is possible to develop joint-venture entrepreneurial activity and other forms of cooperation.

V. Zaytsev. The stagnation in Soviet-Japanese relations can be seen noticeably against the backdrop of the recent improvement in our relations with the United States and West Europe and the progressive dynamics of our relations with China. In fact, a serious anomaly has taken shape that is not only affecting our bilateral relations but, in my view, also the clearly expressed geopolitical aspect.

I would like to talk about the economic components of this process, which is acquiring increasing significance. M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok gave rise to hopes in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan, that our concept of participation in integration processes in the region will soon be published. But from the events of the past 2 years these expectations have to some extent faded and left a residue of perplexity: what indeed does the USSR want to do on the economic plane in the Asia-Pacific region?

Japan is a Pacific power and the only world economic power that was formed in the 20th century and is of not only regional but also world importance. Let me cite some figures. Japan's share in the world gross national product is 12 percent; according to the predictions, by the year 2000 it will be about 14 percent to 17 percent. Japan's role as world creditor has noticeably grown. Japanese banks now account for 25 percent of the developing countries' debts. From this the conclusion is obvious: the economic decisions that Japan is now

making are affecting the entire world situation and leading to the transformation of the economic structure in other countries. One sphere of special interest for Japan is the Asia-Pacific region, and it can be asserted with boldness that political confidence in Japan in that region will grow in step with how that country creates a Pacific market there comparable to the American and West European markets.

On this plane the creation in our Far East of a national economic complex that would be an organic part of the world and regional division of labor is not only of great importance for the Soviet Union but also acquires a geopolitical aspect. At the same time the status of Soviet-Japanese economic relations gives cause for alarm. Since the latter half of the Seventies they have been in a state of crisis. Negative trends are growing. All the diversity of forms for foreign economic ties are in practice being reduced here to simple barter, which has exhausted its potential. New forms of foreign economic ties such as joint-venture initiatives, mixed companies, the exchange of services, currency-and-credit relations, and scientific and technical links are virtually absent.

What is holding back the development of the Far East's export potential? First, the rigid system of regulations [rezhimnost]. Second, the centralized nature of economic decisionmaking. Third, departmentalism. Fourth, manpower shortages.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize that the time factor plays a very large role. Decisions that will be made today will start to have their effect in the next century. It is therefore essential to jump on the train, which is rapidly gaining speed.

A. Nagornyy. To a significant degree our problems stem from the fact that the Pacific expanses of our territory have not been developed. The longer we put off our decisions the more difficult it will be to catch up because dynamic countries—Japan and China—are developing right there alongside us. Now the question is being put this way: either we make fundamental, structural decisions, and then our ship will start to move ahead, or we shall as previously move along the path of slow growth.

What do I have in mind? What is not needed is a domestic economic policy that is oriented not on additional capital investments, but a policy that will be oriented on new forms of economic activity. This is connected with the shaping of a consistent demographic policy that would stimulate migration to the Far East. If a person coming to the Far East will have an opportunity to develop his own economic energy he will remain there. And this kind of incentive does not require gigantic capital investments.

Correspondingly, a foreign economic entry into the Pacific market will also be guaranteed if "doors are opened" and the hands of enterprises, individual people and cooperatives are untied.

It is essential to move along the road of creating in the Far East not only autonomy in decisionmaking but also autonomy in the economic and political mechanism, which would operate in a situation according to its own socioeconomic indicators more favorable for the population than in the European part of the territory. It is essential to think about a new economic, social and political climate that should be created within the framework of expanded autonomy for the Far East.

I would like to refer to a conversation that I had with an American political figure. Describing the position of the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region he asserted that time is not on the side of the USSR in the Asia-Pacific region and that in the future this will become increasingly apparent. In his words, the United States will act in every possible way to insure that the Soviet Union "will in the future remain increasingly in political and economic isolation in the Asia-Pacific region." For the United States, he noted, the most troublesome thing would be that the Soviet Union would suffuse its own Far East region very quickly demographically and economically and become an integral part of the Asian-Pacific division of labor. Herein lies one of the reasons, *inter alia*, why the United States is trying to push us to build up our military presence in the Far East. It reckons that this will prevent economic development in our Far East regions.

MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN. The comprehensive program for the development of the region has as its goal the creation in the Soviet Far East of a highly efficient national economic complex, with its own major resources and scientific and production base, an optimal economic structure and a developed social sphere, that is an organic part of the system of the all-union and international division of labor. How are the outlined goals being reached in a practical way and that problems still remain unresolved?

P. Minakir. Today the long-term state program for the economic and social development of the Far East economic region, Buryat and Chita Oblast through the year 2000, which was approved in 1987, is already being realized. The program sets the task of achieving integration of the region in the system of the international division of labor in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time it does not envisage qualitative changes in the structure of the economic potential of the Far East. This means that as before the emphasis is being placed on primary raw materials (raw materials of not very high quality) with an extremely slight nod in the direction of deepening processing of some kinds of raw materials, in particular, timber. If this trend is continued then beyond the year 2000 we shall find ourselves economically isolated and shall be able to hope only on some kind of sporadic contacts and attachment to individual markets.

In order to find a fundamental resolution it is essential to implement a set of measures whose ultimate aim is to create a structure for the economic potential of the Far

East with the emphasis on the creation of a high-technology type of reproduction. In addition, it is essential to insure the region's inclusion in the international division of labor, mainly along the line of so-called "soft" goods and indirect exports, and the use of non-commodity forms. These noncommodity forms could include tourism and its associated spheres, and joint scientific and technical activity, including licenses and other matters. Plus the joint form of activity in high-technology fields.

M. Khaldin. It should be obvious to all of us that poor use of the economic potential of the enormous territories of the Soviet Union in the East should demand more solid foreign policy backing. When in the spirit of the new political thinking we start to look at our positions precisely from the standpoint of foreign policy backing for our boundaries in the East, then we see that our backing is very sparse. We must think about how to strengthen our cooperation and our positions in the regional and subregional organizations of the Asia-Pacific region. Since ESCAP [Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN)] is the most representative UN organization in which all the main countries and even the dependent territories of the region are represented—47 countries and territories—then we should start by changing and activating our relations with this commission.

Along that path we shall be able to some extent improve and facilitate the establishment of relations of cooperation with other regional and subregional organizations. Finally, it is precisely through enhancing the regional status of this commission that we shall perhaps deal a blow, slight but nevertheless a blow, against the Eurocentrist ideas about the Soviet Union as a predominantly European power, and as a result, against the desire not to include it in the regional affairs of the Asia-Pacific region.

V. Smolyak. The long-term program for the development of the Far East, particularly the foreign economic part of that program, does not provide recipes for entry into the foreign market. The program for setting up joint-venture enterprises is still not being implemented because when it was being drawn up no consideration was given to the experience in world development. Passiveness in the creation of joint-venture enterprises means that we still have not found forms acceptable for partners and have been unable to interest them. What we are proposing to the Japanese does not suit them because it does not take into account the structural changes that are taking place in Japan. They are not about to sink their capital into extractive sectors in the Far East. And it is mainly in those sectors that we are offering joint-venture enterprises.

The Japanese say that there is no incentive to cooperate with us because they do not know what plans for the development of the Far East are and are not convinced that we shall deal seriously with solving the problems of the region.

N. Gagarov. I would like to deal with the theme of foreign economic ties right there in Maritime Kray. I shall not get into the theoretical problems. There are many of them and they must be resolved. But what I would like to do is focus attention on what is now being done in Maritime Kray and on what steps it is planned to take in the long term in this direction.

In my view, it is advisable to create cost-accounting local foreign trade firms, primarily at the largest enterprises in Maritime Kray—"Dalryba," "Dalpolimetall," the mining-and-enriching combines and a number of others. These organizations already have adequate experience in foreign economic ties with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. As an experiment it would be possible to extend to them the right to move directly into the foreign market. Then it would be possible to include some of the other firms in Maritime Kray that are switching to full cost accounting and self-financing and have some experience in foreign economic activity.

When talking about Maritime Kray it is advisable to consider the question of creating specialized regions where it would be possible to set up joint-venture enterprises on a bilateral and multilateral basis in order to develop trade and economic ties with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Subsequently they could possibly become an important component of a future specialized complex on the territory of the kray. In addition the ports of Nakhodka and Vostochnyy could be the base for creating a specialized transport and industrial complex using foreign capital in various forms. The functioning of these regions could create the prerequisites for the formation of a larger specialized economic complex or zone that is important in all respects, based on the cities of Vladivostok and Artem.

All conditions are right for the development of international cooperation and specialization and the creation of joint-venture enterprises. Use of manpower from Vietnam the PRC and the DPRK will make it possible solve to a whole series of long outstanding problems, in particular compensating for the manpower shortage and eliminating disproportions in the kray's economy, recruiting manpower primarily for ship repair and shipbuilding and the fisheries sector, and also for handling cargoes in the ports.

The existing practice and the proposals being received from firms in Japan and the United States are making it possible to start planning for work to create joint-venture ship-repair and shipbuilding enterprises on kray territory, and also to pass on major orders for locating them in third countries. There are real prospects for reconstructing and developing these sectors by intensifying cooperation with Vietnam and the DPRK, involving and modernizing their production capacities. In aggregate this will make it possible to increase the export potential

of the kray through the sale of small-, medium- and large-tonnage shipping to the countries of Southeast Asia, and also to satisfy the growing demand in the region.

On the subject of international tourism. International tourism accounts for 5.4 percent of incomes from aggregate world exports. Thus, in the PRC foreign currency income from tourism increased from \$220 million to \$1.1 billion during the period 1978-1984. For the Soviet Far East internationalism tourism should also become a very important channel for the development of trade and economic, scientific and technical and cultural ties with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and make an important contribution in realization of the program to develop production forces in the Far East.

Development of international tourism in the kray will make it possible already by 1989-1990 to acquire \$500,000 to \$550,000 spent on food and accommodations. In all, after five or six years it will be possible to acquire up to \$186 million, not counting individual receipts and additional services and the souvenir trade, which among the Japanese account for 40 percent to 50 percent of the cost of a tourist trip. Here, due consideration should be given to the fact that the potential number of Japanese tourists alone wishing to visit Vladivostok is estimated to be 1.5 million people. The immediate prospects for developing transit forms of services for tourists from Japan, the United States and other countries are connected with the organization of trips through Maritime Kray into the northern regions of the PRC and Mongolia and the western regions of the USSR, and the return trip to Japan.

Ye. Kovrigin. The truth is that a new system for the international division of labor is being created in the Pacific. It is taking shape through the gradual changes in the sector structure of countries or groups of countries that are enabling them to specialize in a particular kind of output that best meets their supplies of particular resources and the level of economic development at any given moment.

In this new system for Pacific division of labor, for the first time in history the central element is turning out to be not the raw materials and semifinished goods but machinery and equipment. Machine articles and their components are becoming a very dynamic sector in international trade while raw materials and semifinished goods, except for those that are unique, will for a long time, perhaps forever, be a class of commodities with low growth rates and in which trade is increasingly less profitable both for the importing countries and the producing countries.

Real involvement of any country in the economy of the Asia-Pacific region and the derivation of profit from this kind of integration are now connected primarily with the movement of capital and with international investments in which foreign trade in its classical sense is becoming

an increasingly less important element. Hence the conclusion that we cannot enter the economy of the Asia-Pacific region simply by increasing our exports or imports. It can be done only through the migration of capital.

The word "migration" assumes a two-way path: exports and imports. For the future of our country in this region it would be ideal if there really were a two-way street with two-way movement, along which we could actively import and export capital—balanced, of course.

It is well that the times have now gone when it was considered unpatriotic or a deviation from Marxism-Leninism to think about the attraction of foreign capital. There is nothing anti-Leninist or antisocialist in this. It is well that we now perceive it as an important and integral element of the policy of peaceful coexistence, the policy of world economic competition.

It is pleasing that in recent months we have managed to show a certain flexibility. When the law on joint-venture enterprises was adopted, it was obvious to the experts that it contains many elements that are unacceptable to foreigners, first and foremost to the Japanese. But the recent amendments to it regarding the fixed ratio of Soviet and foreign capital indicates quite definitely that we are able to operate with adequate flexibility.

In plans for the creation of a future Pacific cooperation the most important goal is every possible liberalization of the movement of capital. I do not call for us to allow a "debauch" of foreign investors on our territory, including our Far East. They must study our laws carefully. But the laws should be such that they allow flexibility and attract foreign investors to us.

MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN. How can we sum up everything that has been said here?

I. Rogachev. It seems to me that one important conclusion that we can rightly draw after our review of our policy and practice along all the avenues in the Asia-Pacific region over the past 2 years or more is that there is obvious progress in development of the Soviet Union's political relations with the countries of this extensive region and that political relations are being developed more quickly than economic cooperation.

Since Vladivostok the Soviet Union has taken major and serious steps in a given foreign policy direction. We have adopted and are implementing the decision to withdraw the temporary contingent of our armed forces from Afghanistan; which has already affected our positions in the Asia-Pacific region in the most favorable way and will have a long-term positive effect.

Movement has been seen in unclogging the Cambodian conflict; this was seen in particular following the decision by the Vietnamese government to withdraw half of its troops from Cambodia this year.

The Soviet Union has included its medium-range and shorter-range missiles deployed in the Asian part of the country in a general agreement to eliminate these types of nuclear missiles. This is essentially the first real step along the road to nuclear disarmament in the region. The USSR was the first nuclear power to sign and ratify the corresponding protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty, signifying the creation of the first nuclear-free zone in the Asia-Pacific region. We have activated political dialogue with virtually all countries in the region at all levels, including the summit level. Relations with many countries in the Asia-Pacific region have become more dynamic and meaningful.

Of course, this is only a start. Behind this "showing of the flag" there must be persistent, painstaking and creative work really to improve the situation in the region.

Our country has taken steps to expand its participation in economic and scientific and technical cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. The fact remains that our economic contacts and trading ties are being maintained as previously at a very low level. This situation must be changed in a revolutionary way.

Yet another conclusion that we can draw: we can no longer tolerate the situation with regard to development rates in our Far East regions. This is causing extraordinary concern and alarm. Without a strengthening of this basis our real opportunities for exerting a positive influence on the regional situation will not increase.

Much has been said here about inertia in thinking, stereotype approaches to problem solving, mechanical transfer of experience in conducting European affairs to the Asia-Pacific region and so forth. The opinions expressed have been varied and sometimes paradoxical. Assessments and proposals by our scholars on a number of subjects and aspects of the situation in the various parts of the Asia-Pacific region are useful.

We can say with complete justification that this discussion will be a stage on the road to the search for an optimal position that we must work out, giving due consideration to the maximum number of viewpoints and opinions of interested parties.

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Selected Articles from AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No 6, June 88

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Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izdatelstva "Nauka"

USSR-Africa: Economic Cooperation

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 6, Jun 88 pp 2-5

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences G. Polyakov: "USSR-Africa—Economic Collaboration: The View from the Positions of Perestroyka"]

[Text] Glasnost is removing the bureaucratic taboo from the broad discussion of many still quite recently forbidden or "exceedingly undesirable" topics and is forcing us to look anew at the state of affairs in the realm of international ties as well as in the internal life of Soviet society. Step by step, surmounting departmental barriers, false stereotypes are being broken in the illumination of the relations of the USSR with the countries of the developing world, and especially with the African states. It is as if we are discovering Africa for ourselves anew and are trying to investigate the complex and sometimes extremely contradictory processes that are transpiring on the "Dark Continent."

What is the set of problems in Soviet-African economic collaboration today? What should we take from accumulated experience in resolving new tasks, and what are the myths it is time we are rid of?

Let's return to 1960—the Year of Africa. Fifteen African countries obtained independence at once, and rapid decolonization continued. Africa very quickly came to be called a liberated continent. The way was also cleared for the establishment of varied external contacts for the

young states. It was namely then that our economic and technical collaboration with Africa essentially began. Whereas before 1960 the Soviet Union had proper agreements with just three African countries—Egypt, Guinea and Ethiopia—in the next five years this list was supplemented by Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, Congo, Mali and Uganda, and by the end of the 1970's such agreements were also concluded with 34 of the states on the continent.¹

Now a few words about us ourselves—about what we were like in the 1960's, what motivated us in the development of collaboration with far-off Africa. The USSR, having borne on its shoulders the principal weight of the war against fascism, had already rehabilitated the economy that had been destroyed by war and was on the crest of economic ascent. It was considered possible to declare from the high rostrums that communism was not far off. Quite a few believed those predictions—making it all the more painful and vexing to recall them today. But this historical excursion makes it possible to shed light on some primordial omissions in collaboration with the continent, which has become much closer for us since then.

Being in a certain euphoria on the score of the collapse of the colonial system, when the term "neocolonialism" had not yet been invented, we were not very interested in what the mother countries were concocting and what they were counting on in letting go of the colonies they had earlier hung on to so strongly. The postwar restructuring of mutual economic ties in the capitalist world, including one element of it—the change of relations to "North-South"—was understood by us in a one-sided fashion. We were inclined to see in all of this just features of the untreatable progressive illness of capitalism. Did we have the right to cast our dark-skinned brothers to the whims of fate? Who then will open the door to a new society for them? They must be helped, and first and foremost, of course, by those who have declared their adherence to the ideas of socialism.

No particular differences were evoked by how to help. Industrialization, the creation of large and highly mechanized farms in the villages, collectivization with the support of the poor peasants. But what revolution could there be if one cannot defend oneself? The young states themselves asked us about all of this frequently, having before themselves the historical example of the USSR.

One can today be proud of the Aswan hydro complex and the Helwan Metallurgical Complex (Egypt), the hydroelectric power plant on the Casse River (Tunisia), the metallurgical complex of el-Hajar (Algeria), the petroleum refinery in Aseb (Ethiopia) and other facilities built in the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's. True, their designers and builders managed without consulting representatives of Soviet African studies—it was just getting on its feet then. They operated according to the principle of "They ask, we do it, for us—Bratsk, for

them—Aswan." Many questions, as within the country, were resolved with enthusiasm. After all, they went to Africa to work shoulder to shoulder with their brothers!

Years passed. Academies caught up to practice—or was it contrived for it? The necessity of industrialization for every African state as the most radical way of surmounting backwardness along with the policy of the preferential development of the state sector, within which new industrial relations should ripen, and the possibility of creating the preconditions for socialism even in those countries where a tribal-clan structure predominated were substantiated from theoretical positions.

Not all Africanists were engaged with such lofty matters. Some began with a study of history, culture, the everyday life of Africans, the tools of labor and the methods of cultivation employed by various tribes and peoples. Some of the works of those researchers, having stood the test of time, have become central. But those, the "eccentrics," were not all that mattered then. Academic thought overall unfortunately did not light the way for practice.

This is one of the reasons that the seemingly smoothly running mechanism of external economic ties with Africa created disruptions from time to time. Sometimes they were little noticed. The watch of collaboration still showed an exact time, but the hands were off. The amount of assistance formally grew at the former rate, and only the specialists knew that inflation was "helping" them to fulfill the plans and that the actual state of affairs was looking far less reassuring. Serious difficulties were experienced more and more often at facilities after their placement in service. A metallurgical combine was built, but the question of the marketing of its products was insufficiently studied; a fish cannery was turned over, while the fish, not knowing it come that way every third year as before, matters are poor at an animal-husbandry farm; the steppe-bred cows brought in do not grow humps, and without them they have difficulties on the local food rations.

The organizations occupied with questions of collaboration were not particularly troubled by such "petty sins." The main thing was to start up the facility on time. Everything possible was done for this, and nothing was impossible, the whole world was watching us! Amusing incidents occurred. They tell of this one among them. They had been unable to stretch a pipeline all the way, but a delegation was already flying in from Moscow for its opening. And they put a truck with oil around the corner so as not to spoil the holiday. The Africans also got a visible lesson in "planned" management along the way.

...

As if to justify the unprofitability of many of the enterprises created with our technical assistance, practical workers began forcefully to puff up the theory that the economic drawbacks were supposedly compensated for with interest by the political effectiveness of the collaboration.

But politics is, in the words of V.I. Lenin, a concentrated expression of economics. It has always been that way everywhere, and our mutual relations with Africa are no exception. Without having fulfilled a single one of our "African five-year plans," we began to note that Africa was not post-revolutionary Russia, that every country and every region there has its own traditions and problems going back into the past. Africa itself reminded us of that. First one state and then another where we sent so much manpower and funding, using our terminology, rejected the "progressive course" and ceased economic collaboration with us.

In our country, the ascent of the beginning of the 1960's gave way to what is today called the period of stagnation. Times changed, people changed. Now they went to Africa with the candid aim of righting their own personal financial affairs. It sounds bitter to say, but to return home, to the mother country, was almost the severest punishment for those who were working abroad.

A group of welders was flying to a petroleum refinery that was being built with the assistance of the USSR in one of the African countries. Their faces were unhappy and concerned, and with reason. At the construction site it was discovered that just one of the four was familiar with welding, and purely theoretically at that. The local workers, who did not have the time to train their Soviet mentors, smiled condescendingly while the "specialists" guessed which side to approach the welding equipment from. Who had sent them from distant lands to do intricate work—install a petroleum tank?

This is perhaps an isolated incident? Alas, no. It has today become widely known that the selection of specialists for overseas work was accomplished on the scale of entire union republics according to the "principle" of kinship and nepotism, and sometimes simply for bribes. Many people who went overseas with good intentions were psychologically poisoned when surrounded by self-interest. Others gave up. Why argue, why defend one's viewpoint? Wouldn't it be better to act according to instructions or at the bidding of superiors?

Flaws in personnel policy along with the interdepartmental muddle led to even worse miscalculations. Construction sites, especially for agricultural facilities, were sought in regions that were opportune for our planners to receive medals as trailblazers. What profitability could be discussed if dairy farms are located hundreds of kilometers from the capital? The guilty are not found. The government of the African countries finally asked about this, and the embassy just "alluded" to the specialists that the matter was politically important.

An ever greater number of our facilities proved to be unprofitable. Requiring constant subsidies from the state, such state farms and industrial enterprises not only did not provide economic support, but even pulled the rug out from under the progressive forces. And after all they had to count more and more on credit granted for

construction. Where to get the money? Either increase the pressure on the principal taxpayer—the peasant—or go hat in hand to the West. As a rule, both the one and the other were done, which could not help but foster the degeneration of progressive regimes.

It was with such problems in the realm of foreign economic ties with Africa that we entered the 1980's. The continent remained most unstable as before. Its socio-economic difficulties had worsened considerably, and the prospects looked much less cheerful than 15-20 years before. The biggest sore spot was the food shortage, especially in the countries that were our most major partners.

We had had the time to learn about Africa better, but the approach to collaboration with it had changed little. Scholars—true, carefully and without their former enthusiasm—were proving that "the second-generation socialist-oriented countries" were more mature than their predecessors, who had earlier closed their eyes to that which was outmoded, concocted or foisted from above, passing off what was desired for what actually was. Practitioners were assisted more and more often by the "magic number." But if our kolkhoz representative tried to fulfill a simply unrealistic plan with postscripts, how to justify those who, while abroad, ascribed non-existent achievements to other countries? It came to pass that one day the country is achieving great successes in the construction of a new and independent economy, and the next millions of its citizens are threatened with death from starvation.

And what about the beginning of the 1980's? Even today, during the period of glasnost and perestroika, we habitually continue to "juggle" in speaking out of assistance to Africa. Take, for example, the television program *Izmenya*. It shows a tractor plant in one of the African countries. The yard of the plant is filled with new tractors. The voice behind the frames informs us how they are needed by the state, battling against drought. The tone seems to be: the invisible author of the report himself is seated at the steering wheel and is rushing the Belarus to assimilate virgin African lands. But the fact is that the tractors are parked there because a base has yet to be created to utilize them: they started building the tractor and machinery stations after the start-up of this prestigious facility. By the way, the capacity of the plant is small, and one hundred percent of the parts and units for assembly are brought in over thousands of miles.

The "counterargument" of the practitioners can be foreseen in advance, it is the same: "The project is politically important, it must be completed without fail by the anniversary of the revolution."

When will we finally realize that political effectiveness and economic advantage are two sides of the same coin?²¹ What political impact can be provided by idle tractors or lands assimilated with great difficulty that are newly

overgrown with grass and brush? This is a direct economic loss for the African country and, for the country that carried out the planning and construction, a discrediting as a partner and an undermining of its reputation.

If we add to everything else our slowness and clumsiness in making foreign economic and foreign-trade deals, it becomes clear why the growth rate of collaboration with Africa has slowed. We are not even "rescued" by inflation today. Having built hundreds of facilities and assimilated and irrigated thousands of hectares of African land, we have still not learned to collaborate to mutual advantage, on a compensated basis. The number of our trading partners on the continent has decreased from 30 in 1975 to 16 in 1986, while the trade deficit has increased from 100 to 560 million rubles.² The latter number could be "corrected" somewhat if we do not take into account the value of goods of African origin that we procure on the London markets and have no connection with bilateral trade; but then the overall volume of Soviet-African trade turnover, already quite modest without it, is further reduced by the amount of that deduction.

Without bandying philosophies, we try to ascribe much to "resisting imperialism." Yes, there was and remains the CIA and the other Western intelligence agencies that have organized more than one coup d'état on the continent. But as for economics, we must blame ourselves here first and foremost: we too often prove not to be market competitive, we sometimes do not even make use of the advantages that the political factor gives us in certain cases. Our allies in Africa are turning more and more to credit and free aid from the developed capitalist countries. They, by the way, do not think of hindering us from erecting hydro stations on African rivers, knowing from their own experience how expensive and low-profit that occupation is. Aren't we doing some of the hellish work for them, aren't we proceeding there based on our own canonized theories that are not being confirmed by practice?

One should not, of course, lay it on too thick when describing our collaboration with Africa. There are positive examples as well. Take, for instance, Ethiopia. The polytechnical institute in Bahir-Dar, the Soviet Red Cross Hospital imeni Balchi in Addis-Ababa, the phytopathological laboratory in Ambo, oil tank farms, grain silos, coolers and a whole series of other facilities built with the economic and technical assistance of the USSR have become organic parts of the economic structure of the country. And the broad-scale aid rendered in 1984-85, during the vicious drought? So many human lives were saved then by Soviet physicians, pilots and drivers. Many such examples also exist in collaboration with Angola, Mozambique and other countries. All of this is true.

But today, having taken everything positive that is provided by practice, we should find new approaches to the development of Soviet-African collaboration. Its

mechanism has still changed little—it has just been throttled back somewhat. There still occurs the planning and construction of facilities that include some whose economic effectiveness is doubtful. But an increase in volume in and of itself is devoid of sense, since it sometimes forces thousands of people, both black and white, to work idly.

...

Isn't it time, in looking around at what has transpired over the almost 30-year path, to ask oneself: "Just what are the realistic goals of our collaboration with Africa? What do they expect of us now, when tens of millions of its inhabitants suffer from hunger and poverty? Maybe, taking Africa as it is, trying to make aid to them commensurate with our funds and, first and foremost, to support people for whom the principal task is to survive?"

Over two billion dollars worth of unsold goods—fabric, linens, shoes, clothing, hats, metal cookware and other domestic items—accumulates every year in the warehouses of our traders, supply houses, consumer cooperatives and the like. Those who have been to Africa know what demand all of this enjoys among the rural population. They say that it would be shameful to send goods there that were not sold on our internal markets. But we should be ashamed that the results of human labor go to waste. And the fact that somewhere on the Red Sea the wives of fishermen will do their wash in our washtubs and not in the shells of enormous turtles is in no way shameful.

The Americans are not shy about sending second-hand items to Africa—true, in the form of free aid. We are a little poorer, and no one will condemn us if we sell new and unbroken items cheaply. How can this be organized? Mixed associations are fashionable today. We could try that form of collaboration, imparting a new direction for us to it. Matters proceed, the joint companies make money, they begin to invest it in production-type enterprises that will begin to put out improved tools of labor for the peasants and the same consumer items. Why not risk it?

Would this signify a rejection of the traditional means of collaboration, first and foremost with the state organizations of the African countries—the ministries, commissions and administrations? No. But one can hardly hope for success only by building gigantic industrial and agricultural facilities. Time has shown that we shunned the "little ones" for nothing. A micro-dam built over five or six months on some rivulet can prove to be more effective than a major irrigation project whose coordination sometimes requires several years. A little plant for the production of agricultural implements plays a no less appreciable role in solving food problem than a tractor-assembly enterprise. This cannot fail to be taken into account today.

We will dwell briefly on the multilateral collaboration of CEMA and Africa, which, despite the signing of a whole series of documents, is practically nil. Isn't that partly because we still look upon the Africans as "little brothers" all the same? We welcome them to CEMA sessions as observers—just to clap at the opening and closing of the forum. Excursions of this sort have long ceased to suit them. By the way, the World Bank and other leading world financial and economic organizations either do not invite someone to their meetings at all, or invite them as full-fledged participants.

It should also be taken into account that our CEMA partners, greatly indebted to the West, have a vested interest in collaboration with Africa on a primarily commercial basis. Shouldn't we try to include them in the realization of major Soviet-African projects, for instance, in the realm of irrigation that promise a good return—cotton, oils, tropical and sub-tropical fruits and the like in exchange for equipment, agricultural implements or the services of specialists? They will get their share of the profits, and it will be easier for us to "endure" such a project and reduce its construction time.

In conclusion, a few words on the question of the new thinking. It is time to learn how to distinguish among those who do not look like us who are genuinely interested in helping the young states. Sweden, for example. How many schools they have built at their own expense in Africa, how many millions of textbooks they have given to African children! We must seek out where and how we could work together to assist the "Dark Continent" and the whole developing world. The cause of peace will gain as well.

In practice, of course, everything is more complicated than on paper. But we do not have the right not to act, and we do not have the time to rock back and forth. What is impeding the development of the new directions of collaboration? I will call the principal causes for inertia by their own names: bureaucratism and departmentalism. It is gratifying to see that the situation is changing already. A unified ministry has been formed to deal with foreign economic activity. This is a significant step in and of itself toward the solution of many problems. But in order that things not turn out as they did in the well-known fairy tale of the musicians undertaking the playing of a quartet, a further democratization of all of our economic life, the vested interest of producers and a reliance on market methods for managing foreign economic affairs are essential.

Footnotes

1. See: "Postroyeno pri ekonomicheskom i tekhnicheskoy sodeystvii Sovetskogo Soyuzu" [Built with the Economic and Technical Assistance of the Soviet Union]. Moscow, 1982, p 222.

2. Calculated from "USSR Foreign Trade." Moscow, 1975, 1986.

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OAU Secretariat Director of Information Visits Moscow

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 6, Jun 88 p 7

[Article by correspondent S. Kosolapov: "We Are Paying for Our Shortsightedness"]

[Text] At the invitation of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Countries of Asia and Africa, the director of information and press service of the Organization for African Unity [OAU] Secretariat, Onambele Fuda, came to Moscow. He had meetings and discussions at the Information Directorate of the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], USSR Goskomizdat [State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade], the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Soviet Peace Fund, the University of the Friendship of Peoples imeni Patrice Lumumba and the journalism department of MGU [Moscow State University]. Speaking at a press conference at the Soviet Committee for Solidarity before his departure from our country, Onambele Fuda said in particular:

"My first visit to the Soviet Union has taken place within the framework of functions to prepare for the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Organization for African Unity. Over the last quarter century, the OAU has achieved considerable success in various realms. It has expended great effort to facilitate the decolonization of the continent. It can now be asserted that only in the southern part of Africa does there remain a seat of colonialism and reaction. We naturally devote paramount attention in our political work to the liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia. The OAU is rendering moral, material and military support to the forces opposing the Pretoria regime, and recently granted a million dollars to an organization for collaboration and development in the 'front-line' states. Here we are counting on broad international support as before.

"The OAU faces most serious tasks in the realm of economics. The discussion concerns first and foremost the fight against drought and hunger. Recall that as early as 1980 the Lagos plan of action was adopted, envisaging the surmounting of economic difficulties on the continent first of all through the joint efforts of the African states themselves. But we have given priority to political issues for a very long time, while economic ones have seemingly remained in the shadows. Today we are paying for our shortsightedness. The situation is being worsened by the fact that a heavy burden of foreign

indebtedness lies on Africa, the payments for which are many times greater than the income obtained by the countries of the continent through export. World prices for raw materials are continuing to fall, and trading conditions remain unfavorable for their suppliers, and that also troubles us.

"A development program for Africa through the year 1990 was prepared and presented for the consideration of the world community in 1987. Its fulfillment is projected by relying both on the domestic potential of the African states and on foreign aid. A special committee of the OAU has been created that has been called upon to track the economic development of the member countries, study world market conditions and work on solving the African debt problem. A special fund to aid in the fight against drought and hunger has also been formed within the framework of the OAU. Some 16 states have made use of its services in a little over a year.

"The Organization for African Unity is filled with determination to become an even more useful tool for continent-wide collaboration in the name of progress and peace."

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Simoniya on Socialist Orientation

*Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 6, Jun 88 pp 16-18*

[Letter to the editor by Doctor of Historical Sciences N. Simoniya: "Conduct Academic Debate Honestly!"]

[Text] The problems of socialist orientation have recently come to be at the center of attention of Soviet scholars once again. There is nothing surprising in this. After all, three decades have passed since the appearance of the phenomenon of socialist orientation. Considerable historical experience has been accumulated on both its positive and negative aspects that requires new and profound interpretation. The euphoria and illusions of the 1960's and somewhat of the 1970's, which impeded a sober look at the role and place of socialist orientation within the framework of the world revolutionary process, are basically outdated.

And, as often happens in discussion of the burning questions of modern times, the extreme positions revealed themselves almost at once. On the one hand, some scholars who were at one time in the front ranks of the rabid advocates of the concept of socialist orientation, who had expected rapid and efficient practical results from the very fact of the selection of an orientation toward socialism, became uncertain of their expectations and converted to the position of rejecting an actually existing phenomenon. On the other hand, those adherents of the concept of socialist orientation who did not trouble themselves with a serious analysis of the

objective and subjective difficulties and the domestic and external obstacles on that path along with the reasons for the defeat of revolutionary democracy in a whole series of countries took positions of blind optimism, signified in practice by the rejection of efforts at new thinking of both historical experience and contemporary world realities.

The views of this second group of scholars were reflected in an article by A. Kaufman and R. Ulyanovskiy¹ and, perhaps, there would have been no sense in touching on it. After all, this is the time of glasnost, and everyone has the right to express his own viewpoint. But glasnost in no way assumes consigning to oblivion moral and ethical principles in academic discussion. As an editorial in PRAVDA on 5 Apr 88 noted, "Glasnost has shown that there is sometimes not enough political culture in disputes, an ability to listen to each other, to analyze social processes scientifically, and sometimes simply not enough knowledge and reasoning." Such negative phenomena are often linked with "pretensions to monopoly in science, to one's own infallibility in matters." It is namely those qualities that distinguish the article of Kaufman and Ulyanovskiy.

The authors of that article resort to a method that is impermissible in honest academic debate, which consists of the gross falsification of the positions of their opponents. Here is what they write in particular: "One of the first to criticize the policy of socialist orientation was N. Simoniya in his article 'Specific Features of the Formation of Parties and their Interconnection with the State Apparatus in the Countries of Non-Socialist Development,' written in conjunction with K. Merdel. Enumerating the difficulties of development along this path, the authors concluded that as a result, 'the prospects for the non-capitalist path are removed altogether.'"

If this phrase had really reflected the true sense of the idea contained in the joint Soviet-German anthology, its authors would have doubtless deserved reproof. But the fact is that the "criticism" was based on two clear distortions. First, Simoniya and Merdel are quoted as if they are criticizing the "policy of socialist orientation," and not deviations from it. Second, Kaufman and Ulyanovskiy have arbitrarily taken from the text a part of a sentence—"the prospects for the non-capitalist path are removed altogether"—and presented it as the sum conclusion of the article of Simoniya and Merdel. It considers, however, not the question of the prospects for socialist orientation in general, but just the situation in a single group of countries where revolutionary democracy had not only come to power relying on "mass parties" that were heterogeneous in a class sense, but had also tried to realize the transition to socialism with their aid. The following is stated in the article of Simoniya and Merdel in this regard: "Ways of resolving crisis and eliminating, in particular, the lack of correspondence of the 'mass parties' to the new social functions and tasks depends on the specific correlation of political forces and the specific features of the regime, as well as other

subjective factors in individual countries. In some cases, as in Ghana, the initiative for resolving crisis can shift into the hands of the rightist forces, as a result of which the prospects for the non-capitalist path are removed altogether."² Only a very rich imagination can see here a rejection of the policy and prospects of socialist orientation.

Simoniya's monograph "The Countries of the Orient: Paths of Development," published in 1975, is also subjected to "criticism" in the same spirit. Kaufman and Ulyanovskiy assert that it expresses "an opinion of the non-vitality of the policy of socialist orientation." Naturally, no references are given, since there simply are no such assertions. But this does not deter the critics, who continue to sound accusations that ascribe to the author the following theory: "The framework of socialist orientation is historically limited, and this course has exhausted itself and has no chance for success." A specific page number—354—is given this time. We open the book to the indicated page and see what is actually said there: "The above analysis makes it possible to conclude that the development of the countries of the Orient in general and those that have entered onto the path of socialist orientation in particular are fully within the general laws of the development of human society as discovered by Marxism-Leninism... But these general laws also make it possible for us to conclude that the boundaries of the universality of the phenomenon of socialist orientation are historically limited. It is essential to emphasize herein that the discussion concerns namely a specific **political** form of the transition to socialism, that is, socialist orientation headed by revolutionary democracy, and not socialist prospects in general."³

If one carefully checks this quotation against the critical statements, at least two fundamental distortions are easily detectable: a) in leaving out the word "universality" in the phrase "boundaries of the universality of the phenomenon of socialist orientation," the critics have achieved the desired distortion of that thought, which makes it possible to accuse Simoniya of asserting the limited nature of the **very phenomenon** of socialist orientation rather than the possibilities for its **geographical dissemination**; and b) citing a position altogether lacking in the monograph—"this course has exhausted itself and has no chance of success"—the critics have again obtained the opportunity of passing Simoniya off as an adversary of the concept of socialist orientation.

With the aid of such methods, the author of the monograph has ascribed to him the idea that he "also expresses a mistrust of the political possibilities of revolutionary democracy, although under favorable conditions in a number of instances it can become the forerunner of Marxism-Leninism and lead to scientific socialism." We will leave to the conscience of the critics the assertion that **contemporary** revolutionary democracy can be a "**forerunner** of Marxism-Leninism" (that is, can **precede** the long-existing teachings of socialism) and

turn to the text of the monograph: "Scientific socialism is not the 'monopoly' of any caste of 'already communists.' It is open to the perceptions of those who truly wish to defend the interests of the workers and the ideals of socialism. In short, if the labor principle finally prevails under the effects of an acute domestic political and external struggle in revolutionary democracy over petty-bourgeois fluctuations and nationalistic vacillations, that is, if in the course of the domestic political and international struggle an evolution of its thinking and correspondingly its political positions occurs on the plane of an ever greater acceptance of the tenets of scientific socialism, then revolutionary democracy **begins to cease to be** what it is, and its representatives ultimately become adherents of Marxism-Leninism."⁴

The monograph moreover puts the question directly: "How realistic is the evolution of revolutionary democracy in the direction of scientific socialism?" The author points out that a whole series of factors speaks convincingly in favor of such a possibility.

It is asked, where is there a "mistrust of the political possibilities of revolutionary democracy" here? It is obvious that a single aim was being prosecuted here—to depict Simoniya as a long-time fundamental opponent of socialist orientation. It is another matter that even with the recognition of the revolutionary and socialist potentials of revolutionary democracy in a certain, not numerically predominant group of countries, the question of different forms and versions of the revolutionary struggle and the subsequent transition to socialism in the developing countries is not removed.

It is this burning problem of modern times that is simply skirted in the works and the article under consideration by Kaufman and Ulyanovskiy, who reduce the whole issue of socialist prospects to a single specific form of the revolutionary process—socialist orientation—and on that basis accuse all of those who doubt the ability of the phenomenon of socialist orientation significantly to expand further the geographic boundaries of a rejection of socialist prospects altogether. Strictly speaking, they do this in asserting that if the "policy of socialist orientation is consigned to oblivion, there remains before our critics just one possibility—to say that the liberated countries have but one prospect—capitalism." The grievous paradox is that it is namely making socialist orientation absolute and universal that leads in reality to nihilism in relation to other potential paths for transition to socialism and in that manner makes any socialist prospects whatsoever more remote.

As for the views I expressed in the middle of the 1970's on the issues being considered here, the practice of the 13 years that have passed since that time have fully confirmed them. But my critics are not in the mood for facts and realities. They neglected them in their theoretical constructs quite often in the past as well. I had occasion to point this out as early as in 1975 in the monograph mentioned above.⁵ Little has changed since that time on

the plane of ignoring actual trends in the name of cheerful, pleasant-sounding and reassuring conclusions and positions. It is enough to refer to Ulyanovskiy's monograph that came out in 1985. Here is what is asserted in it in particular: "The number of developing countries that are selecting socialist orientation is growing steadily. Afghanistan joined them in 1978. The political regimes are stabilizing in these countries, serious successes have been achieved in the development of the national economy and education, anti-feudal democratic agrarian reforms have been carried out, progressive labor legislation has been introduced and the like."⁶

All of this was written after a number of countries that had entered onto or were trying to enter onto the path of socialist orientation had suffered the bitterness of defeat and after serious contradictions that sometimes extended to sharp conflicts (sometimes armed) had been uncovered in many countries that were continuing to proceed along this path, while their economies had run up against serious difficulties. Closing their eyes to the extant situation, Kaufman and Ulyanovskiy prefer to accuse Simoniya of the fact that he, "ignoring historical realities," has advanced a "doubtful theory" of socialist orientation as "a variety of a political rushing forward within the third stage of the worldwide process of bourgeois social revolution."

There is naturally not a word here on the fact that the discussion in Simoniya's monograph concerns the concept formulated by F. Engels of the undulating development of political revolutions, a concept that V.I. Lenin interpreted anew after October, in the most difficult period of the emergence of Soviet power, in the period of the growing counter-revolution of the 1920's. V.I. Lenin moreover felt it necessary to recommend that the other communist party members of the Comintern take this concept and the very possibility of the recoil of the revolutionary wave after a jump forward into account in their program documents. Simoniya's monograph recounts all of this in detail. But the authors prefer "not to enter into the discussion."

The main thing, however, is something else. Had Ulyanovskiy not spent many years of effort in fighting the concept of the undulating development of revolution that is set forth in Simoniya's manuscript, and had rather directed his efforts toward interpreting its applicability, for example, to the situation extant in Afghanistan in 1978, then perhaps neither the Afghan nor the Soviet people would have had to go through all that they did. Here can be seen with particular clarity the closest possible interconnection of academics and politics.

Moreover, the innocent reader, perhaps, is surprised by the fact that the "many years of effort" of Ulyanovskiy are mentioned here. The fact is that he and Kaufman displayed excessive modesty when they reported to the reader at the beginning of their article that "a number of the unfounded theoretical positions" of Simoniya's book "were severely criticized in Moscow academic journals."

They forgot to add that one of them was the initiator of the critical campaign unleashed against this book, that it was namely he that published both devastating reviews in the "Moscow academic journals" in 1976, about 50 typewritten pages, that it was namely he, making use of his official position, who obstructed the reply of Simoniya to the journal NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA, which was at the time headed by Academician S.L. Tikhvinskiy. It is impossible for me to reproduce even in abridged form all of the detailed counter-reasoning I used in my answer then. I will limit myself just to recalling one of its positions. Here it is: "It always seems to me that commentary or criticism on anyone's thoughts and statements is permissible with the suitable reproduction of those thoughts and statements, so that the reader can compose for himself a distinct impression of the justice of the critical observations. All of Lenin's works can serve as an example of this, even small newspaper articles. The critical article of R.A. Ulyanovskiy unfortunately demonstrates a different 'model' for us."

That time, Ulyanovskiy also neglected elementary moral and ethical norms of behavior in academic debate. The natural question arises of how can it happen that such a titled scholar even today displays such neglect and comes to be on the path of primitive falsification? Evidently, long years of being outside the zone of criticism and a feeling of complete lack of a need to answer to the scholars he is criticizing have not passed for nothing. A feeling of impunity develops, followed by irresponsibility, which is gradually transformed into a certainty of one's own infallibility and the possession of the "truth of last resort" and, accordingly, the right to the role of "supreme judge" and the right to lecture one and all, coming on in a "director's" tone (after all, there were many others, including major Soviet Oriental-studies scholars, aside from Simoniya who were the targets of his shattering and slashing criticism over the last two decades). All of this enters so solidly into the "flesh and blood" that the authors of the critical article under consideration here really do not understand (or do not want to or cannot understand?) that life has moved on, that the word perestroika has been written in red letters on our country's calendar.

So it comes to pass that the party leadership never tires of summoning us to new creative endeavors and a deepening of theoretical ideas and their transformation into practice, while Kaufman and Ulyanovskiy drag us back, demanding that we not transgress on the "heights" they have reached in their past, and not always irreproachable, works. But isn't it time to turn over such methods of "debate" to the historical archives? If Soviet Oriental studies were able to move forward and achieve appreciable successes during the years of stagnation, then it must be assumed that today the efforts of Kaufman and Ulyanovskiy are even less able to hinder the large detachment of scholars from fulfilling their duty and making a weighty contribution to the development of the foreign-policy concepts of our state in the spirit of the new thinking.

Footnotes

1. See AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No 5, 1988.
2. "Partiya i gosudarstvo v stranakh sotsialisticheskoy oriyentatsii" [Party and State in Socialist-Oriented Countries]. Moscow, 1973, p 41.
3. N. Simoniya. "Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiya" [The Countries of the Orient: Paths of Development]. Moscow, 1975, p 354.
4. Ibid., pp 359-360.
5. See, for example, the criticism of the broad treatment by R.A. Ulyanovskiy of the theory of the non-capitalist development path in the book "Strany Vostoka: Puti razvitiya," pp 268-269 and 308-309.
6. R.A. Ulyanovskiy. "Pobedy i trudnosti natsionalno-osvoboditel'noy borby" [Triumphs and Difficulties of the National-Liberation Struggle]. Moscow, 1985, p 87. See also p 80.
7. R.A. Ulyanovskiy. Deeper Research of the Problems of the National-Liberation Movement.—PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA, 1976, No 2, pp 211-213; R.A. Ulyanovskiy. Some Questions of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of the Revolutionary process.—NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA, 1976, No 4, pp 61-83.

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AAPSO International Conference on Regional Conflicts

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 6, Jun 88 p 25

[Article by G. Shmelev under the rubric "The Motto—Solidarity!": "Break Up Conflict Situations!"]

[Text] Some 12 million people have perished in 145 regional conflicts in the years since the end of World War II. No small number. The fact that the number of victims is growing catastrophically, that weapons and violence are being resorted to more and more often, that new disputes are being added to old ones is evoking more and more alarm. Can progressive world opinion fail to notice this and be reconciled to such a situation without taking its own practical steps to break up explosive situations?

That is how the question was posed by the participants in the international conference "The Role of World Society in Settling Regional Conflicts" that was recently held in Kabul at the initiative of the Asian and African People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) and the Organization for Peace, Solidarity and Friendship of Afghanistan. Over 100 delegates from social forces and movements of

the most varied of nature and thrust from 50 of the states of Asia, Africa, Europe, America and 15 regional and international organizations took part in its work.

What has evoked such great interest in the Kabul conference?

First and foremost the very postulation of the problem. After all, the settlement of regional conflicts is taking on an ever increasing significance for the normalization of the international climate and a reduction of tensions in different places of the globe: Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, southern Africa, Central America and the Persian Gulf region. How to settle existing regional conflicts and avert new ones, how to uncover the origins of this or that crisis situation—these questions on the conference agenda reflected the profound concern not only of the peoples of Asia and Africa, but also of other continents for the fate of a lasting and secure peace on the planet.

Both the time and the place of the conference were no accident: the military conflict—one of the harshest and most painful—has gone on in Afghanistan for a long time. The agreement for a political solution for Afghanistan that was signed on 14 Apr 88 in Geneva gives hope that the long-awaited peace will come quite soon to Afghan soil and that that country will be able to build its life the way it wants to on the basis of nationwide reconciliation without outside interference. Those who see in the Geneva agreements the first prototype of a peaceful resolution of regional conflicts on the basis of the principles of the new political thinking are undoubtedly correct.

Speaking at the opening of the conference, Afghan Prime Minister Soltan Ali Keshtmand emphasized that every time the forces of imperialism and reaction see a threat to their interests, they unleash war. Such an unjust war has already gone on for nine years on Afghan soil. Nonetheless, the leaders of Afghanistan have proclaimed a strategic policy of national reconciliation. This is a bold action by a government in power possessing full constitutional powers. After all, the discussion concerns not simply a cessation of military action, but also the assumption of the creation of a coalition government and the sharing of power with the opposition, including with those who are waging the struggle against it with the aid of arms obtained from outside.

The policy of national reconciliation, at the basis of which is the new political thinking, is gaining more and more support from the people. The results of the first year of the execution of this policy of national reconciliation promise much.

The acting president of the AAPSO, Murad Galeb, noted in his speech the important significance of the policy of national reconciliation being followed by Afghanistan.

World public opinion sees a means of eliminating sore spots through political solutions, via dialogue and negotiations, with the aid of the policy of national reconciliation.

The concluding communique fixed many examples of how and in what form, in the opinions of the conference participants, the principles of the policy of national reconciliation could have a positive influence on the situation in other "hot spots" on the planet. The conference welcomed the initial results of the meetings of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, Hun Sena, with Prince Norodom Sihanouk as a step on the path of resolving the Kampuchean problem through national reconciliation.

The aggressive and expansionist designs of Israel against the Arab peoples of the Near East and the bloody and repressive policies of Tel Aviv in relation to the Palestinian Arab people on the occupied West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza were subjected to sharp condemnation. It was emphasized that a just and all-encompassing solution to the Near East problem can be found by convening an international conference with the participation of all interested parties, including the PLO.

The participants in the Kabul conference expressed profound concern on the score of the escalation of the destructive and ruinous war between Iran and Iraq, which contradicts the genuine needs of the peoples of both countries and is a threat to peace in the region and on the planet overall. Particular attention was devoted to a consideration of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States and the South Korean administration are carrying out the Team Spirit 88 military maneuvers, which are unprecedented in scope.

Regional conflicts are taking an ever greater number of human lives, destroying colossal material resources and disrupting the efforts of the developing countries to solve their own urgent problems of socio-economic development. That is why it is essential to utilize today's senselessly enormous arms spending for the needs of development. Disarmament in the name of development is the urgent requirement of the present day, as the speeches of the delegates emphasized. The Kabul forum called for a special session of the UN for a cardinal resolution to the problem of disarmament and in that manner to assist in the incarnation of the concepts of national reconciliation to settle regional conflicts in order to re-animate the climate on our planet and achieve a nuclear-free and non-violent world.

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"Nauka"**

**Book on Nationalism and Authoritarianism in
South and Southeast Asia Reviewed**

*Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 6, Jun 88 p 63*

[Review "Politics and Ideology" by V. Ovlev of book "Natsionalizm i avtoritarizm. Politiko-ideologicheskiye protsessy v Indonezii, Pakistane i Bangladeš" [Nationalism and Authoritarianism. Political and Ideological Processes in Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh] by

V.V. Sumskiy. Moscow, Main Editorial Board for Oriental Literature of Nauka Publishing House, 1987, 216 pp]

[Text] This book attracts attention for a number of reasons. First, it is research that is simultaneously theoretical and concrete area-studies in nature. Having posed the question of the preconditions for the so-frequent co-existence and mutual support of nationalism and authoritarianism and the social functions of official nationalist ideologies under conditions of authoritarian regimes in the contemporary Orient on a general plane, V. Sumskiy considers in detail and juxtaposes political and ideological processes in three countries of southern and Southeast Asia. Parallels, typological similarities and distinctions in the political history of Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh are found at the juncture of theoretical and empirical analysis. A second distinguishing feature of the book is its forward thrust. The author tries to look into the future, evaluating the strong and weak aspects of the currently existing regimes, projects the prospects for their evolution and trying to determine their chances for political survival. Finally, a third noteworthy feature of the book is a demonstration of the negative and reactionary aspects and trends of the inherent Afro-Asian nationalism.

Correlating the changes in the sphere of ideology and propaganda with the overall course of political and socio-economic development of the countries under consideration, Sumskiy concludes that one of the chief functions of official nationalistic constructs is to compensate for those defects of the social order and political systems that the corresponding authoritarian regimes are organically unable to eliminate. At the same time, the deep kinship of authoritarianism and nationalism—in their characteristic anti-individual and anti-universalist tendencies (pp 34-35)—is expressed sometimes more and sometimes less clearly.

One of the main results of the research is the author's proposed typology of regimes of "strong power" and the description of the two types of authoritarian rule that is developed—civilian-charismatic and military-bureaucratic. The first type includes the "directed democracy" of Sukarno and the regimes of Z.A. Bhutto and Mujibur Rahman. It should be noted that the evolution of a charismatic leader and the political system that arises under his aegis along with the phenomenon of charisma itself is more interestingly researched, perhaps, using the example of a leader such as Z.A. Bhutto (pp 84-109). Noting that the advancement of a leader of the charismatic type often transpires at the stage of a modernization crisis (as occurred, for example, in Pakistan at the end of the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's), the author shows how, under the cover of radical-nationalistic and leftist phrases that have obtained widespread dissemination under the conditions of civilian charismatic rule, the preconditions for political coups to the right ripen along with the affirmation of other authoritarian regimes—military-bureaucratic ones.

The author includes as the pragmatic version of the military-bureaucratic regime the "new order" in Indonesia in the second half of the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's, the regimes of M. Ayyubkhan in Pakistan and Ziaur Rahman in Bangladesh. The leaders of a pragmatist bent refrain from emotional rhetoric and suffer no push toward the development of concepts of "national socialism" and the like. Their "calling cards" are programs and slogans of "national development" whose official adoption is frequently accompanied by certain positive shifts in the economy. The vulnerable spot of these at first glance quite strong rulers is an inability to ensure the just distribution of the fruits of "national development" combined with a shortage of attention to the sphere of ideology and propaganda along with a comparatively thin sweep of official directives in society. It is namely this flaw of government policy that they try to supplement through large-scale propaganda campaigns and persistent appeals to ideas of national originality and the dominant cultural and religious tradition—General-Presidents M. Zia ul-Haq (Pakistan) and H.M. Ershad (Bangladesh). Whence the description of the corresponding military-bureaucratic regimes as ideologized.

As concerns the fate of the "strong power" regime, in elaborating on the circumstances that bring them to ruin or consolidation the author concentrates on factors of a

political-ideological and socio-economic nature. External conditions and influences are for the most part relegated to parentheses, which leads to somewhat of an absolutization of domestic phenomena and processes. It is not completely justified, in particular, to ascribe all successes and failures in the economic realm to the actions of the ruling regimes.

I would like to conclude my survey of Sumskiy's work with the author's words that "millions of people in Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh, as in many other countries of Asia and Africa, must be profoundly aware of how authoritarianism diminishes human dignity (including the dignity of the simple laborer so often appealed to), how much it limits the possibility of social progress, so as to reinforce on that basis the moral readiness to oppose arbitrary political rule" (p 188). It remains only to add that the publication is well-printed and contains interesting photographic illustrations and to complain that the quite inadequate run of the book (a little over a thousand copies) was sold out soon after it came out.

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12821

**Worker Exploitation Under Joint Ventures
Addressed**

18070166 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in
Russian No 7, Apr 88 pp 28-29

[Article by G.I. Kovaltsev, candidate of economic sciences: "Won't We Be an Object of Exploitation?"]

[Text] *FROM A LETTER TO THE EDITOR. Today we are creating joint enterprises with the capitalists. As everyone knows, exploitation of the working class, profits, and surplus value are at the foundation of the capitalist method of production. Thus, by creating joint enterprises with the capitalists in the USSR, the Soviet people, communists, are naturally becoming objects of exploitation, through which the capitalist will create profit and surplus value, and, moreover, will take currency out of the USSR. And all of this is taking place in the eighth decade of Soviet power. How must all of what is taking place be understood, what is the mutually advantageous cooperation here, and how is it compatible with the teaching of K. Marx and V. I. Lenin on the irreconcilability of class struggle and the final goal of building socialism? G. I. NIKONENKO*

Candidate of economic sciences G. I. Kovaltsev, a senior expert in the department of multilateral cooperation with foreign countries, USSR Gosplan, answers our reader.

It should be remembered that surplus value can be created when two opposing classes exist: capitalists or private owners of the means of production on the one hand, and hired workers on the other. That is, it is necessary to have economic and legal separation of the direct producer from the means of production, which are in private hands, and creation of conditions for the forced sale of the work force to the capitalists. The work force absolutely must have the nature of a commodity. Only under these conditions is the creation of surplus value possible.

It is well known that under socialism such a commodity as the work force, and such a class as the class of hired workers does not exist in principle. Therefore, the ownership by a foreign partner firm of part of the means of production (this refers to a joint enterprise operating on the territory of our country) cannot serve as the basis for capitalist production relations, since its second necessary aspect, the sale of a work force; i.e., an indigent class, is lacking.

Exploitation is the unpaid appropriation of surplus labor, and sometimes even part of the required labor, of the direct executors. On his own the capitalist appropriates all surplus value, which he uses in his own interests. But the economic activity of joint enterprises will be regulated by Soviet law, and by our social and labor norms, according to which part of the surplus product obtained by our partner (up to 50 percent), through taxation, will be used in the interests of Soviet society.

Here is the distribution that is being introduced: The Soviet share in the profits of the joint enterprise will be no less than 51 percent, and of the 49 percent remaining for the partner, approximately half will remain in the USSR through taxation (an annual 30 percent tax plus a 20 percent collection when the profits are transferred abroad). All of these funds will go into the state budget and will be used in the interests of the economy. Thus, there is no unpaid appropriation of surplus labor, and therefore there is also no exploitation.

Moreover, Soviet workers cannot be the object of exploitation, since they will be working at the joint enterprises according to the Soviet system of work and wages. Their working conditions and schedules shall be monitored by the chairman of the board of directors and the general director of the joint enterprise, positions that will be filled only by Soviet citizens. Consequently, the Soviet worker and the capitalist remain no more than partners in mutually advantageous cooperation.

What are our interests?

1. We are able to use the capability of foreign firms extensively to accelerate scientific and technical progress, reduce the time needed to assimilate new types of products, and increase the technical level and quality. In the end we will saturate the internal market with high quality goods.

2. Production collaboration in the form of cooperation will enable us to reduce our dependence on importing of finished products from the developed capitalist countries.

3. The competitiveness of our products on the world market will increase, and thus the export capability of the country and our currency opportunities will grow.

4. Protection of the economic interests of the USSR from discriminatory measures, boycotts and embargos of any kind will be strengthened.

The interests of our partners are associated mainly with the possibility of access to the extensive socialist market.

Thus, there is no reason to fear the creation of joint Soviet-capitalist enterprises, or to see in them almost a class retreat. V.I. Lenin called foreign economic ties of the Soviet state a most important item in our income budget, looked at this item as a real source of new technology, equipment, raw materials and semi-finished products, and called upon the country to "scoop out with both hands that which is good from abroad..."

For the first time seven joint enterprises with firms in the capitalist and developing countries have been formed on USSR territory, including two with Finnish, two the West German and one each with Japanese, Indian and Italian partners. Another 250 proposals are under study.

The spheres of their activity are priority fields of production. They are individual types of the latest machine building products, the chemical industry, and others.

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9069

Interview with Visa International Chief
18120200 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 32, 14-21 Aug 88 p 7

[Text] This year the USSR became a member of the international organization Visa International producing credits cards. What might the new system of settling accounts give us? Queues will get smaller, the payment procedure will take 5-6 seconds and the possibility of being given the wrong change will be ruled out. Many cashiers and bank clerks will be free to take other jobs. Finally, the new cumbersome system of registering credit will be more simple. Dmitry Sidorov, an "MN" correspondent, approached Joao Ribeiro Da Fonseca, chief general manager, of Visa International.

What is the main aim of your visit to Moscow?

I came to attend the presentation of the first Soviet credit cards. People will be able to use them at the Olympics in Seoul, of which Visa International is a sponsor this year. The national committees of many countries, including the USSR, will get additional money for displaying the Visa International trade marker. In Moscow I was pleased to see that Intourist understands the importance of having credit cards and helps its own firm—Inturcard, set up recently in Moscow.

I was told that InterCard is prepared to issue credit cards from September. However, the Foreign Economic Bank is suspicious. As an argument in favour, I can refer to the experience of our Visa International, which unites 20,000 banks in the world.

But, as far as we know, even the USSR Foreign Economic Bank was advertising not cards but cheque books.

I don't want to touch on relations in your internal market but, at present, nearly all countries of the world are trying to replace the cheque system with credit cards. I don't know a single bank in the world that would make a profit from cheque books. I'm sure that by introducing the cheque system, the USSR will repeat the error already made by the West. A credit card programme can include many more people than any other system.

12232

Odessa Firm's Success on World Market
18250071 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Aug 88 p 2

[Report on interview with plant manager by IZVESTIYA's own correspondent in Odessa, F. Chernet'skiy, under the rubric "The 'Experience' Program": "An Exporter from Odessa"]

[Text] The "Zarya" Association, which had remained in the background of the sector until recently, is now successfully earning foreign exchange in the world market.

The "Zarya" Production Association is part of the textile and haberdashery sector. It produces handkerchiefs, pillowcases, and sheets...

Just what brought me here? This is what. Over the past 3 years exports have increased by nearly 10 times as much here, from 451,000 to 4 million rubles. What were such earnings from? Handkerchiefs and sheets! And to whom are these handkerchiefs and sheets being sold? To Sweden, Denmark, Japan, Italy, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland... Is "Zarya" in the world market? Some kind of fiction!

Olga Fedorovna Gramma, the general manager of the association, considered my bewilderment to be appropriate; evidently many persons are amazed.

Just what has taken place in the "Zarya," in fact? The whole point is that nothing astonishing has happened. They had warned the association in advance: beginning in January 1987 it is to shift to full cost accounting and self-financing. The people wondered: what do we do, and where do we begin? They identified the worst bottleneck—it turned out to be the weaving, the starting point in the production cycle. It was necessary to replace the worn-out equipment. Where did they get the funds from? They had saved up their own money beforehand to purchase the equipment. And they had accumulated 400,000 rubles. They bought the equipment. They shifted the brigades to cost accounting. Each brigade, as a rule, makes a completed item exclusively for the end product. It gets a production target and a wage fund is established. And things began to move. It is enough to trace the production volumes: in 1985 the products sold totaled 32.6 million rubles, and this year their sales are expected to total 37 million rubles. And here is the dynamics of profit: 3.2 million rubles were received in 1985 and 4.8 million rubles were received in 1987, including nearly 1.4 million rubles in above-plan profit.

"The reform instilled confidence in us," Olga Fedorovna said. "Previously they scheduled literally everything down to the kopeck for us from the top, and they decided how we were to work and live. They took away everything the collective earned and then sent part of it back. They returned it at their discretion. And everything was just enough. No matter how you tried, you were not left with a ruble to spare. Now everything is decided by

profit. We are now well aware that with each ruble of profit, we, the association, keep 17 kopecks. So we are trying our best. The association earned 800,000 rubles for itself last year instead of the 470,000 stipulated by the five-year plan. I think we will have more this year. Our very own. Now we don't beg from anyone, we don't ask anyone for money, and we don't have our hands out. Bosses? We are our own bosses; we decide in the collective how to distribute what has been earned, what to do and how to do it.

"I will say frankly: before the shift to self-financing we all thought that our enterprise had no future and that it would gradually fade away. But we are now speaking about a complete renovation. This is the plan. To erect a new building on a new site (it has already been selected, by the way) and to put all our subunits scattered around the city under one roof. We will put the valuable equipment in the new building and get rid of the old things. We are planning construction in 1991. The money is ours. We need 4 or 6 million rubles, depending on the equipment, which we will manage to obtain—either domestic or imported equipment. We may have to borrow some part from the bank, as credit."

[Question] Won't the previous misalignment be traced in your plans? Won't the production program infringe upon the social plan?

[Answer] No. In 2 years our average wage has risen by 21 percent, from 184 to 215 rubles. We intend to resolve the most critical problem—housing—in the next five-year plan. We have 60 families who need housing. A 28-apartment building is ready for construction, using our own resources. At the same time, we are transferring funds to the city soviet as share holding. We are organizing the construction of individual cottages. These are the conditions: the future owner will bear half the expenditures for the cottage and the enterprise will bear the other half. I think we will solve the housing problem by 1995.

[Question] Olga Fedorovna, how did you manage to break into the world market? And why do you need this, actually?

[Answer] You see, we are faced with this condition: if you want to live better, you earn more. So more products have to be turned out, and with better quality. And we have to think first of all about the technical reequipment of the enterprise. It will have to be provided with the most up-to-date equipment. We want to obtain imported equipment for this reason. We need foreign exchange. We can only earn it in the world market. They sometimes looked at us as if we were silly: the unknown "Zarya" intends to vie with foreign firms! But we held our ground. We found people in the same "Raznoek-sport" who agreed: why not try? We tried, and it turned out well.

Do not think that we are sending out something special for export—the same things that are on the domestic market. The main point is to offer, to supply a commodity. You do not have to iron that sheet on your knees—pass it through a press, and a neat, attractive label is needed. Each sheet has to be put into a polyethylene package. Yes, the work is painstaking, and it requires additional labor input. But all this is built into the cost of the sheet, and if it brings us 4 rubles and 85 kopecks in the domestic market, it sells for a little over 6 rubles in the world market.

[Question] Why not provide such a product for the domestic market as well?

[Answer] We are ready. But we're running into a paradox, I would say. The trade enterprises do not want to take products from us at the export level—too expensive, they say. Here is an example. We offer the trade handkerchiefs, packed 10 to the box. They refuse them, saying they want them in bulk because they are cheaper. But the cost of the box itself is only 11 kopecks...

It is even interesting to work for export now. It turns out that our firm is also completely competitive. In addition, we now have about 300,000 exchange rubles of the first category, that is, ones we can use to buy what we need in any country.

[Question] Olga Fedorovna, I have the impression that everything has gone well and smoothly with your shift to full cost accounting, and that you have no problems or questions...

[Answer] We have more than enough problems. Even if you take the state order. All our products are included in it. There is no room to maneuver; all the raw material is in accordance with the purchase order and all the sales are in accordance with authorized orders. So the Law on the [State] Enterprise is functioning poorly for the present. Take the above-plan profit. It is good that we get 17 kopecks from each ruble of planned profit. But why don't we receive those same 17 kopecks from the above-plan profit as well? It's not fair; after all, above-plan profit is the result of the collective's initiative and additional effort. An unforeseen windfall for the state, we can say. It is logical that a little more should be left for the enterprise here; they have been talking about this for a long time.

We've thought about renovation. But whom do we order the project plan from? Who will carry out the construction? How do we include the construction project in the plan? Every question is a brainteaser. Everything must

be "forced through." And the paperwork! The paper cycle is not subsiding in the heat of the struggle against bureaucratism; on the contrary, it is gathering momentum. Judge for yourselves: in 1986 we had 2,495 incoming and outgoing documents, last year there were 2,956, and in the first quarter of this year alone there were 1,169. But after all, we dismissed 15 of our 84 management employees.

Olga Fedorovna has been associated with the "Zarya" her entire working life. She started here as a foreman and climbed each rung of the official ladder; she has headed the association for 8 years now. And she is well aware from her experience that no one, not even a minister, will help if the labor collective itself does not get down to business and apply itself to restructuring in this case.

8936

Future U.S.-Soviet Relations Studied

18120097 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 32,
14-21 Aug 88 p 6

[Article entitled: "Not Everyone Can Think Alike—
Soviet Experts on the Future of Soviet-U.S. Relations"]

[Text]

Basic Objectives of Soviet Foreign Policy

	Agree	Disagree	Hard to say
Distinctions and contradictions between capitalist and socialist countries are so profound that cooperation between them can be only temporary and limited	14%	74%	12%
Soviet foreign policy's main objective is the spreading of socialism throughout the world	7%	77%	16%
Soviet foreign policy's main objective is the prevention of nuclear war	77%	7%	16%
In the future, bilateral Soviet-American relations will take a back seat vis-a-vis other world policy problems	43%	35%	22%

Nuclear weapons and the Security Factor

	Agree	Disagree
The existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the USSR contributes to the maintenance of peace	56%	27%
The existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the West contributes to the maintenance of peace	35%	44%
The full elimination of nuclear weapons is possible	43%	29%
The full elimination of nuclear weapons is impossible	26%	48%
The scrupulous maintenance of parity between the USSR and the USA is meaningless	73%	22%

The "American Threat"

Does it exist?		If it exists then in what spheres	
It does	43%	Military	73%
It Doesn't	33%	Economic Scientific and Technological	52%
		Ideological	44%

The USSR's Security

The most effective means for ensuring the USSR's security is:

Political	52%
Economic	46%
Politico-military	17%

and military policies. The research is being carried out in the framework of an international project by the Institute of the USA and Canada and the Institute of Space Research (USSR Academy of Sciences), in conjunction with Brown University (USA).

Ideology

Should the USSR switch to a policy of "unprovoking defence" (a renunciation of offensive arms and preservation of defensive arms)?

Yes, in any case, even unilaterally	30%
Yes, only on a reciprocal basis	62%
Shouldn't either way	4%

To what extent will ideological contradictions between the USSR and the USA hamper the normalization of Soviet-American relations?

To a great extent	49%
To a small extent	45%
Not at all	5%

What should the correlation of military forces between the USSR and the USA be?

Equal military might	50%
USSR must be stronger than USA	3%
USSR has no need to have as many arms as USA	46%

At present there are restrictions in importing books, periodicals, video films and other kinds of information from the USA and other Western countries. Keeping restrictions on pornography, war and racism propaganda, do you agree that other restrictions must be:

Preserved in their present state	4%
Increased	2%
Reduced	22%
Lifted altogether	70%

Soviet scientists have begun one of the first open polls of Soviet public opinion on problems of the USSR's foreign

Humanitarian Contacts

Should be developed regardless of the political climate	85%
Should be developed depending on the political climate	11%

Human Rights

	Yes	No
The observance of human rights in the USSR and the USA is strictly their personal matter	16	81
Human rights can't be a "zone outside criticism," including on the part of other countries	92	6

From 'Unanimity' to a Wide Range of Views

For too long a time the military and foreign policy sphere in the USSR was considered the prerogative by top government bodies. It was allegedly beyond ordinary people to have an insight into these questions. It was supposed that there was unanimous tacit public support for any foreign policy decisions, although it was clear to both intellectuals and the less well-versed that normal public opinion is always multidimensional and varied.

The poll of Soviet experts has shown that a whole number of traditional ideas and concepts, typical of the old mode of thinking, are dying out.

Isn't this evidenced by the fact that 43 percent of those polled foresee that future Soviet-American relations will occupy a less prominent place in world politics? Ever greater weight is being given to notions about the interdependence of socialism and capitalism, the USSR and the USA, and about the priority of general human interests over those of state or class.

The poll revealed a general shift in foreign policy views towards untraditional, alternative approaches, especially in regard to security matters.

There is a very interesting change in the attitude towards the problems of parity in the nuclear sphere. Let's recall our obsession, only in the recent past, with the principle of equality and equal security. In evidence today is a shift towards the concept of reasonable sufficiency. Considerable support has likewise been accorded the idea of switching to a policy of "unprovoking defence." Moreover, a fairly high percentage of the experts polled (30 percent) favour this kind of transition, if even unilaterally.

The poll has also shed light on the real difficulties and contradictions which arise in people's minds with the new mode of thinking, even among specialists. Thus, most of those polled spoke critically of the deterrence strategy, an item which has been the subject of criticism in the CPSU's foreign policy platform. But on the other hand, when the question was posed in a different, indirect way, the majority agreed that the existence of nuclear weapons in the hand of the USSR contributed to

the maintenance of peace. And no small percentage recognized the existence of nuclear weapons in the West's hands as such a deterrence factor as well.

Considerable differences also cropped up in assessing the desirability and possibility of nuclear disarmament. While the majority sees the total elimination of nuclear weapons as necessary, a mere 45 percent considers it feasible. And although the programme of stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear arms by the year 2000 was announced by the Soviet government as one of its top foreign policy priorities, only 6 percent of those polled believe that this is possible within the indicated time limits.

Six Scenarios

The results here are in many ways unexpected. And yet the main objective of the research was something different—by utilizing its results to computerize the most stable and recurring combinations of ideas and views characterizing the alternative notions of Soviet experts about the prospects for Soviet-American relations by the year 2010.

Six such scenarios resulted:

1. Ideological aspects and ideological struggle will be determining factors in Soviet-American relations in the future, as well.
2. This scenario could be called the "superpower" one: the realization of the USSR's state interests instead of the ideological interests of socialism as a system.
3. "Competitive coexistence." At its root is the notion that the main objective of Soviet foreign policy is to prevent the nuclear threat, so there is a need to reach compromises and understandings aimed at reducing arms. The USSR's security will be ensured under strictly verifiable agreements made with the USA. In this case, rivalry in Soviet-American relations will continue, but it will switch from the field of armaments to the political, economic, scientific, technological and humanitarian spheres.
4. A "comprehensive normalization" of Soviet-American relations. A lessening of tensions in relations with the USA in all areas, and a transition to extensive bilateral cooperation.
5. A "restructuring of international relations." It is proposed that a transition be effected to completely new principles of international relations and security-building consistent with the new mode of thinking, to a recognition of the importance of general human interests, and to a subordination of the interests of the USSR and the USA to those of the world community. A universal security system will be created which will

include special international agencies for the verification of disarmament agreements and international armed peace-keeping forces.

6. "The USSR concentrates on domestic problems." Unconditional priority is given to the interests of effective reconstruction within the country itself. The advocates of this scenario would like the USSR to unilaterally cut back on its foreign policy commitments, and concentrate resources on internal development instead. The improvement of Soviet-American relations will cease being a foreign policy priority. The USSR's security will mainly be ensured through unilateral action—through building up economic and defence capabilities while maintaining parity.

It can, of course, be asked why there is a need for these various scenarios if the Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives have been clearly defined and we are all well aware of what kind of future we would like to have for ourselves and our children. Generally speaking, this is correct. But after all, people are people, they have different interests and preferences, ideas and views. These differences must be known and taken into account when a political course is being formulated and implemented. Let us repeat that people's foreign political views and persuasions are not hard and fast—they can and must be developed and enriched. This will be impossible without open discussion and a comparison of different viewpoints.

It would seem that none of these six scenarios for the development of Soviet-American relations is either "correct" or "incorrect." All of them reflect the frames of mind and mentality of our experts in international affairs who, like all normal people, have different views and ideas. This is what socialist pluralism in the foreign policy field is all about.

To what extent are these scenarios consonant with the sentiments of the Soviet public at large? We shall look for an answer to this question in the next stage of our study.

This publication was prepared by staff members from the Institute of the USA and Canada and the USSR Academy of Sciences—Andrei Melville, D.Sc. (Philosophy), and Alexander Nikitin, Cand. Sc. (History).

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US Military Bases in Pacific Trust Territories Decried

18070134 Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No. 6,
Mar 88, pp 50-51

[Article by S. Vasilyev under the Agitator's Atlas rubric: "Micronesia: Annexation Under the Guise of Trusteeship"]

[Text] MICRONESIA—A group of small islands in the Western part of the Pacific Ocean, mainly to the North of the equator: the Mariana, Carolina and Marshall Islands

[US Trusteeship]; the Gilbert Islands and the Islands of Oceania [Banaba], British possessions; Nauru [an independent state since 1968]; and others. AREA—2,622 square km; POPULATION—Over 250,000; indigenous population, Micronesian. The majority of the islands are coral atolls; the remainder, of volcanic origin; largest island, Guam [US possession]. Climate, equatorial and subequatorial. Main occupation of indigenous inhabitants—fishing and cultivation of fruit trees. Bauxite and phosphorus are found in the Caroline Islands; phosphorus is extracted on the Nauru and Oceania Islands. The US and Great Britain have naval and air bases on certain islands in Micronesia.

"Not long ago we celebrated the creation of a new American commonwealth—the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, and two new free associations of states—the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands. We welcome these new participants to the Pacific Commonwealth." Such were the high-flown words with which US President Ronald Reagan described the US strategy in the area of national security, disseminated by the White House on 28 January 1987. Concealed by such colorful phrasing, as "the creation of a new American commonwealth," the American annexation of Micronesia has been going on for 40 years.

Even before receiving the mandate of the UN Security Council in 1947 for temporary administration of Micronesia, the US looked upon the islands and atolls which make it up as a convenient test range for nuclear and other kinds of weapons, and as a Pacific Ocean beach-head for the Pentagon. Therefore it is not surprising that after receiving the mandate, Washington immediately embarked on a policy of perpetuating its control over Micronesia, instead of fulfilling its obligation to bring about the independent political and economic development of the people of this territory. According to the definition given by American politician Gary Hart, a "military colony of the United States" has been established there.

Here the United States possesses a wide selection of neocolonialist devices: here there are not only numerous "agreements" and "supplementary agreements," but also "referendums" and "plebiscites," as well as intimidation and attempts to change the constitution of the island states... But one thing remains unchanged—the right bestowed on the US to take up the "defense" of Micronesia, that is, to maintain its numerous military bases, nuclear and chemical weapons storage sites, and test ranges there. F. Zeder, a personal representative of the President of the United States, without beating about the bush, declared to Congress, that "The agreements with the Micronesians are necessary in order to support the long-term fulfillment of important US strategic missions."

The annexation of Micronesia is an integral part of a more extensive scheme among imperialist circles in the USA.

According to the designs of the Pentagon, the military objectives in Micronesia must back up the military, naval and air bases which extend from Alaska and Japan in the North to Australia in the South; and from Europe in the West to the Pacific Ocean in the East.

The Pentagon's increased means for waging modern warfare, in the opinion of specialists, is capable of turning Micronesia into the most militarized part of the Pacific Ocean, from whence the US will be able to threaten not only the USSR and the other socialist countries, but also those states whose interests do not coincide with the interests of Washington.

Here is what the Pentagon possess in Micronesia: One of the largest US military bases in the Pacific is located on Guam, and 3,000 American military specialists are based on Kwajalein Atoll (Marshall Islands), which has been a US missile test range since 1959. Since that time hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from the base at Vandenberg in California have fallen into the lagoon surrounded by the islands of the atoll. Kwajalein Atoll is also used today for testing intercontinental ballistic missiles, including the MX and missiles launched from submarines.

The Pentagon has decided to create a beachhead here for carrying out its program of offensive space weapons known as "Star Wars." It was from Mek Island that a missile was launched to intercept another missile, 100 miles from its entry into the atmosphere. And the Altair radar, which is part of the US Air Force satellite tracking system, has been operating on the neighboring islands of Roy and Namur since 1982. Its mission is to guide antisatellite weapons to their target.

In the Carolinas, the Pentagon is building a naval base capable of servicing Trident missile-carrying submarines, and is building training areas for Marine infantry. On Tinian and Saipan (Mariana Islands), US Air Force engineers are modernizing airfields of World War II vintage. The Americans have plans to build the largest nuclear and chemical weapons storage site in the region on Babelthuap [Palau group]. A training center for special-purpose forces is also to be located there.

The Americans have gone to extreme lengths to force the people of Palau—which remains a part of far-flung Micronesia—to bow to the American diktat, and are turning this territory into a nuclear weapons base and storage site. And all of this in spite of the frequently-expressed wishes of the people of Palau not to permit the deadly nuclear weapons on their land. The exceptional importance of Palau is explained by the fact that the Pentagon plans to create a major military base here for Pacific Ocean strike forces, composed of 140 warships and 1,125 aircraft. So this is trust territory, a la America: this is why the USA requires Palau. If Washington gets its way here, the present population might be subjected to eviction.

From 1946 through 1958, almost 100 American nuclear and hydrogen weapons were test-fired in the Marshall Islands, as a result of which six atolls have disappeared from the face of the earth. When American Admiral D. Bert said that if necessary the 14,000 inhabitants of Belau might fall victim to "higher interests," he was merely citing the precedent of the actions on Bikini and Eniwetok. The inhabitants of the latter were resettled several times from place to place, and were deprived of their means of existence. To this day, people in the Marshall Islands are still suffering illness and dying from the radioactivity resulting from those blasts. Those who lived through the American blasts are giving birth to either stillborn or deformed children. Because of the high residual radiation, the atolls of Bikini, Eniwetok and Rongelap are not suitable for life, and even to visit them temporarily is dangerous. Both the fish and the surrounding waters have been poisoned.

It is worth remembering, that it was from a base on one of these very Micronesian Islands—Tinian—that the US aircraft which dropped the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki took off.

Throughout the period of their "governing" of Micronesia the US Government has ignored the protests of the peaceful inhabitants with respect to annexation of this territory. In a letter to the participants of the UN General Assembly special session on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev pointed to the annexationist activities of the USA with respect to Micronesia. It was indicated in the document that this is a vivid example of how the imperialist powers foist various neocolonial statuses on such territories in their strivings to preserve their hegemony over such independent territories, and are turning them into their own strategic military strongpoints and jumping-off points for aggression.

The rapacious actions of the US with respect to Micronesia are convincing evidence of the fact that the most reactionary circles in Washington are striving to make the world over as their own patrimony, to plant the "law of the jungle" in international relations, and to put down with force the people's desire for freedom and national independence.

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U.S.-USSR Computer Camp for Pupils

18250069 Tbilisi: ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
8 May 88 p 3

[Article under "Contacts, Cooperation" rubric: "Children of the Future"]

[Text] This is what they call the Soviet-American computer camp for pupils that opens in July of this year in Tbilisi. In August, a similar camp will begin to operate in

the American city of Aspen in the state of Colorado. An agreement on this was signed in Tbilisi by the heads of the Soviet department of Worldwide Laboratory, the Rustaveli Society and the Georgian Ministry of Education, the administration of "Rocky Mountain School" and public representatives of the city of Aspen. The local Administration of Health Resorts under the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers looked after the guests and offered an interesting program during their stay in the republic.

"The main goal of the organization of joint camps," said V.A. Gelovani, deputy chairman of the Soviet department of Worldwide Laboratory, in an interview given to the correspondent of GRUZINFORM, "is the education of young people in the ideas of humanism, the inculcation in them of a sense of ecological responsibility, and the consciousness of personal involvement and interest in the fate of the planet."

"The idea of establishing a camp for Soviet and American pupils received the broad approval of our public," says Georgian Minister of Education N.Sh. Vasadze. "In

particular, the Rustaveli Society offered to be one of the sponsors of the impending action. Well-known cultural figures expressed their intention to provide moral and material assistance. Among them are the winners of the Lenin Prize, artist and monument builder Zurab Tsireteli and film director Tengiz Abuladze."

"This project interested us so much that we did not wait to formalize a traditional mission and utilized the services of tourist organizations," says Emery Lovins, renowned American physicist and director of the research center of the Rocky Mountain Institute in the state of Colorado, who came to the USSR with a group of teachers, architects and designers. "The very fact of the agreement on the organization of a joint camp was possible because of the process of perestroika, which both of our sides need, in my opinion. The meetings of our national leaders strengthen trust between the peoples."

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Certain Aspects of West European Integration
*18070137 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 2, Feb 88 pp 35-50*

[Article by Yu. Borko: "On Certain Aspects of Studying the Processes of West European Integration"]

[Text] Systematic study of the processes of West European integration began in our country 3 decades ago. Its starting point was, probably, a discussion which unfolded on the pages of the weekly *NOVOYE VREMYA* in 1957. It was followed by a number of other scientific discussions, the most fruitful of which was the International Conference of Marxist Scientists in Moscow (1962). There is no need to reproduce the content of the discussions and the points of view and arguments of opponents within this article, but we definitely should emphasize the primary point: The elaboration by Soviet scientists of the Marxist concept of regional capitalist economic integration¹ was accompanied by rather lengthy theoretical polemics, during the course of which a number of oversimplified ideas and categorical assessments were repudiated. In subsequent years and decades, the Marxist analysis of capitalist integration was substantially supplemented and deepened.

Is there a reason to mention now the history of the study of the processes of West European integration? In our opinion there is, because this is one of perhaps a few examples which indicate that in the 1960s and 1970s, despite certain hindering circumstances, Soviet social scientists continued creative elaboration of international problematics. The results of this activity was reflected in the USSR's current European foreign policy, including in the idea of an "All-European Home" and in the new approach to mutual relations with the European Community (EC).

Recalling what has been achieved makes it possible to assess more precisely what has not yet been done. Since that is precisely the purpose of this article, the author would not want to look like a person who jumps from one extreme to another and repudiates today everything that was accepted in the past.

I

So, it is a matter of the study of West European integration having gaps. Of course, this is not "terra incognita." Experts know that they exist, but for a long time it was customary to treat some of them as being in the ticklish category, seeming to not notice and to avoid them. If they were mentioned, it was in rapid speech and not very

intelligibly. There are also aspects which require rethinking. New facts have been amassed, and new tendencies have emerged which prompt a critical reassessment of a number of previous ideas on the processes of West European integration.

The first question is on the extent and motives of support of integration by the population, by the public. The many years of regular public opinion polls—"Eurobarometer"²—can serve as the most common indicator of the level of this support. According to data of a poll conducted in nine member-states of the EC in September 1973, 63 percent of those polled favored integration of Western Europe. The average indicator of support revealed by 13 subsequent polls between 1975 and 1983 was 72 percent. A poll conducted in October-November 1984 in 10 EC countries (the nine plus Greece) gave a result of 77 percent, and one conducted in October-November 1986 gave 80 percent.³ In the six original EC member-states the support was markedly higher than in the rest (from 75 percent in the Netherlands to 91 percent in Italy and Luxembourg), while it was 69 percent in Great Britain, 66 percent in Ireland, 45 percent in Denmark, and 71 percent in Greece (according to the 1986 poll). Finally, according to a poll conducted in March-April 1986, 77 percent of those polled in Portugal and 75 percent in Spain advocated integration of Western Europe.⁴ Responses to the question on attitude towards their country's participation in the EC also provided a similar picture. Between 1973 and 1985, an average of 56 percent of those polled favored it, 23 percent were opposed, and 21 percent either had no opinion ("neither good nor bad") or declined to respond altogether.⁵

Naturally, the question arises as to how to assess the numerous actions of the working people—workers, peasants, farmers, and the population experiencing economic depression—against the negative social consequences of capitalist integration and against a "Europe of trusts." Our scientific literature, and particularly mass propaganda, often interpreted these actions as an indication that the bulk of the working population is opposed to West European integration and the European Community. However, this does not conform to reality. Of course, attitudes of dissatisfaction, skepticism and indifference are fairly widespread. They are caused by the pro-monopoly socio-economic policy of the EC, the low effectiveness and bureaucratic nature of its institutions, the constant contradictions and conflicts among member-states, and so forth. Nevertheless, these noted moods are combined with approval by the majority of the population of the course toward integration of Western Europe.

What are the motives of this approval? They are also repeatedly brought to light by "Eurobarometer." For example, the results of a poll conducted in 10 EC countries in 1985 (see table) gives a definite idea about them.

Table. Choice Between Integrated and Separate Actions of EC Countries Needed To Resolve Certain Problems (in percent)
[Source: "Europe as Seen by Europeans. European Polling 1973-1986" (EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION, No 4, 1986, p 24)]

Problems	Integrated Actions	Separate Actions
Assistance to Third World	87	13
Fighting terrorism and crime	84	16
Environmental protection	79	21
Developing scientific research	78	22
Providing energy resources	77	23
Assistance to the least developed areas	69	31
Fighting unemployment	65	35
Fighting price increases	65	35
Safeguarding national security	64	36
Consumer protection	55	45

As the poll showed, the range of problems with respect to which joint actions were preferred over separate actions includes foreign policy and national security, scientific and technical progress and environmental protection, fighting terrorism, such very critical issues as unemployment and inflation, and so forth. Thus, support of the course toward integration is based on a significantly broader foundation than just economic and social interests directly affecting the everyday life of the populace. In essence, at the basis of this support is the widespread idea that an integrated Western Europe is more capable of solving the entire complex of internal and external problems on which the development of society, the future of the region and its place in world economics and politics depend. In our opinion, this conclusion is the key to understanding the interaction between integration and public opinion, between integration and the positions of the main socio-political forces.

For example, it explains why economic crises (1974-1975 and 1980-1982) and the resultant exacerbation of social problems are almost not reflected in the "Eurobarometer" indicators characterizing the level of support for integration and participation in the Council of Europe. In 1974-1975 it was even higher than in the much more prosperous years of 1970-1973, and in 1980-1982 was only somewhat lower than in 1977-1979. In other words, the economic and social difficulties did not cancel out the ideas that integration of West European countries gives them better chances to preserve independence and development.

So, the many years of "Eurobarometer" polls make it possible to compile a certain picture of the attitude toward West European integration at the "unorganized" public opinion level.

How do these polls correspond to the positions of organized social and political forces? It must be said that the situation in this case is unique. On the one side, the course toward integration is supported by the bourgeois parties—from the extreme right to left-wing radicals, associations of businessmen, militaristic circles, and the

like; on the other is the majority of organizations of the working class and democratic intelligentsia, comprising the nucleus of the democratic camp in the countries of Western Europe.

Of the parties of the Socialist International (they dominate in the working-class movement of almost all West European countries), until recent years only the British Laborists and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) came out against their countries' participation in the EC, but in recent years they also have dropped this slogan. All national trade-union centers of a social-democratic and Christian orientation in EC countries support integration; as for the left flank of the West European trade-union movement, the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) takes the same stand, but the French General Labor Confederation (CGT) at least assesses integration and the EC as an irreversible reality from which it must proceed in its activities. The Italian Communist Party, the largest in Western Europe, takes the stand of active support of integration. The communist parties of the rest of the states included in the original six participants of the ECSC [European Coal and Steel Community] and the EEC follow a more cautious approach, recognizing the objective nature of integration and the inevitability of participation in the EC. Finally, the communist parties of Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Greece and Portugal advocate their countries leaving the EC. The Communist Party of Spain has supported the country's joining the EC, but the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain has taken the opposite stand.

A significant portion of the democratic intelligentsia is associated with the working-class movement and for the most part played an active role in developing a the positive approach of workers' parties and trade unions to integration and in determining the tasks which face them within the framework of the EC. Integration is also basically supported by democratic circles of the so-called non-party intelligentsia—scientists, writers, figures engaged in art, and so forth.

This raises a legal question about the motives of such support. It should be said that in our literature it is not analyzed sufficiently clearly or in all its aspects. Since the late 1950's, the motives which guided business circles, bourgeois parties and ideologists, militarist circles, in short, all social and political forces seeing integration as a means of strengthening internal foundations and international positions of West European capitalism, were repeatedly and quite thoroughly examined. But what are the incentives of approval of the course toward integration by the majority of labor organizations? And by broad sections of the population? And what is motivating democratic forces to support this course? Unfortunately, our literature does not provide a detailed answer to these questions. Suffice it to say that the most complete analysis of the positions of the West European working-class movement with respect to integration was set forth in the collective work "Western Europe: Workers

Against Monopolies," published back in 1965. Works which came out later, as a rule, give a fragmented picture; omissions are typical, and outdated stereotypical assessments are frequent.

In our opinion, there are a number of arguments in favor of seriously analyzing the positions of that part of democratic forces which relates positively to the idea of West European integration.

Firstly, such an analysis is a constituent part of the study of West European integration as a whole. Above all, here we must reject the bias which at times was demonstrated in the past. Without this it is impossible to give an accurate assessment of the alignment of social forces waging a struggle due to integration and in connection with it; without this a realistic view of the status and prospects of integration of Western Europe is inconceivable.

Secondly, in this regard we need to analyze the role of socio-political factors and the mechanisms of West European integration and their comparison with other economic factors. As it appears, this question has not been adequately reflected in our scientific literature and, what is more, has been interpreted in an oversimplified and one-sided manner.

Thirdly, today the analysis can be based on more profound and precise ideas on the correlation of socio-political forces in the countries of Western Europe, on the positions and real role of various organizations of the working class, including social democrats, and also general democratic movements, and on the extent of their influence on social development. This became possible after the long struggle between creative and dogmatic approaches as a result of many years of study, on the basis of which a number of new fundamental tenets and assessments have been formulated and included in program documents of the 27th CPSU Congress.

Fourthly, the increased topicality of the theme is the result of the current international situation. The present foreign-policy course of the Soviet Union, based on concepts of a new political mentality and creation of a comprehensive system of international security, has opened up new prospects in the struggle to prevent nuclear war and ensure stable peace on earth. In light of this and taking into account the growing trend in Western Europe toward greater realism in policy, the question again arises about the correlation of West European integration and all-European cooperation. It is obvious that this is one of the key aspects of the struggle between forces of reaction and democracy in the EC.

II

The history of studying West European integration in our science developed in such a manner that the greatest attention was given to its economic aspects—preconditions, basic directions, forms, consequences and contradictions of forming a regional economic system. It is

possible that this was caused in part by the characteristics of the theoretical discussions of the late 1950's and early 1960's. At that time, the oversimplified point of view that the ECSC and EEC were new variations of traditional imperialist alliances, emerging on the basis of a temporary harmony of interests of the member-states during the struggle for a redivision of spheres of influence and inevitably breaking up as a result of the development of inter-imperialist contradictions, was subjected to just criticism. It ignored the deep-seated processes which had developed in the capitalist economy after World War II and the sharply intensified trend toward internationalization of production and capital. In this light, emphasis on studying economic integration was natural.

The systematic study of other aspects began considerably later. In the 1970's and 1980's there appeared informative works which analyzed the processes of political integration, the institutional system of the European Community, foreign political cooperation of the member-states, and so forth. Nevertheless, in our opinion, the entire complex of questions indicated by the phrase "the role of socio-political factors and the mechanisms of West European integration" have still not been sufficiently studied and comprehended. Has this not resulted in an extreme schematization of the processes being studied and created a somewhat "distorted" picture of their purely economic determination?

Meanwhile, questions are emerging in the very first familiarization with the history. In fact, the well-known "Schuman Plan" and the Paris Agreement based on it for creating the ECSC are dated 1950-1952, that is, at a time when the economies of the "group of six" countries had barely recovered from the after-effects of the war and the degree of internationalization of economic ties was no higher than, say, in the 1920's. And in 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was signed, economic integration in the true sense of this concept, signifying a high degree of interweaving of national reproduction processes, was in an embryonic state.

From this it follows that we cannot explain the creation of the ECSC and EEC as inter-state alliances of a new type, remaining exclusively within the limits of economic analysis. In any case, such an explanation would be incomplete. It is also necessary to analyze two inter-related groups of factors and processes: first, the reasons (factors) for integration which go beyond the economic basis; second, the socio-political mechanism by means of which any objective reasons and stimuli (including economic) are transformed into realized interests and then into political guidelines, actions and decisions.

In our view, the historical experience gained by the countries of this region in the first half of the 20th century should be included among the most important factors which gave initial impetus to the real process of the integration of Western Europe. This the same objective reality as economic or other social processes which

unfolded before the very eyes of contemporaries. Having endured the most profound upheavals, European capitalism became West European capitalism, was deprived of its colonial periphery, and so forth. But this is also the experience of peoples who went through the horrors and calamities of economic crises, fascism, and two world wars. Hence, it is understandable why the idea of integrating Western Europe, as a means of eliminating inter-state contradictions and conflicts, especially Franco-German, and a means of overcoming nationalism and chauvinism, received support during the post-war years in the most diverse social strata and sociopolitical organizations, including those belonging to the democratic camp.

Another factor should be ranked with this—the new balance of forces in the world arena, which became clear during the very first postwar years and also perceived as an objective political reality dictating the need for integration of Western Europe. This factor—let us call it geopolitical—by no means came down to a community of socialist states emerging side by side with the capitalist states on the continent. For Western Europe, its weakness compared to the allied “superpower”—the United States—was distressing and unacceptable. In time, other changes also took place in the alignment of forces in the international arena. Another center of modern capitalism had developed—Japan. Developing countries which had also taken the path of creating regional groupings were beginning to play an increasingly active role. With all the dissimilarity of these changes in the international balance of forces, they influenced the West European countries in one direction—toward their integration. Despite the differences in interpreting the place and role of this alliance in the system of international relations, at least from the early 1950s there existed widespread agreement that this was the best method of defending the independence and interests of the West European countries and ensuring their future. The public opinion poll data cited indicate that this point of view still dominates in EC member-states today.

Finally, one cannot help but take into account a quite significant and, in our opinion, underestimated factor—the long-standing and firmly deep-seated in public consciousness idea of the inseparability of the historical destinies of the European peoples, the unity of European culture and European civilization. As a phenomenon of spiritual life, “Europeanism” can be considered a centuries-old tradition. It emerged as a political phenomenon in modern times. In the mid-19th century, it was transformed into the well-known slogan “United States of Europe.” Its origin is most often linked to Victor Hugo’s speech in Paris in 1848. During the decades that followed, the idea of “United States of Europe” was supported by European democrats and later by parties of the First and Second Internationals, including the bolsheviks, right up to August 1915.

The collapse of the Second International during World War II was also the downfall of this slogan, canceled by

the shift of the majority of working-class parties to the position of social-chauvinism. It was to this time that Lenin was referring in his conclusion that the slogan “United States of Europe,” remaining vulnerable from a political standpoint, as a slogan of the struggle against the three reactionary monarchies in Europe was untenable from an economic standpoint, for under conditions of domination by monopolies and imperialist reaction it is these forces which determine its real content.⁶ This conclusion was reconfirmed in the 1920’s, when the idea of “United States of Europe” was adopted by the extremely reactionary, anti-Soviet and anti-communist movement “Pan-Europeanism.”

Nevertheless, “Europeanist” moods remained widespread not only in bourgeois liberal circles but also in the social democrat movement and among the progressive intelligentsia. What is more, in the 1930’s and especially during World War II and the Resistance Movement, many perceived “Europeanism” as the answer to the rampage of chauvinism and racism, as an antithesis to the cult of violence in international relations, and as an ideological formula taking in the fundamental values of the European progressive culture—democracy, equality, social justice, and so forth. This ideological stand largely explains the support given by a considerable part of the democratic forces to the real process of West European integration.

The question of where in this the boundary between reality and illusions lies needs to be dealt with separately. We should recall the substitution of the phrase “unified Europe” by the abbreviated phrase “unified Western Europe,” the anti-Sovietism and “cold war,” to which the “Europeanist” social-democratic movement paid a handsome tribute, and so forth. But, again, this is a special topic. Here we would just emphasize that the above political factors and ideological motives played an independent and significant role as stimuli of West European integration.

How significant? It appears that initially it even played a leading role, and not only due to the relative weakness of the economic stimuli during the creation of the first of the communities—the ECSC. What is more important is that the political realities were a more obvious, more convincing motivation in favor of integrating Western Europe. Another characteristic of this motivation was that it appealed not to social and class interests, but to nationwide interests. This is how it was perceived in reformist organizations of the working class and in broad circles of the democratic intelligentsia. Above all, a broad social and political consensus emerged on this basis—from the right-wing to a considerable part of the left-wing—without which under the conditions of post-war party and parliamentary democracy it was impossible to shift to “European construction.”

But political factors by themselves could not ensure a prolonged and stable development of West European integration. This was demonstrated quite clearly by the

failure of the hasty attempts to create a political and military alliance within the framework of "Little Europe" (1952-1954). Development of the European Community became possible only after the processes of internationalization and integration of capitalist production began to acquire their own dynamism in the exceptionally favorable conditions of economic development in the 1950's and 1960's. The economy simultaneously became both a sphere of intensive development of West European integration and the material basis of the latter. Accordingly, economic and social motives for integration advanced to the forefront.

However, the political factors of West European integration remain in force today; what is more, their role grows when inter-state contradictions in the EC cause a crisis situation or when the processes of economic integration come to a standstill. In the first case, as it was during the institutional crisis of 1965-1966, for example, the objective need for unity as a condition of EC member-states' successful defense of their interests in the modern world served as a decisive argument motivating them to compromise. In the second case, more aggressive actions in the political sphere become a sort of compensator for the slowed-down economic integration. This interrelationship was clearly demonstrated in the 1970s when a sharp worsening of the overall conditions of capitalist reproduction frustrated the plans for transition to an economic and currency union and intensified protectionist tendencies in the EC.

In the late 1970's, the processes of economic integration (the creation of a European currency system, a course toward forming the European Technology Community, and so forth) again intensified. At the same time, there was a clear trend toward stepping up the foreign-policy cooperation of the member-states and increasing the role of the EC as an independent subject of international relations. For the sake of this goal, the EC accepted Greece, Spain and Portugal as members, despite the fact that this step markedly complicated the development of economic integration "deep into the interior." The desire to link the economic and political aspects of "European construction" permeated a new, important standard document of the EC—the Unified European Act, which entered into force on 1 July 1987.

The mutually complementary nature of the economic and political components helps to broaden support of "European construction" and preserve the consensus which developed in the 1950's and 1960's with respect to a unified Western Europe. Strictly speaking, manifested in this is the function of the social and political mechanism which transforms the objective factors of West European integration into motives, decisions and actions of socio-political forces.

III

The broader the spectrum of forces declaring themselves supporters of some new trend of social development and new slogans, the more complex the ganglion of ideological and political contradictions emerging on this basis.

West European integration is no exception to this rule, and its history is also a history of continuous confrontation of the interests and goals by which organizations of capital and labor, bourgeois and working-class parties, militaristic circles and peace advocates, and forces of reaction and forces of progress are guided in their attitude toward integration of Western Europe.

During the course of their confrontation, at least four basic concepts of West European integration have been identified—bourgeois-conservative, bourgeois-reformist, social-democratic, and democratic alternative of communist parties.

Both bourgeois concepts—conservative and reformist—are united in defining the main goals of integration: strengthening economic foundations and socio-political stabilization of West European capitalism and turning a unified Western Europe into one of the centers of power in the modern world, serving simultaneously as a competitor of the United States in inter-imperialist rivalry and as its class and military-political partner in the North Atlantic Alliance. Some of the guidelines of the concepts differ, but they are of little importance from the practical political standpoint.

The conservatives' approach to economic integration, and also to its social consequences, is determined by their adherence to a market economy minimally restricted by government regulation and open hostility to the organized working-class movement and its programs for protecting workers' interests. On the international plane, a unified Western Europe initially was thought of by conservatives exclusively in the categories of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, confrontation with the community of socialist countries, and the "position of strength" policy. The most reactionary and militaristic circles in Western Europe still hold these positions.

Bourgeois-reformist circles advocate a more balanced use of market mechanisms and regulation in the process of regional economic integration, as well as switching methods of social partnership to a regional level. As for the foreign-policy aspects of integration, the bourgeois-reformist concept evolved from supporting the "cold war" to recognizing the need and benefit of all-European cooperation, including between integration alliances such as the EC and CEMA.

The ideological basis of the social-democratic interpretation of West European integration is the concept of "democratic socialism," in accordance with which a future unified Western Europe must demonstrate the example of a society which is an alternative both to socialism in the USSR and East European countries and to American-style classical capitalism. Economic integration is seen as one of the absolute prerequisites for stable growth and modernization of production, increase in the standard of living, and implementation of social reforms; political integration is seen as a way to overcome inter-state and international strife, on the one

hand, and to create a regional system of democratic institutions, on the other. Such a Western Europe, in the schemes of social democrats, could again become one of the poles of the modern world and could play an independent and active role in the international arena as a "third" counterbalancing force in the system which developed during the postwar period of "bipolar" relations. Such was the concept of integration advanced by the social-democratic and socialist parties of the "group of six" countries at the turn of the 1950's to 1960's and approved by the Socialist International. But this ideological concept still had to be translated into the language of political practice and made to conform to realities—with the system of international relations as a whole, existing social relations, the alignment of forces in the West European countries, and also with the rules of political behavior adopted by the social democrats.

The fourth concept—the democratic alternative to capitalist integration—was proposed by communist parties of the "group of six" countries in the 1960's after they dropped the slogan of withdrawal of their countries from the Common Market and its dissolution. It was based on a recognition of the objective and irreversible nature of economic integration and on the fact of the existence of the ECSC and EC. It advanced to the forefront the task of the struggle by democratic forces, led by the working class, to use integration in the interests of the workers, to democratize the institutions of the EC and to change the social essence of its policies, linking this goal with the overall democratic and socialist alternative to West European capitalism. A constituent part of this communists' concept is the idea of a peace-oriented Western Europe which had embarked on the path of cooperation with socialist and developing countries on the basis of equality.

Just what was the correlation of forces which were defending the various concepts of integration and, on a broader plane, the correlation of class forces in postwar Western Europe?

This may come as a surprise, but there is no unified opinion on this account in our literature. More than that, two popular points of view exist. One lies in the phrase "the growing omnipotence of capital;" the other in the these on the more favorable historical conditions which developed during the postwar period and the broader opportunities in the struggle of the working class to improve its socio-economic position and political rights. The disparity to the facts and the anti-historical nature of the first point of view appear obvious. The second reflects the dominant trend of the postwar decades, but it is very general and vague and does not contain qualitative characteristics of the correlation of class forces during this period.

In our opinion, during the postwar period, in any event up to the mid-1970's, in West European countries with bourgeois-democratic regimes there existed a balance of

class forces, manifested in the sphere of the socio-economic struggle as a balance of organized capital and organized labor, but in the internal political arena as a balance between bourgeois and working-class parties. The balance is unstable with continual deviations to both sides under the influence of specific circumstances—economic and political, domestic and foreign. Nevertheless, during the last 40 years these deviations have never once crossed that line which would signify a return to the situation typical for the period 1920-1939, all the more for the eve of World War I.

This unique socio-political situation had its consequences: first, the long, lasting almost 3 decades, alliance of two types of reformism—bourgeois and social-democratic, implementing the strategy of social compromise;⁷ second, the advancing to the forefront of the function of the state as an "arbitrator" and umpire in relations of labor and capital. Relying on the aforementioned alliance, the state implemented a complex of reforms, including creating a system of state regulation of economic and social processes, reforms in the area of social security, health and education, and expanding the framework of bourgeois democracy. The concepts of "mixed economy," "state of prosperity," "pluralistic democracy," and a number of others became the ideological frame of these measures and announced the emergence of a "new society" in the West European countries.

A series of crises in the mid-1970's and early 1980's put an end to the euphoria of "economic miracles" and social illusions. Capitalism remained capitalism, substantially modified, but retaining its basis. Social-democratic leaders and ideologists openly admitted this, as well as the erroneousness of their previous assertions that the capitalist system had become a thing of the past. Capital's offensive on the positions of the working class, the intensification and growth of the influence of political conservatism, and the collapse of former centrist coalitions in many countries attested to the change in the correlation of socio-political forces in most countries of Western Europe and the formation of a new majority within the ruling class which took the path not of social compromise and reforms but of "social revenge." All this contributed to the "enlightenment" of social democrats and stimulated their search for new orienting points in theory and practical activities.

The new situation which developed was directly related to the clash of the different concepts of West European integration and to the political struggle which anticipated every step on the path of the rise and development of the European Community. The alignment of forces on fundamental issues of development of the society also determined to a certain extent the specific nature of positions in questions of West European integration, helping to understand, in particular, from what calculations the social democrats were proceeding in their concept, as well as their miscalculations. The social-democratic and socialist parties of EC countries (at that time the "group of six") intended to shift to a regional

level the political strategy which they were implementing within the nation-state framework and which in the end would make them the majority parties or at least leaders of some centrist coalition. Thus, they viewed movement toward a society of "democratic socialism" in individual countries as a prerequisite and guarantee of implementation of their concept of West European integration.

As was already noted, in the mid-1970's, social-democratic leaders had to reexamine their assessment of the results of postwar development of the West European society. But even earlier they had to admit the erroneous of their calculations in the area of "European construction." By the late 1960's, no longer just the communist parties, left-wing socialist groups and class trade unions but also virtually all trade-union centers of the EC countries had risen in opposition to the economic and social policy of the EC, qualifying it as a path to creating a "Europe of trusts." Social democrats also began subjecting this policy to increasingly harsh criticism. Such a change was natural. In fact, whereas social reformism achieved certain results within individual countries, relying on the real power of the entire national working-class movement, including its militant left wing, at the EC level the correlation of socio-political forces proved to be clearly not in favor of the democratic camp. This was one of the main calculations of the "European" concept of the social democracy, and to a significant extent it was guilty of the split.

Here we should mention first of all the underestimation of big capital's ability to make mobile use of the opportunities which opened up thanks to the creation of the EC. A consequence and material expression of this ability was the priority development of private-capital market integration, in which West European transnational corporations were interested in much more than creating a regional system of regulating economic and social processes. Later, the organizational potential of big capital was also underestimated. Despite the contradictions between its national and other groupings, it was able to consolidate on the EC level more quickly and in greater depth than the working-class movement and democratic forces as a whole. This affected all directions of the EC's practical policy—trade and tariff, industrial, social, regional and so forth.

The superiority of big capital was also manifested in the institutional structure of the EC—its technocratic and bureaucratic nature, and the impotence of quasi-democratic representative bodies created within its framework. Taking into account the role which the system of representative democracy plays in the tactics of social democrats, one can conclude that here they ended up deprived of their customary field of activities and traditional methods of influencing the decisionmaking process. Finally, the last (in position, not importance!) circumstance which predetermined the unfavorable correlation of forces in the EC was the anti-communism of social-democratic leadership, intensified by the "cold war" situation in the 1950s and 1960s; it prevented

consolidation of the working-class and democratic forces on a community scale. Whereas within the nation-state framework ideological and political barriers nevertheless were broken through by the actual unity of actions of the workers and their organizations, this was not the case at the EC level.

Does this mean that the correlation of forces on the EC scale has not undergone any changes and leaves no prospects for the working-class and general democratic movements in the struggle to change the EC policies and the social trend of the integration processes? It is extremely difficult to answer this definitively. Apparently, this in part (but only in part!) explains the sharp differences in the assessments and positions of individual organizations of the working class.

In our opinion, two trends which manifested themselves back in the 1970's give reason to assert that the potential of the democratic forces' influence on the development of the EC has been far from exhausted. The first is a trend toward consolidating the working-class and democratic movement. It is expressed in the creation of the European Trade Union Confederation, in the social democrats' critical reexamination of some of their positions, including those concerning the approach to cooperation with communist parties, in the increasing coordination of the international activity of alternative movements and, finally, in the search for a new unity of left-wing forces in Western Europe with participation by all contingents of the working-class movement, the democratic intelligentsia, the "Greens," and so forth. The second is a trend toward stepping up the influence of democratic forces on certain aspects of the activities of EC bodies. One can include in the manifestations of this trend the marked increase in the range of social policies and expenditures for them, the initiated practical implementation of programs of regional development and reconversion of critical sectors, the transition to direct elections to the European Parliament, and somewhat expanding its powers, which increases its potential role as a democratic institution in the decisionmaking mechanism in the EC. With all the modesty of the changes, they are in essence the first indications of a real influence of democratic forces on the internal policies of the EC and under conditions when the process of their consolidation is in the beginning not the concluding stage.

There also exists a number of weighty factors of an opposite nature. The first is the increased concentration of production potential in the hands of big capital and West European transnational corporations. The second is the offensive by conservative forces beginning in the 1970's. Although they have not yet managed to accomplish their proclaimed "social revenge" and eliminate the basic gains of the workers in the preceding decades, this danger is still great. Moreover, it is exacerbated by the unfavorable economic conditions for the workers. By the mid-1980's the West European countries had come out of the period of crisis and depression, but their

economic growth rates remain quite moderate and, judging by forecasts, are unlikely to increase substantially in the near future. But it is not just and not so much a matter of rates as it is a revival of unemployment—a direct result of capitalist use of the fruits of the scientific and technical revolution. And this is another factor, most unfavorable for democratic forces.

These circumstances function not only in the sphere of "European construction"—they manifest themselves in all directions of socio-economic and political development of the EC countries. This has also caused sharp theoretical discussions in the democratic camp and intensive quests for concepts of social transformations, renewed strategy and tactics. Integration is a constituent and integral part of that reality which the working-class and democratic movement of the countries of the region is encountering, which it cannot "cover" or declare "non-existent" and, finally, which requires a political response.

IV

Up to now, it has been a question of the interrelation between integration and social development of West European countries. But integration is also a phenomenon of international affairs, important both from the standpoint of restructuring inter-state relations in Western Europe and its influence on the system of relations on a global level.

During the nearly 40-year period of its development, the EC has been unable to overcome inter-state contradictions and conflicts which have numerous times put it in a crisis situation, for behind them is the historical past which has not been fully overcome, but above all the keen competition of national groupings of monopoly capital in domestic and foreign markets and the diversity of economic and political interests of EC members. It has not managed to overcome the inter-nation discord and eliminate the social causes of national minority movements.

One cannot help but see significant changes also. They are expressed in the shift from relations of open hostility or at least mutual unpleasantness that were dominant in the past to a new type of relations which can be characterized as "competitive cooperation." The mechanism created within the framework of the EC for regulating conflicts and coordinating the interests of the member-states played a large role. At its basis is a neo-functionalist concept of integration. Although this mechanism breaks down from time to time, it nevertheless functions, ensuring slow but gradual movement of the EC along the path of integration. Such a mechanism does not yet exist in any other region of the capitalist world, be it developed or developing countries, and its experience merits close attention.

This, so to speak, is the level of inter-state relations. But there is another very broad sphere of social relations—party, professional, cultural, in the area of education, international tourism, personal, and so forth—much more diverse and intensive than in the past. Their development is stimulated both by the purposeful activities of state agencies and by social initiatives. Modern mass media, particularly television, also play a most important role in this. In essence, it is a question of the initiated process of integrating national societies, without which, as is becoming increasingly obvious, the transition to the most developed forms of integration is impossible.

These changes today have made Western Europe a zone of the most stable relations between the states comprising it (not counting, of course, the countries of the socialist community).

The process of West European integration appears much more contradictory in the context of global relations which are characterized by a complex configuration of splits and divisions—between West and East, North and South, and also within the West itself.

Today it appears obvious that the rise of the European Community as an independent subject of world politics is the same objective reality as economic integration. Therefore, we should approach in a new manner the analysis of the question of the EC's place and role in the system of international relations, isolating in it two aspects: the objective basis and its subjective interpretation. In this light, it is as if the problem has not been examined in our literature. Of course, such an approach requires fundamental substantiation, which cannot be covered within the limits of this article. We will limit ourselves to certain views which may become the subject of future discussion.

In our view, the objective basis of the trend toward turning the EC into an independent subject of world politics is the characteristics of their position in the modern world, common to all West European countries and predetermining the overall specific nature of vitally important interests. These interests consist of ensuring, first of all, national security and peace, primarily in Europe; secondly, ensuring economic security, decisive factors of which are the guaranteed import of energy and industrial raw materials and the availability of reliable export markets. The EC approach to solving these key problems cannot help but differ from the approach of all other countries and regional alliances, and not only those with opposing social systems but also those with the same type, including the United States. The farther Western Europe moves along the path of integration in general and foreign-policy integration in particular, the more pronounced the trend will be toward independent actions determined by the specific nature of the position and interests of the region.

At the same time, these actions are determined—and even more so will be determined in the future—by the relations of global interdependence which have developed. The nature and method of coordinating the interests of the EC with them also depends on its role in the international arena. The question is, what are the subjective ideas of the main socio-political forces of Western Europe on the methods of protecting its vitally important interest in the modern world? In our opinion, there is no simple answer to this question, which is confirmed by the experience of the past decades which demonstrated two substantially differing approaches of Western Europe to safeguarding its own interests and determining its international role.

The first pertains to the period from the late 1940's to the mid-1960's. The foreign-policy reference points of the "group of six" and the majority of other West European countries were being determined basically by the "cold war" situation. The slogan "unified Europe" was being interpreted as the unity of capitalist Europe professing anti-communism and anti-Sovietism in the face of socialist Eastern Europe. What is more, it reflected West European capitalism's claim to speak on behalf of all European peoples and to be the sole legitimate godfather of the centuries-old European culture. Accordingly, safeguarding national security and peace in Europe is thought of only in categories of the "position of strength" policy, the "balance of fear" doctrine, and the like. On the whole, West European integration acts as an alternative to all-European cooperation. True, we should qualify that during this period the EC had not yet become an independent subject of international relations; its jurisdiction in this sphere was limited to questions of overall trade policy; and there also was no mechanism for coordinating the foreign policy of the member-states. So it is a question of the overall conceptual approach prevailing at that time to determining the place and role of Western Europe in world politics.

This approach, without a doubt, corresponded to the ideological and political positions of the bourgeois-conservative circles, which also were its most active exponents. However, the peculiarities of the situation were that under the influence of the "cold war," it was perceived to a certain extent by the bourgeois-centrist parties, reformist working-class parties and trade unions, and a considerable portion of the intelligentsia orienting on them. The only political force defending the idea of coupling and linking the objective processes of economic integration in Western Europe with peaceful coexistence and with mutually advantageous cooperation of all countries, especially European, was the communist parties of the "group of six."

The process begun at the turn of the 1960's to 1970's of lessening international tension in Europe proved the possibility of a different approach of the EC to determining its role in world politics, an approach based on a realistic assessment of the correlation of forces on the continent and on a global scale, an understanding of the

vital need for stable, peaceful mutual relations between the West and East, and the mutual profitability of their economic and cultural cooperation.

This approach emerged as a result of the majority of West European political figures' awareness of the truth that the Soviet-American military and strategic parity which had developed by that time not only was revealing the senselessness of the increasingly burdensome arms race, but was also making the guarantees of peace in Europe based on confrontation of the two military and political blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—increasingly unreliable. This reassessment of values, stimulated by the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, made possible the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which concluded with the signing of the historical Helsinki Final Act—one of the most important international documents of the entire postwar period. It is apropos to say that this conference was the first international forum on problems of relations between the East and West where the EC countries, as a rule, came out with coordinated positions, using the mechanism for coordinating foreign policy which they created in 1970—European Political Cooperation (EPC).

The experience of detente in the 1970's makes it possible to derive certain lessons and draw a number of conclusions, not only of a historical but also a prognostic nature. First of all, the 1970's proved the fundamental possibility of combining the principal foreign-policy tasks facing the EC—ensuring nation-state interests; further developing integration; establishing stable, peaceful relations between the capitalist and socialist countries of Europe. What is more, it turned out that it was under this variant that the independent role of Western Europe in the world arena was brought out to the greatest extent.

Secondly, it appears fully proven that given the immutability of the prevailing social system in the EC countries, a radical change in the balance of forces is possible in favor of the supporters of close linkage of the processes of West European integration and all-European cooperation. This camp was joined not only by the left-wing forces, which comprise its nucleus and its most active part, but also by realistically thinking circles of bourgeois-centrist and even conservative orientation.

True, as events at the turn of the 1970's to 1980's showed, the noted positive trend proved to be quite unstable and was temporarily suspended by the offensive of neo-conservatism both in the United States and in a number of leading countries of Western Europe. But the potential of the democratic forces was also far from fully realized. This applies primarily to their most influential part—the social-democratic and socialist parties. In the 1960's and 1970's, a significant evolution in the approach of these parties to the problems of war and peace, all-European cooperation and in the understanding of the processes taking place in the capitalist as well

as the socialist countries. At the same time, old stereotypes and also prejudices remained, interfering with the unity of actions of social democrats, communists and other left-wing forces. The relations of working-class parties and trade unions with general democratic movements did not develop easily, particularly with trends which were known under the names of "alternatives," and with the "greens," certain groups of supporters of peace, and women and youth organizations.

Thus, there are considerable reserves for intensifying the struggle of democratic forces for the European Community to act as a factor of peace and cooperation. Partially this depends on the efforts of the states themselves which are a part of it, and partially on external factors. It is precisely with the latter that the third lesson of the 1970's is linked. It lies in the fact that stagnant trends in the Soviet society and also in a number of other socialist countries of Europe had a negative effect on the state of all-European relations and impeded the actions of democratic forces in EC countries directed at reexamining its foreign-policy reference points.

The new course of the CPSU and Soviet state at comprehensive restructuring and qualitative improvement of the Soviet society, and the reforms being carried out with similar goals in other socialist countries are opening up broader opportunities of the interconnected development of socialism and all-European cooperation. So far, only the first steps have been taken on the path of perestroika in the USSR, but already today one can single out several directions of its influence on public opinion in countries of the West and on inter-system relations in Europe.

Above all, the Soviet Union's image and conceptions about socialism and the potential and mechanisms of its development are changing. The greatest impression is being made by democratization, glasnost, and the decisive reexamination of erroneous or outdated concepts and methods of building socialism. But it is obvious that in the final analysis the attitude toward real socialism will depend on the practical results of perestroika in key spheres of life of the society—economic, social, and political.

Further, the present foreign-policy course of the USSR and the entire socialist community is meeting growing understanding. The new conceptual base of socialist diplomacy (the need for new political thinking in an era of nuclear missile weapons and global interdependence of all countries) as well as its renewed style, characterized by rejection of certain stereotypes which had developed in the past, an emphasis on practical actions, and an adherence to principles combined with a readiness for rational compromise, are having a serious affect. The USSR's new European policy, formulated in the "all-European house" concept, expressed in particular in a number of large-scale actions (the "dual nuclear missile

zero option" proposal; recognizing the EC not only as an economic association but also as an independent political unit in the international arena) evoked a wide response.

Finally, for the first time broad opportunities have opened up for social diplomacy, which is to play a primary role in developing dialogue.

Today, as never before, favorable conditions are developing for mutual understanding and joint actions of all forces in favor of creating a solid system of security and cooperation in Europe. Naturally, this also pertains to those democratic and socialist forces which support West European integration and strive to link it to all-European cooperation. In any event, this prospect today appears considerably more real than it did several years ago. The international dialogue of left-wing forces, which has been given new impetus during the days of celebrating the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution in Moscow, in addition, contributes to the mutual linkage of the integration processes in Eastern and Western Europe with the construction of the "all-European house."

Footnotes

1. The initial points of the concept were formulated in the theses of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the USSR Academy of Sciences "On Imperialist 'Integration' in Western Europe (the Common Market)" and in the report of the director of the IMEMO, Academician A.A. Arzumanyan, at the aforementioned conference (see: "Problemy sovremennogo kapitalizma i rabochiy klass" [Problems of Modern Capitalism and the Working Class], Prague, 1963).

2. They have been conducted twice a year, in the spring and fall, since 1973. The range of individuals polled changes each time, but invariably corresponds to the social and professional, gender, and territorial structure of the population.

3. "Cadmos," Feb 1986, Geneva, p III.

4. Ibidem.

5. Calculation based on: "Europe as Seen by Europeans. European Polling 1973-1986." (EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION, No 4, 1986, p 31).

6. See: V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 26, p 352.

7. This thesis needs at least additional comments. First of all, this political alliance existed not only in the form of governmental coalitions but also under conditions of alternating bourgeois-centrist and social-democratic governments adhering to a similar strategy of social

compromise and partial reforms. Further, social-democratic reformism actually was based upon the struggle of the entire working class, to which communist parties and trade unions holding consistently class positions made a weighty contribution.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnoshe-
niya." 1988.

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Polish Official on One Europe, Relations with USSR

18070146 Moscow SOVetskaya Kultura in Russian 14 Jul 88 p 7

[Interview with Professor Bogdan Sukhodolskiy, chairman of the People's Cultural Council of the Polish People's Republic, by SOVetskaya Kultura special correspondent Irina Pirogova in Warsaw: "We Have Found a Common Goal—Socialism"; date of interview not given; first paragraph is SOVetskaya Kultura introduction]

[Text] We met with Professor Bogdan Sukhodolskiy, chairman of the People's Cultural Council of the People's Republic of Poland, while the 19th All-Union Party Conference was in session. This extremely prominent Polish scholar in the fields of pedagogical science, philosophy and cultural history is a member of the presidium of the Committee for Research and Prognosis: "Poland in the Year 2000."

[Question] Professor, you are a man who has grown wise with life experience and accomplishment. I hope you would agree that it has never been an easy life for people, with their age-old dreams of a "golden era." Time has always confronted them with newer and more complex problems. More and more they have entered into conflict with themselves, their environment, the state, the inexorable laws of economics and, finally, even with nature itself... We will not begin to encroach upon the mast of the "golden era." But we ask ourselves whether man is able in our complicated times to get just one step closer to it! What is man's personal role in making this difficult journey?

[Answer] I would respond in this way. It is true that people are being confronted with new problems, often difficult to resolve and at times unforeseen, for which the answers do not all appear in one textbook. These difficulties are the result of our personal activities and have not been left us by nature.

We can observe this in the most diverse spheres. For example, technology has faithfully served and assisted man for many long years in his creative efforts. But the time has come when it is abandoning its subordinate role to us, when it is threatening nature and mankind's very existence. On the one hand science is the engine of progress, opening up unforeseen possibilities for the spiritual and economic flourishing of our society. On the other hand, scientific discoveries have turned out capable of being used for the barbaric, mass destruction of people and for poisoning the earth. An example of the duality in the significance of science can be seen in the discovery of atomic energy.

How can people be trained so that they not only enjoy the achievements of civilization but also manage them judiciously for the sake of preserving life on earth? This is a very difficult question. The consumer orientation

towards achievements of progress has already been defined with sufficient clarity. Now it is time to learn the methods for its wise management. It is inspiring that we already have some positive experience here. We see it in the ecological movement, whose purpose is to remove the threat of destruction from mankind by preserving vital capacity on the planet. The fundamental model in managing our civilization is the struggle for peace. Participating in this today are Polish public figures, prominent scholars, the creative intelligentsia and the broad popular masses of various state systems.

Here I would assign culture a special role. There is a tendency in the world to subordinate culture to the policies of imperialism. And this is a very dangerous tendency. Culture will perish under such subordination, for it is an achievement and valuable of all mankind. There exist two Europes today. They are divided politically into capitalist and socialist, economically into European Economic Community and Council for Mutual Aid, militarily into two blocs. But, indeed, there was—and is—a single Europe, the cultural Europe. All our technology today quickly becomes obsolete. Yesterday we had the airplane; today we have the spaceship. And tomorrow...? Only true art acquires ever increasing value with the years, with the centuries. "Life is short; art is eternal," said the ancients. And the validity of this truth is becoming more and more evident, all because cultural Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals—is a symbol of our hopes. Here we come to a very important question: to what extent can new art be accessible to the broad population? For only to that extent does it escape oblivion and become preserved for future generations. I am convinced that interrelations between the broad masses and truly creative people must be free of mistrust and misunderstanding. Artists who amuse themselves in their field and create works which are not understood by the people comprise a phenomenon which, unfortunately, has become more acute now than ever before. But I think that the artist who stands apart from that which agitates the people, who avoids the people's problems and common concerns for their welfare, passes sentence upon himself in both the creative and civic sense.

[Question] Doesn't it seem to you that contemporary communications between people has been weakened by rationalism, egoism, the pressures of time and extremism in many political, social and everyday situations?

[Answer] Yes, that is so. Such relationships have been organized in large part using stereotypes of individual, collective and oftentimes nationalistic thinking and formalistic standards established by prior institutions in power. Direct man-to-man relationships have become something entirely different. Expansion and enrichment of the "I and you" formula are becoming extremely important tasks in people's education and upbringing.

[Question] And that applies not only to individual people, but to entire peoples as well. I and you...my country and your country...Poland and the Soviet Union... The bourgeois mass information media, the diverse venomous

"voices," are constantly exaggerating the theme of supposedly unfriendly feelings held by the Polish people towards the Soviet people. In mean fashion they strive to play on dramatic situations in our common history and on difficulties we are today facing together.

[Answer] I think they are believing what they would like the situation to be, not what it actually is. The Polish National Public Opinion Center conducted a survey (from October of last year through June of this year) on the topic: "Who do you consider the most prominent world political leader of 1987?" First place went to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. In October of last year Poles were asked to select the one of 16 world leaders they deemed most attractive. 76.2 percent of my fellow countrymen expressed their liking for Gorbachev. They showed a tremendous interest in his book on restructuring, a thorough, analytical work characterized by courageous thinking and filled with the spirit of culture and democracy. Without a doubt this book has exerted a tremendous influence on the attitude of my fellow citizens towards restructuring. At the end of last year, while the anonymous survey was being conducted, two-thirds of the Poles expressed a positive attitude towards the Soviet Union. Only 9.5 percent held a negative view, and 24 percent described their feelings as mixed. This shows that the true glasnost and equity in Polish-Soviet relations today will pave the way to a future in which we share the same ideas.

The summit meeting in Moscow between M. Gorbachev and R. Reagan made an unforgettable impression upon the Polish people. Our studies show that, following the meeting, there was a fourfold increase in the number of city people in Warsaw alone who acknowledged the priorities of the Country of Soviets in consolidating peace and implementing specific peace initiatives.

These percentages are, of course, very important. But they do not reflect everything—quality, not just quantity, is important here. It is quality which has special significance. Perhaps for the first time in the history of our two peoples we are faced with the very same, vitally important tasks. Prior to this time we see a history of separate development and sometimes it seemed the two were in opposition. Only after World War II did we find a common goal—the building of socialism. Its course was charted in "outline" form, however, without taking into account the differences and features particular to our peoples and states. But these differences divided us, especially during the Stalin period, which embroiled us in the same errors, problems and dramatic situations. Now that the yoke of this cult has been cast aside, the full commonality of our tasks has become clear.

You can therefore understand why we are so excited and hopeful as we follow the proceedings of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, which has engaged in decisive combat the forces of stagnation and hindrance. We note with satisfaction and are convinced that, during the work of this forum of Soviet communists, a political and

economic program still more concrete has been adopted promoting the further development of socialism and ways of effecting its implementation. We join our special hopes in this process with the triumph of Leninist democratic principles, for only under such conditions will man in a socialist society assume the position he deserves and feel he is the master of his destiny, his abilities, his country. His role in the development of contemporary civilization will grow and strengthen because the future depends on the spiritual and moral qualities of people. These comprise the guarantee of success for all our revolutionary plans. I am very pleased to find confirmation of my own ideas in the speech of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and in the presentations of delegates. It is thanks to the policies of the new way of thinking, thanks to restructuring, that the time of our hopes is being transformed into the time of real common action. This is why Poland has been so eagerly awaiting Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and is today happy to welcome him to this land.

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Poland, USSR Agree on Economic Problems
18120099 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 32, 14-21 Aug 88 p 6

[Text] During the visit by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Gorbachev to the Polish People's Republic, the sides discussed the prospects of cooperation and economic integration. At Poland's request, concrete bilateral economic problems were solved before the visit during several inter-government meetings, Polish government spokesman for the press Jerzy Urban told journalists. He regarded as erroneous Western mass media statements that the visit, though politically eventful, produced little in the economic sphere, so important for Poland.

The Soviet leadership, said J. Urban, met Poland halfway accepting the proposed methods of solving a number of economic problems. The Polish side knows that the Soviet Union has passed a number of decisions, not simple for its economy, but guided by the striving to support Poland in overcoming economic difficulties.

Deliveries to Poland over the next 5-year period of oil, natural gas, iron and chromium ore and some other minerals at the previously established level were confirmed. These deliveries are of major importance for the Polish economy, since they provide the foundation for its development in 1991-95.

The Soviet Union agreed to postpone payment by Poland of its hard-currency debt—about 1.5 billion dollars—for 10 years, with favourable conditions. The USSR has offered Poland further credit to the tune of 400 million rubles for levelling out the balance of payments, and has agreed to pay Polish builders in the next 5-year period according to world market standards.

These provisions concern payments to the sum of 1.4 billion rubles. Also being examined are questions related to the procedure of freezing Poland's debt in clearance rubles.

Agreements have been reached on difficult issues. The Soviet side aimed to help ease Poland's problems in the economy, J. Urban noted.

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Polish Official Interviewed on Consultative Council

18070181 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 23, 4-10 Jun 88 p 7

[Interview with Wieslaw Gornicki, aide to chairman of the PPR [Polish People's Republic], by B. Golub, special correspondent: "An Open Dialogue in the Public Interest"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs in boldface are ARGUMENTY I FAKTY introduction]

[Text] "I came across a report in the press that a Consultative Council is operating in Poland under the Chairman of the PPR Council of State. Could you tell us what kind of organ this is, and what its goals and tasks are?" (N. Korneyev, Donetsk)

In reply to our reader's question, we present the following interview by B. Golub, our special correspondent, with Wieslaw Gornicki, an aide to the Chairman of the PPR Council of State and director of an independent research group.

[Answer] The Consultative Council is one of the political-type innovations which have been engendered by the process of socialistically democratizing Polish society. Members of the PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party], non-party people, atheists, believers, and members of the former Solidarity have been invited to join the Consultative Council. Among the council's members are active builders of socialism, as well as those who, while not considering themselves to be convinced advocates of the socialist system, nonetheless do wish to take part in determining the principal trends of Poland's development.

[Question] You said "invited to join the council." How is this to be understood?

[Answer] The Chairman of the Council of State personally invited people to join the Consultative Council, people who express the views of various strata of the society in order to know what kinds of problems are of concern to the society.

[Question] But, as far as we know, even without this, the country has enough organizations whose advice and consultation could be utilized by the Chairman of the Council of State.

[Answer] The Consultative Council is not an organization. And each council member represents in it merely himself rather than any sort of organization. Inasmuch as well-qualified advice is needed, most of the persons invited to join the council are prominent scientists. Such as the former chairman of postwar Poland's State Planning Commission, the economist Professor Bobrowski, and the renowned shipbuilding scientist, Professor Sackowski. People of another stripe also sit on the council. For example, the leader of the former Rural Solidarity, Jan Kulaj, as well as a former Solidarity adviser, the attorney Sila-Nowicki.

[Question] Have such diverse people found a common language?

[Answer] Not immediately. At first they had to study, talk, and listen to the others. The first few sessions were particularly stormy, which is also to be explained by the fact that the matters being discussed at them were not simple ones. Poland was preparing for the second stage of the economic reform, the implementation of which had to lead, and did lead, to price increases. Furthermore, the economic changes likewise assumed the promulgation of a new tax policy. Of course, there was no unanimity among the people with regard to evaluating the forthcoming changes. Therefore, passions were also boiling in the sessions of the Consultative Council.

In time, however, the council members learned to control their emotions and to stand above their personal interests and attitudes.

[Question] What questions, in addition to those already mentioned, do you discuss in the council?

[Answer] During the slightly more than one year of its existence the Consultative Council has discussed several other important problems. Among them have been demographic and ecological problems, the problem of drug addiction, and others which have been brought up for discussion by the Chairman of the Council of State. Questions meriting universal attention are also brought up for discussion by the council members. For example, the aforementioned attorney, Sila-Nowicki, proposed accelerating the research studies being undertaken by the leading Polish and Soviet scholars on the "blank spaces" in the history of the relations between our two countries. PZPR member W. Baka has drawn the attention of the Chairman of the Council of State to the uneconomical attitude being manifested toward energy resources.

[Question] What specific results have been achieved by the activity of the Consultative Council? Could you cite some examples?

[Answer] This question is also of interest to Poles. But the fact is that this is not the main concern in the council's activity nowadays. At the present stage it is

rather supposed to play the role of a catalyst in the process of activating public life. Because, of course, in Poland there are quite a few persons who, after the well-known events of 1980-1981, removed themselves from public life and do not recognize any public organizations. At the same time they do consider themselves to be fully entitled citizens of their own country.

And so for such persons the Consultative Council is opening up broad possibilities. It is, so to speak, "reanimating" its own members, returning them to active public life, and thereby exerting a health-restoring influence on society as a whole.

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AMERIKA No 6, June 1988**

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**New Approaches to Soviet-Latin American
Economic Relations**

18070175 Moscow *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA* in
Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 3-12

[Article by O. V. Lavrova and O. D. Ushnurtseva, "New
Approaches to Soviet-Latin American Economic Rela-
tions"]

[Text] People in the Soviet Union and Latin America are becoming more and more clearly aware of the importance of developing mutually beneficial economic cooperation. However, the geographic remoteness and the rather high level of industrial development of a number of states in the region have had an effect on our economic relations thus far. Various consumer goods and certain types of machines and equipment are being produced by local companies for domestic needs and for export, but the importation of technology is limited by rigid customs barriers, as a rule. The situation is complicated by the fact that Soviet organizations have to enter into contact more and more frequently with private companies, rather than state companies, which presupposes that foreign supplier firms are subject to a bargaining procedure. Because of this, the quality of Soviet industrial commodities being delivered to Latin America should meet higher requirements. Underestimation of this factor by our competent organizations has resulted in serious detriment to foreign trade relations time and again.

However, the basic obstacle on the path toward intensification of Soviet-Latin American economic relations is international monopoly capital, which attempts to retain its positions of undivided supremacy in the region's economy. The United States' monopolistic positions in the Latin American economy created practically insurmountable barriers to Soviet export commodities and technology for a long time. Later, the U. S. influence in the region was weakened somewhat, and other developed capitalist states—primarily Japan, the FRG, Britain and France—managed to take advantage of this. And today, through their traditional ties with local firms, a far-flung trade and sales organization, and knowledge of market specifics, the leading monopolies in the Western world are continuing to hold the key positions in the strategically important directions of economic development in states in the region. More than 40 percent of the region's aggregate GNP and roughly the same amount of industrial output, chiefly by processing sectors, are being produced by affiliates of TNK's [transnational corporations] at present.

It is clear that all this narrows the limits of the Soviet-Latin American economic dialogue and influences the selection of priorities by the local business circles by predetermining their negative reaction to the many business offers by Soviet organizations. It is sufficient to say that certain initiatives by the USSR for assistance in building enterprises in the power generation, electrical engineering, tractor manufacturing and mining industries, for synthetic rubber production, and so forth were declined by Argentina, Brazil and Mexico as "economically unsuitable" in the early 1980's.

However, the transnational corporations can no longer disregard the objective trends as before. The steady increase in economic potential and export opportunities has enabled our country to come into the Latin American market with technical machinery and other industrial products and to offer diversified technical assistance to states in the region in spite of the obstacles mentioned. Apart from a mutually beneficial exchange of commodities, the system of economic relations between the USSR and capitalist states in Latin America now includes different forms of economic and scientific and technical cooperation—assistance in building production facilities, extension of credits, the transfer of technical documentation, joint study of scientific problems, help from specialists, training of national personnel, and so forth.

But unfortunately, the scope and structure of our economic relations are growing and undergoing qualitative modification more slowly than required by the NTR [scientific and technical revolution], global progress, and the international division of labor. The restructuring of management in the foreign economic field now under way in the USSR and the policy of speeding up the development of new forms of ties with the capitalist

states—scientific and technical and production cooperative ventures and the establishment of joint enterprises—have been called upon to remedy this problem.

On the other hand, the ruling circles in Latin American countries are becoming more and more convinced that they cannot count on achieving real economic independence without extending the limits of foreign contacts and without organizing cooperation with the socialist states. Comprehension of the importance of such cooperation is also reaching those in the local upper bourgeoisie who are thinking realistically. For example, E. de (Paula Ribeiro), president of the Brazilian Foreign Trade Association, noted that "although the systems for trading with the socialist countries are not simple for us, they function well. This is creating extreme dissatisfaction in the GATT Secretariat and among the Western defenders of free trade."¹

So the transnational corporations are not as confident as they formerly were about the durability of the mechanism of production and market attachments that they created. Hence the attempts to employ special demarches aimed at preventing an increase in the USSR's economic and scientific and technical influence in Latin America. Analysis of this unseemly practice is hampered by the fact that objective information on it is hidden from public opinion, as a rule, or is presented in distorted form.

Among the rather extensive means utilized by the transnational corporations to discredit the USSR as a business partner, two basic groups (quite arbitrary, of course) should be singled out. The first one "blends" with ordinary business competition: various attempts are made to take one Soviet organization or another "out of the game" when it is operating in the Latin American market. The local affiliates of the TNK's seek to prevent the signing of any contract between a country and a Soviet firm that is objectionable to them, and if a contract has been signed already, they seek to disrupt its implementation. A typical example is the protracted implementation of agreements concluded in 1974 between the All-Union Association "Traktoroeksport" and the Mexican state company Empresa Mexicana Siderurgica Nacional, S. A. (SIDENA) for a consignment of Soviet T-25 tractors and a production line for their manufacture, as well as for provision of the appropriate technical assistance. Machine building companies from Western countries providing agricultural equipment for the Mexican market, mainly Ford (the United States) and Massey-Ferguson (United States and Canada), attempted to prevent these agreements from being implemented, deliberately delaying deliveries of their products to Mexico and even threatening to leave the market. At the same time, misinformation was spread about the alleged unsuitability of the Soviet model for the specific conditions in Mexico and its "insufficient horsepower." The Mexican firm did not yield to the blackmail, though the time periods for implementing the agreements were disrupted. In order to convince our

partners that the attacks were unfounded, it was necessary to conduct a series of lengthy additional tests with the T-25, during which its superiority over Italian and American vehicles in this class was demonstrated. As the Mexican magazine *COMERCIO EXTERIOR* noted, for a number of years these agreements were the "object of continuous attacks from the TNK's, which was largely because the 'Mexicanization' of the sector was too slow."²

There are other examples as well. Thus, the fact that the Westinghouse TNK and certain other U. S. machine building companies were implicated in disrupting the USSR's participation in the planning and construction of a nuclear power plant in Mexico is well-known. It is characteristic that Westinghouse received the order package as the result of the machinations surrounding the proposed contract.

Western firms often resort to a financial boycott of Latin American companies that seek the services of Soviet organizations. They skillfully take advantage of one of our weakest points in international economic cooperation—the problem of providing credit for joint projects. At the same time, Western investors grant loans unsparingly to those Latin American firms which decline Soviet business offers. The many difficulties which our organizations encounter in the Latin American market are caused by this. Thus, when an order was placed for reconstruction of the Argentine port of Bahia Blanca, the All-Union Association "Tekhnopromeksport" had to overcome the persistent opposition of large companies from the FRG and the Netherlands, supported by the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development]. The Soviet organizations seeking to obtain orders for construction of a 310-kilometer railroad from Buenos Aires to Rosario and enterprises to produce urea and ammonia from natural gas (Argentina), and to develop the Carajasa deposits (Brazil) were subjected to similar financial pressure from a number of Japanese, French and American corporations.

The second group of methods utilized by the transnational corporations to destabilize Soviet-Latin American economic ties are those of a political nature. The increased economic power of a number of monopolistic groups which have extensive assets in Latin America enables them to directly influence the state machinery of the countries where they are based, the governments of countries which admit them, and the international credit and financing institutions and other organizations—GATT, the IMF, the IBRD, and so forth. Certain U. S. periodicals, as well as the right-wing Latin American press, which engage in sensational anti-Soviet campaigns from time to time, provide considerable service in discrediting the Soviet Union's economic activity.

Thus, with the help of the Western mass media, fabrications have been spread alleging that Soviet trawlers fishing in the 200-mile zone adjacent to Argentine and

Peruvian territory, in accordance with intergovernmental agreements with these countries, are undermining their economy and plundering their natural resources. The local conservative press has also been spreading panic to please its powerful patrons. So the Chilean *EL MERCURIO* seriously alleged that the Soviet-Argentine agreement on fishing in the South Atlantic "may lead to diplomatic problems, including armed conflicts, in the near future."³

However, the Argentine Government rejected the false accusations leveled at the USSR and the All-Union Association "Sovrybflot," stating that the agreement as a whole, and particularly the conditions under which the Soviet side delivers part of the catch for processing and acquires processed fish products in Argentina, is beneficial for Argentina from a number of standpoints. In Peru, the anti-Soviet "fishing hysteria" was whipped up to an even greater extent. The transnational corporations and the circles associated with them unleashed a purposeful campaign in order to make the USSR appear before the Peruvians as a partner which does not inspire trust. So at the demand of the ESPEP (the state fishing industry enterprise), the loads of two Soviet ships, a refrigerator ship and a trawler, were held up, allegedly in connection with "Sovrybflot's" nonpayment of a duty of about 200 million dollars. However, it was established in the course of the court proceedings that the debt was incurred through the fault of "Sovrybflot's" Peruvian partner for organizing the fishing in territorial waters, the "Facifico" company. "A problem which arose for reasons of a purely commercial nature," the newspaper *LA REPUBLICA* stated with regret, "has become the cause of an unpleasant international incident—the first in the 15-year history of relations between Peru and the USSR. In a month before power is transferred to a new government, it is hard to believe that those who provoked this incident did it without premeditation."⁴

But even after the government of Alan Garcia came to power, the right-wing press stubbornly continued to spread ridiculous anti-Soviet rumors, for example, about the failure of negotiations between the Peruvian side and the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry. At the same time, accusations were again leveled against the Soviet fishing fleet for "plundering another country's natural resources." We may be fully justified in assuming that the new anti-Soviet wave was inspired by the transnational corporations, who were frightened by the growing anti-imperialist mood in Peru.

In certain cases it is simpler and more profitable for the transnational corporations to seize the initiative directly from the USSR, considering that the inflexibility of our foreign economic structures, the fact that we have been poorly informed about partners' needs, and even elementary mismanagement have literally pushed them toward this for many years. For example, original technological developments often do not get to Latin America directly from the USSR, but after they are purchased secondhand... from the firms of developed capitalist

countries. Thus, "Japanese" and "Italian" technology which is really of Soviet origin is utilized in Brazil's metallurgical industry. It is scarcely necessary to prove that such cases do not help to improve the prestige of our science and technology in the region, not to mention the extensive losses of foreign exchange. There is "borrowing" of another sort as well. It is sufficient to say that business circles in the United States have demonstrated considerable interest in Soviet experience in resolving the problem of overdue debts by Peruvian firms.⁵

...

The Latin American economy's high degree of dependence on foreign monopoly capital and the transnational corporations' opposition to economic contacts between the region's states and countries of the socialist community do not provide grounds for stating that the Latin American course of Soviet foreign economic policy is "hopeless," in any case.

Demand for certain types of mineral raw material will apparently be a basic factor in increasing Latin America's role in the system of our foreign economic priorities. Bauxite, tungsten, high-grade iron ore, manganese, copper, tin, lead, zinc—the stocks of these and other types of minerals are rapidly decreasing in the USSR, as well as the world as a whole. At the same time, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru and Jamaica have an abundance of the appropriate resources and are interested in developing them in a considered and systematic manner. Of course, the USSR can acquire the right to broad participation in projects of this type only by increasing and improving the production and delivery of its own industrial output (chiefly machines and equipment) and by fundamentally improving all forms of technical assistance. Especially since a larger and larger proportion of Latin American mineral raw material and finished products with a high raw material cost component delivered to the USSR will be within the framework of compensatory agreements.

We particularly have to mention the important role which trade agreements between the Soviet Union and a number of Latin American states can play in resolving the food problem in the USSR and in filling our market with high-grade agricultural raw material. Our country's policy of increasing self-sufficiency in products of the agrarian sector by no means indicates that we seek autarky in this area: the more geographically and structurally diversified the supply of agricultural commodities, the less sensitively the Soviet market will react to different kinds of chance occurrences and fluctuations accompanying agricultural production. Apart from the grain agreements, which are of key importance in this area of cooperation, as well as the traditional contracts for a number of tropical products (coffee, cacao, bananas), the Soviet side has been interested in broader agreements for the delivery of fodder crops (from Argentina and Brazil), canned fruits and vegetables and juices

(from Brazil and Mexico), food concentrates (from Brazil and Peru), wool and hides (from Argentina and Uruguay), and other agricultural commodities.

However, we do not have to present the matter in such a way that the Soviet side is guided by purely pragmatic considerations in approaches to cooperation with countries in the region. An increase in the effectiveness of foreign economic ties also has a political and moral dimension which is reflected in a warming of the international situation, in increased trust among states, and in the mutual enrichment of cultures. Hence it is necessary to take the diversity of requirements and interests of our Latin American partners into account more completely and to overcome the inertia of outdated views on bilateral relations. For many years, for example, no headway has been made with respect to the delivery of manufacturing industry products, including machines and equipment, to the Soviet market from a number of countries on the continent. Our foreign economic departments have been speaking as if their partners' supply were being maintained, but the adoption of practical solutions actually has been hindered continually by "unfavorable objective circumstances." It is true that certain progress has been noted lately: access to the Soviet market has now been provided for rolled products, pipe, and finished metal items from Brazil and Mexico. The sides have also begun joint scientific and technical studies in a number of industrial sectors. Nevertheless, the question of purchasing machines and equipment of interest to the Soviet consumer (drilling platforms, machine tools, heavy trucks, equipment for light industry, and computer hardware) is still in the discussion stage.

Thus, intensification of economic cooperation with Latin America requires that we overcome both the objective obstacles associated with the dictates of transnational corporations in the region as well as the artificial barriers put on this path by local reactionary forces. What do we see as specific ways to resolve this problem?

First of all, we must sharply increase the competitiveness of Soviet industrial products that are exported. The overall restructuring of the economic mechanism has been targeted at this, in particular. The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On measures to improve the management of foreign economic relations," adopted in August 1986, is especially important in this area. This relates primarily to the establishment of a modern, stable export base with machine building output based on the introduction of advanced technology and accelerated development in instrument making, computer hardware, robotics, and electronics. We must shorten the periods for preplanning study and preparing technical proposals under contracts and most importantly, we must provide for inventories in all sectors for uninterrupted service after a sale with strict adherence to guarantee commitments. Taking into account the specific problems in promoting Soviet exports to Latin America, it is expedient to make the

USSR's technical experience more widely available through the sale of patents and licenses, as well as through the transfer of unpatented types of information.

Secondly, the assimilation of new forms of cooperation which involve direct production ties is of considerable importance. In spite of the organizational difficulties which exist, we must pursue production cooperation with Latin American companies more boldly. This would make it possible to shorten the times for the sale of our commodities and reduce the risks associated with it, speed up compensation for the projects built with the USSR's assistance, and in the final analysis, increase the overall effectiveness of trade and economic exchange with countries in the region. The production of tractors and other agricultural equipment; certain types of mining, oil drilling, and forging and pressing equipment; machine tools; construction and other equipment; the processing of agricultural products (with the delivery of a certain share of the end product to the USSR in payment for economic and scientific and technical assistance); and the production of fabrics, footwear, leather products, and mineral fertilizers may be promising from the viewpoint of cooperative ties.

Thirdly, it is necessary to make wider use of the beneficial elements of the "business partnership" technique adopted in international capitalist practice. Our economic activity in the region was damaged a great deal at one time by superficial criticism of everything "capitalist" and by disregard for the elementary organizational standards which have become firmly established in international economic relationships. "Learning to trade in a civilized manner" under the conditions in today's world market means improving the information base for cooperation; ensuring that reports on the status of the market and the requirements and resources of contractors are received in a timely manner and interpreted competently; utilizing commercial advertising more extensively; extending the contractual and legal bases of economic relationships and making them more specific; using flexible forms of financing foreign trade and technical assistance; strictly adhering to delivery times and the range and quality characteristics of commodities; and establishing a system for service that functions continuously after a sale.

Finally, we have to carefully analyze and resolve the question of association with the companies of developed capitalist states in the sale of Soviet and combined projects in the region's countries. Agreements of this kind, where the interests of all the participating sides are strictly observed, could make a tangible contribution in improving the effectiveness of foreign economic ties.

The interest of both the Soviet and Latin American sides in controlled involvement by partners from Western countries in joint economic activity is explained by the difficulties in financing joint projects and the scope of

some of them. Western companies also are of interest to the USSR as potential partners in tenders, where our organizations are often unsuccessful when they act alone.

On the other hand, how can such a form of cooperation attract those from the West? In referring to this problem, V. M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the GVK [expansion unknown], stresses: "In being realistic, we have to see different inducements, the business interests (of Western employers—O. L. and O. U.), and they are determined by an understanding of the tremendous opportunities for cooperation with the Soviet Union."⁶

Understanding the opportunities for cooperation with the USSR... Doesn't the sense of the indivisibility of our world, different and united at the same time, linked by common concerns, relate to this? The doors of cooperation are open for all states. Thus, speaking at a meeting with American businessmen during his visit to the United States, M. S. Gorbachev mentioned the usefulness of developing such untraditional forms of Soviet-American economic ties as consortiums and joint enterprises. The response is for the American side.

Taking the specific nature of the Latin American region into account, our most likely partners may be West European small and medium-size companies (MSK) which, because of their structural and organizational flexibility, original technological solutions, and readiness to combine with local capital in most cases, have penetrated quite deeply into the economy of the countries that admit them. The combination of efforts with Soviet enterprises in order to operate jointly in the markets of third countries could help the small and medium-size companies hold out in a fierce competitive battle with the transnational corporations and create the winning image of an "international democratic business" by distancing themselves from the odious transnationals. Certain MSK's already have long traditions of cooperation with the Soviet Union, incidentally. There are also opportunities to involve big business, including major private banks, in the implementation of Soviet-Latin American projects.

In the long term, the people of Latin America will acquire the opportunity to resolve their urgent economic problems independently. However, under present conditions—and this is objective reality—economic development of the region is inconceivable without the participation of foreign capital. It is represented today by the transnational corporations and banks, which are orienting the process of development in Latin American countries in a direction profitable for themselves.

A fundamental change toward increasing the efficiency of socialist production based on introduction of the advanced achievements of science and technology and a drastic reconsideration of obsolete stereotypes in the area of foreign economic relations will make it possible to expand Soviet-Latin American cooperation and

replenish it with new content, and on this basis, to reduce the negative influence of monopolistic capital on the development of the region's countries and to provide additional opportunities for them to overcome their economic crisis more rapidly.

Footnotes

1. A FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, 21 February 1985.
2. COMERCIO EXTERIOR, Mexico, No 8, 1985, p 801.
3. EL MERCURIO, Santiago de Chile, 30 July 1986.
4. LA REPUBLICA, Lima, 12 June 1985.
5. It will be recalled that a number of contracts were signed under the agreement for deliveries of traditional export commodities and industrial items, including fish meal, rolled nonferrous metals and alloys, cotton fabric, yarn, food concentrates, and so forth to the USSR from Peru in payment of the debt.
6. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 6, 1987, p 57.

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Academy of Sciences LA Institute Roundtable on Chile's Future

18070175 Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in
Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 25-38

[Roundtable discussion by staff members and specialists of USSR Academy of Sciences Latin America Institute on Chile's Problems and Future: "Why Does the Chilean Dictatorship Want a Plebiscite?"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The Chilean regime has organized a broad campaign to prepare for and carry out a scheduled plebiscite. Experienced specialists and advisers made up of sociologists, psychologists and journalists have begun working in it. Nearly every day the Chilean television audience can see Pinochet visiting the most remote corners of the country. At the recommendation of experts concerned about the dictator's "seemly" appearance, he no longer wears dark glasses and appears more often in civilian clothes than in a general's gold-braided uniform. The dictator is demonstrating refined social mimicry and political firmness. The question arises in this context: is the plebiscite a concession or just the opposite—has it been called upon to further cement the foundations of the authoritarian regime? In order to respond to this question, the editorial staff, together with a group of specialists and staff members of the South American countries sector of the ILA AN SSSR [USSR Academy of Sciences Latin America Institute] engaged in studying

Chile's problems has held a "roundtable" focusing on the possibilities of dismantling the hated regime and the prospects of the struggle for democracy.

The Economy: An "Achilles' Heel" or a "Trump Card"?

P. N. Boyko: The plebiscite which is to take place in September draws a line under the 15-year rule by Pinochet. This is a kind of "jubilee date," and as befits such occasions, Chileans cannot escape eulogistic writings in the official press or statements by the head of the regime painting a vivid picture of what has been accomplished in the economic field. There will certainly be a considerable number of words in connection with the fact that revitalization is being observed in the economy, the influx of foreign investments is intensifying, exports are increasing, and so forth. And in fact, business conditions have improved over the past 2 years. The fact that a substantial increase in prices on the world market for Chile's basic export product—copper, the growth of capital investments, and so forth have contributed to this is of no small importance.

But if we use other criteria, not the market situation, but what the 15-year rule by the Pinochet regime has given Chile, the picture is somewhat different. Let us begin, for example, with the fact that for the past 10 years the rate of unemployment in Chile has not gone below 10 to 11 percent, and reached the record level of 20 percent in 1982. These are figures from the Inter-American Development Bank, that is, an institution that is far from being critical of the Pinochet regime. Until recently, practically none of the Latin American countries has had as high a rate of unemployment as Chile. Urban unemployment in particular. The situation is also complicated by the huge influx of people from the rural areas in recent years. It is sufficient to say that the rural population accounts for only 1.9 million of the country's 12 million citizens.

Until recently, the volume of GNP was lower than the 1981 level. But production modernization has been accomplished at tremendous social costs. These are the results of applying the so-called "Chicago school" model in Chile and the regime's zealous attempts to adapt to the "new" international division of labor propagated by transnational monopolistic capital.

V. M. Gavrilov (editorial staff): If you take the crisis years of 1982-1983, of course, the situation is quite dismal. The dynamics of the process must be seen, however. Otherwise it is difficult to explain why the regime has held out for 15 years. I believe that the results of its economic policy are not so well-defined.

N. Ye. Pitovranova: Indeed, Chile has seen the second year of a significant increase in its GNP; it was 5.5 percent in 1987, surpassing the precrisis 1981 level for the first time. Moreover, the policy of guaranteed prices

for the basic types of agricultural products (primarily grains) implemented over the past 3 years made it possible to meet domestic needs in 1987 (as well as in 1986).

A trend toward an increase in employment is also seen: by 21 percent in construction and 15 percent in industry in the 1986-1987 period. Pinochet personally controls the municipal authorities for building basically equipped houses in the regions of extreme poverty.

Funds have been found for this. "Punctual" payment of debts predetermined the granting of new credits. Loans from the IMF and the IDB [Inter-American Development Bank] were decisive in covering the financial needs in 1987.

P. N. Boyko: When I spoke about the results of Pinochet's 15-year rule, I was referring not to business trends, but long-term trends which characterize the economic model. There have always been business aspects, and always will be. And they are what instills hope, especially for the "middle classes," that something may change for the better by itself. This is unquestionably one of the reasons—although far from the main one—why the regime has managed to last all these years.

Yu. N. Korolev: In order to picture the real status of the economy, we must specify the development trends that have taken shape in past years. I have already had occasion to write that the Pinochet regime has taken an active part in the process of modernization by using the transnational channels. Our conception of Pinochet will not be "complete" at all unless we assess his economic "team" at its true worth. He formed it with professionals capable of working out a program which corresponds exactly to the requirements of the present stage of transnationalization. Pinochet is reacting adequately to the requirements of the world economic market, which is not typical of authoritarian rulers in general. At the same time, the ideological foundations of the regime have not been changed by counting on the technocrats. The continuing line in politics and the social area still is to undermine the hired workers' protective institutions: the organizations and parties oriented toward the establishment of a strong national state sector. The direct "coupling" of state capitalism and foreign monopoly capital, the "atomization" of the working class and its trade unions, and continuous repression of the left-wing forces have been aimed at this.

A number of socioeconomic maneuvers by the government which led to the creation of a relatively large elite of hired workers (10-12 percent), whose wages are five to seven times higher than the average wage for workers and employees, has been the basic means of undermining the unity of the workers movement. In addition, a formal transfer of workers to the category of employees is also a common practice. As a result, the number of workers in trade unions declined from 10-12 percent in 1973 to 8.6 percent in 1980. At the same time, if we take

into account the "savings" in the temporarily employed, the curtailed social programs, and so forth, it becomes clear that the regime has created a broad field for maneuver by forming very different areas of interests and needs among the hired workers and by making it difficult for them to achieve organizational unity. Regardless of how events turn out, the effect of this factor on the destiny of the workers movement will be long-term in nature.

In addition, the "transnational" stage of development has accumulated a certain "critical mass" of problems related to the breakup of the economic structures that were formed. But a transition to new ones is possible only where there is an open and extensive—democratic—search for the necessary ways and means. This is the "Achilles' heel" of the regime. In running into a continuous chain of difficulties which are disrupting the mechanisms which appear to have been set up only yesterday, the regime is persistently seeking variations of reforms, taking the offensive and making concessions, striving to maintain authoritarian rule. In this sense, his turn to a democratic instrument such as a plebiscite is very symptomatic.

The Plebiscite: The Dictatorship's Plans and the Opposition's Opportunities

P. N. Boyko: The plebiscite is unquestionably an attempt by Pinochet to consolidate power and to give his regime a "legal" appearance at a time when his Western patrons are demanding "renovation of the facade." The dictator must demonstrate that the Constitution of 1980 on which this regime is based makes full provision for the democratic functioning of the society he governs.

It is completely obvious, meanwhile, that this is not the case. The Pinochet dictatorship, like Stroessner's dictatorship in Paraguay, is an anachronism, and attempts to maintain it enter into more and more flagrant contradiction with the basic trends of social development, particularly in the region where these countries are located. From this point of view, we cannot help but look at the calling of a plebiscite as a forced concession to those trends which are making an indelible imprint today on political processes in Latin American countries and throughout the world. I mean the growth of democratic movements and the increase in the extent to which the masses have been organized. This also applies in full measure to the situation in Chile, where, as they say in such cases, the lineup of class and sociopolitical forces is complex and ambiguous, but where the democratic movement which embraces the broadest spectrum of Chilean society is becoming stronger and stronger. For that reason, Pinochet himself has to "play democracy" today to remain in power, and very actively.

I think that the next important battle is forthcoming. Pinochet, to be sure, will make every effort—and he is already making them—to win this battle. And not simply to win it. The dictator must present himself to public opinion as the unquestioned victor. In a word, Pinochet is thirsting for victory.

The regime has all the means at its disposal to achieve this by falsifying the plebiscite results, of course. After all, for example, under the Constitution of 1980 which was mentioned, the voting results will not be verified by representatives of those political forces which take part, but by a tribunal created for this purpose which is made up of representatives of the Supreme Court and one of the ex-presidents of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The Pinochet regime will be able to receive all the "necessary results" under such a "tribunal," of course. At the same time, under the present conditions, especially in a country such as Chile—with long traditions of managing electoral affairs, it would be naive for the dictatorship to even have the opportunity to falsify the plebiscite results. I think that something else is stirring Pinochet's optimism: the lack of unity among the ranks of the opposition. At the same time, this concerns not only the lack of unity between the so-called bourgeois-democratic opposition (headed by the PDC [Christian Democratic Party]) and the United Left, but the lack of unity on the question of participation or nonparticipation in the plebiscite among the ranks of the left-wing forces themselves. The PDC and other parties in the Democratic Alliance decided last year to take part in the plebiscite, calling upon their supporters to vote against Pinochet. A similar decision was made by the Socialist Party faction in the United Left, which warned, however, that this decision may be reexamined and another one more responsive to the task of mobilizing the masses against the dictatorship may be adopted, depending on how specific circumstances develop. The Communist Party, on its part, has not conclusively decided this matter (whether to oppose Pinochet by taking part in the plebiscite or by appealing to Chileans to abstain from taking part in it). At the same time, the consideration that the Pinochet "constitution" itself bans the participation of political parties holding Marxist or left-wing views in electoral processes is being rationally advanced. Moreover, one of the articles in this "constitution" calls upon citizens to report on any Chilean who is a member of any Marxist party and tries to register in the electoral rolls. And Pinochet would like to legalize such "democracy." And it is not the free will of the progressive forces that brought about the plebiscite. This is a condition dictated by the opponent. All this is true. At the same time, a struggle is a struggle, and the plebiscite imposed by Pinochet also is an action that was forced on the dictatorship, as already stated. And it is very important for the revolutionary process in the future how it is approached. In any case, it is absolutely clear that it will be the next important "test of strength." The experience in Uruguay demonstrated that a plebiscite can become an important stage in mobilizing antidictatorship forces. The principal and most urgent task is to overcome the immediate obstacle on the path toward genuine democratization of Chilean society—the regime of Pinochet's personal rule. And in this sense, all the efforts which can be exerted to strike the next blow against the dictatorship and reveal the true lineup of forces in the country will turn out to be an important step ahead. I think that the

Chileans, a people with a great deal of political experience and wisdom, will find the correct solution and the means of putting their country on the path of genuine democratic development.

Yu. A. Zubritskiy: I think that even if the Chilean people "display wisdom," the regime which has not disdained and does not disdain the most odious methods in suppressing the will of the masses will simply discard its mask after deciding what will happen after "they have played at democracy." The main task of the progressive forces is to take advantage of the preparation for and conduct of the plebiscite to revolutionize social consciousness.

Yu. N. Korolev: It is difficult to foresee where the procedure, the plebiscite mechanism itself, will lead: to the "revolutionization of the Chileans' consciousness," to hastening the victory of the democratic forces, or to preservation of the current political model—none of the alternatives can be ruled out.

It is necessary to understand what has happened to the Chilean working class, what kind of differentiation has developed in it, and what has changed in the plan for its social and political activity. The Chilean proletariat has rich traditions of struggle, including economic struggle. And this is very important: until a working class assimilates experience in economic struggle, it is incapable of any other important struggle. The Chilean trade unions were deprived of their basic function during the period in which the model of a free market economy was implemented and transnationalization took place. Only a small number of them have been really able to protect the workers' economic interests. This was efficiently "organized" by transnational capital with the support of the authoritarian regime. Purely economic methods were also used to break up the trade unions. I am referring here to the widely used form of subcontracts, where a large enterprise concludes collective agreements for 6 months or less, depriving workers of the opportunity to demand anything at the end of the contract; the employer can "legally" put them out on the street at any time.

Social separateness—this is what defines the status of the basic classes of society today. In Chile, I think, the outlook for unity of the left-wing forces based on a revolutionary socialist program lacks stability.

The range of possible alternatives in the development of events will be narrowed as the date of the plebiscite approaches. Inasmuch as all the forces defending Pinochetism and Pinochet personally have been mobilized right down to the cleaned pistols, and inasmuch as the democratic will of the society has been mobilized, the question of the victory or defeat of Pinochet may acquire the outlines of the following dilemma for the social consciousness: either a civil war or Pinochet. Pinochet is prepared to fight to the last Chilean. This is clear to everyone in Chile. So the alternative to his victory is civil

war. Under these conditions, I assume that it is possible a negative majority will be formed which will vote "for Pinochet," that is, against civil war.

V. M. Gavrilov: It is unlikely that the question is so unequivocal.

Yu. N. Korolev: But it is. I think the ordinary Chilean will consider these alternatives semiautomatically, and that the dilemma for the mass consciousness now is precisely this. The dictatorship will not "fall" unless they "let it fall." A situation such as this, in which a popular movement has overthrown military rule, has existed more than once in Chile. It has also taken place repeatedly in Latin America. I think the people are highly mobilized democratically in Chile. Moreover, I will simply point out the very recent experience in Nicaragua, when the so-called democratic opposition showed fierce opposition to Somoza, brought the people out into the streets, and called strikes, but either did not want or were unable to take power. But the Sandinista front, torn into three groups, weakened, divided and half-executed, broke the terrorist structure and took power with a firm hand. The parallels are very hypothetical, of course. But I see no grounds for ruling out a hypothesis for this course of events.

V. M. Gavrilov: The thesis that there is no unity in the ranks of the opposition was advanced earlier. For this reason, the conclusion on "the high democratic mobilization of the people" is not entirely clear.

Yu. N. Korolev: When I spoke of the "democratic mobilization," I was referring to the fact that no less than 80 percent of the Chileans crave democracy. Moreover, I believe that the civil war was begun in Chile when they overthrew Allende. The civil war has been under way in Chile for many years, first subsiding, then reappearing.

P. N. Boyko: The attempt against Pinochet instilled in many people precisely this notion that Korolev is speaking about. Indeed, Pinochet's entire propaganda machine seeks to create this impression, that this is precisely the dilemma: either "order," that is, Pinochet, or "chaos and violence."

V. A. Tsaregorodtsev: But in general, it is an exaggeration to speak now about the possibility of a civil war in Chile. In the situation that has taken shape, when not only the right-centrist opposition but some of the other forces have made the decision to take part in the plebiscite, a different decision is obviously incorrect for the other detachments of the opposition in order not to contribute to a split and isolation from the masses.

The oligarchy's plans involve the "perfection" of a specific model for the shift from the authoritarian regime to the building of a "new democracy." And for the ruling elite, as well as for the United States in general, it is unlikely to be of great importance who will be at the

head of the regime of "new democracy." The fundamental question for these circles is the opportunity to control the situation. What is crucial for these forces, perhaps, is not so much victory in the plebiscite (this is important only for Pinochet himself), but the very fact that it is being held. I am not saying anything original if I say that the future development of events will depend directly on the specific lineup of political forces in the country. There is no question that very complex processes are under way in Chile, and it is not very simple to assess all their characteristics, and particularly their consequences. Changes are taking place in all strata and in the midst of all political forces. The right-centrist opposition, in which the PDC is the basic force, is leaning more and more to the right, toward the possibility of bringing about a "coordinated transition" to democracy.

While A. Saldivar, the PDC leader in 1982, said at that time that the Pinochet dictatorship could be removed in only two ways—either by armed force or by mobilization of the masses and universal insubordination, toward the end of 1986 the Molina-(Boeninger) proposal, supported by the National Party, assumed that preparations would be made for elections in 1989 and that they would be used in the interests of the opposition. The intentions are quite simple here, and obviously lying on the surface: first of all, the leaders of the right-centrist opposition hope that they will receive the masses' support with their "no" slogan in the plebiscite; secondly, even if this "no" does not turn out to be decisive (and this is precisely the way matters stand according to the latest Gallup polls), the elections will take place in 1989 and the time before them can be utilized to build up influence with the masses. In other words, an alternative virtually without risk of loss for the PDC and other right-centrist forces. It is also without risk in the sense that "no" as well as "yes" in the plebiscite will create a bridge between the right-centrist opposition and Pinochet, for whom the main objective now is that the plebiscite takes place. For this reason, the chances for carrying out a "coordinated transition" remain, whether the regime wins or is defeated. The maneuvers by the ultraright opposition, in which regrouping of forces is also under way to develop and consolidate a strong right-wing political party, also confirm that such an arrangement is possible. This refers primarily to the National Party, which could serve as a kind of "bridge" between the present regime and the right-centrist opposition. Their hopes for isolation of the left-wing democratic forces are also being justified.

V. M. Gavrilov: In your words, the right-wing opposition's plan is aimed at creating favorable conditions after the plebiscite so that the PDC establishes contact with both the masses and the dictatorship and becomes the ruling party in the future?

V. A. Tsaregorodtsev: To all appearances, it will be if it is able to come to an agreement with the ultraright and Pinochet.

V. M. Gavrilov: And Pinochet's scheme comes down to this?!

V. A. Tsaregorodtsev: No, there's no reason to oversimplify it that way. Pinochet is having his own way for the present, and the PDC is having its way. But they have one objective with the ruling elite and the United States—not to allow unforeseen "excesses" in the course of the transition to the "new democracy" and to "play" in accordance with the scenario established beforehand. The PDC's line now is aimed at ensuring that while Pinochet remains in power it wins over most of the consensus and comes to power itself, but that this transition is accomplished in the form and at the pace defined beforehand, without any kind of surprises. So the immediate objectives differ, but the ultimate goal is the same.

P. N. Boyko: All the same, if we look realistically at the specific situation at present, the main task facing the progressive forces is to dismantle the dictatorship, a regime which does not correspond to today's world trends of political development. The fact is that a stratum has developed which is reaping all the benefits of a "consumption society." True, there is also a good part of the population, the so-called "middle class," which is living relatively well, although it has also been subjected to the vicissitudes of life and the whims of fate... For that reason this class is characterized by its astounding turnabouts at times—from an extreme reactionary position to a desperate "ultrarevolutionary" position. There is also a segment of the population that is absolutely destitute. According to certain data, nearly 5 million Chileans—about 40 percent of the population—are living under conditions of extreme poverty. This is what Pinochet is attempting to "legalize." But can such a society, such an order of things really be tolerated in modern times? This is a "powder keg!"

And the entire society, or at least the overwhelming majority of the nation represented by those 5 million Chileans, as well as all those sensible forces that realize they cannot live "on a powder keg," cannot help but be concerned the most by these problems of suffering...

O. P. Proselkova: The position of the armed forces continues to be one of the basic factors in the balance of forces on the eve of the plebiscite. This is actually the regime's strongest support today. The dictator and his sponsors are fully aware that whoever controls the Army, and more precisely the ground forces, practically controls the situation in the country. Pinochet came to power by relying on the armed forces and he has ruled the country for 15 years by relying on them, and he hopes to remain in power for a long time. Despite the fact that certain statements by representatives of the generals attest to disputes in the upper echelons of power, these disputes relate to the search for the best method of saving the existing regime.

The ground forces and the home guard (the corps of carabineros) are nearly 2.5 times larger than the Navy and Air Forces taken together. This is the best equipped arm of the service, which has the most modern weapons of both domestic and foreign manufacture at its disposal. The fact that the ground forces, more than the other service branches, has the closest ties with the U. S. Armed Forces is of no small importance. The U. S. Southern Command, with headquarters in Panama, has a direct radiotelephone link with the commanders of the service arms in Chile, and this link is not monitored by anyone. Moreover, a military air link has been organized between them to transfer personnel, bypassing the usual official channels. The Army is under the continued close scrutiny of the United States, it has been subjected to concentrated ideological indoctrination for many years, and most of the soldiers at the lower and middle levels are from the generation which grew up under the dictatorship, with definite stereotypes of vital values and notions of democracy and freedom (which they have not seen) which were formed during the years of terror. The present soldier, officer, and even the generals are "products" of the dictatorship period.

It should be stressed that Pinochet's position in the Air Forces and the Navy is not as strong as in the ground forces. Nevertheless, he is hoping that he will succeed in persuading the armed forces to support his candidacy in the plebiscite unequivocally.

For the Chilean progressive forces, the struggle for the Army, as an integral part of the struggle for the middle strata, is one of the key factors in the struggle for democracy. It is difficult to say now if any of the opposition groupings will succeed in bringing the armed forces over to its side, offer them an acceptable program, or take advantage of the conflicts among the Navy, Air Forces, and the ground forces.

Yu. N. Korolev: I would add that in the United States, they are now openly discussing the matter of resuming the programs for training Chilean officers at American military centers. And at the same time, they are speaking about creating a democratically oriented stratum in the Chilean Army.

Ye. G. Kapustyan: In order to extend their contacts with the Chilean military, Washington is discussing the possibility of lifting the embargo on the delivery of military equipment and ammunition to Chile. In an interview with the weekly NEWSWEEK, Elliot Abrams, the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, stressed the importance and necessity of cooperation with the Chilean military, their training in the United States, and the transfer of "American values" to them. Otherwise, he noted, the loss of American influence in the Chilean military "may turn into a catastrophe for the United States."

In addition, Washington is engaged in an intensive search for "reliable partners" in the ranks of the right-wing opposition. In general, American-Chilean relations are a separate question. It should be noted that relations between the United States and Chile since 1973 have been marked by "cordiality and complete mutual understanding," according to American press assessments. Even the U. S. Congress' decision to introduce the military embargo in 1977 did not affect the military's interests, in the final analysis. Moreover, it served as a kind of impetus for development of the military industry. However, new factors have emerged in American-Chilean relations since the mid-1980's. Only a small group in the U. S. Congress (headed by J. Helms) continues to speak out on behalf of unconditional support for Pinochet's political and economic policy. The majority of congressmen consider it necessary for the United States to exert political and economic pressure on the military government in order to promote the transition to a democratic regime. Representatives of the highest echelon of power in the United States recognize that the nearly 15-year rule by the military has not provided for democratic freedoms in Chile and do not rule out the possibility that support may be provided to the newly elected civilian government in this country.

Aside from the purely declarative announcements with respect to the violation of human rights in Chile, the White House has undertaken a number of specific steps. At the end of last year, Chile was excluded from two U. S. trade programs in connection with violation of the workers' rights in concluding collective agreements. Exports of individual Chilean commodities valued at 60 million dollars will be impaired by discontinuation of the first program, known under the name "General System of Preferences" (Chile's total exports to the United States amount to about 1 billion dollars). A more serious warning for Pinochet is the discontinuation of the other program, being implemented by the Corporation of Private Investments Abroad, which guarantees about 300 million dollars in investments by American corporations in Chile.

It would be a mistake to assume that the White House has "broken" with Pinochet once and for all, of course. For example, in voting on a World Bank loan of 250 million dollars to Chile, the U. S. Administration abstained, which actually meant that the loan was granted and that Washington approved of Pinochet's economic policy. The Pentagon's close cooperation with the Chilean military is being maintained: the "Unidas" maneuvers are being conducted jointly, and an agreement has been concluded on the use of Easter Island for emergency reception or a possible landing by reusable spacecraft.

What Is Behind the "Threshold" of the Plebiscite?

V. M. Gavrilov: There are two practical examples of U. S. attempts to "take a hand" in the process of democratization in Latin America—El Salvador and Haiti. Will

one of such scenarios be played out in Chile, since the situation is similar in some respects, with the military and the PDC, or will events develop on a different path, and are the left-wing forces capable of seizing the political initiative?

V. A. Tsaregorodtsev: I doubt if we can expect any decisive changes as the result of the plebiscite, inasmuch as it is one of the ingredients of the scenario proposed by the dictatorship. Things will become complicated only for Pinochet himself in the event of a decisive "no." But after all, he is not in the political arena by himself; certain forces, including the Army, are behind him. In the eyes of these forces, and the U. S. Administration as well, a "coordinated transition" would mean a guarantee of "calm," "peaceful" changes and the exclusion of left-wing organizations and movements from this process.

Yu. N. Korolev: I do not think that we should predict all the nuances of the situation. But the question in itself is completely legitimate. Practically every Chilean is concerned about it today. I think that we must take an absolutely "cold" look at the actual situation in the country in order to make a prediction that is the least bit realistic. Only in that way will we be able to "count" the possible alternatives.

In the thinking of the left-wing forces, a powerful state sector plus nationalization of foreign capital provides for 50 to 60 percent of the GNP when power is seized—this is the system-forming factor for building socialism. Only yesterday that was the central point in the left-wing forces' economic program. But today the structure of the Chilean economy has been completely changed. The objective of nationalization itself has become extremely difficult to achieve. I think that R. Arismendi, who stated last year that "the Latin American communist movement is faced with the problem of working out strategy and tactics," is correct. Actually, this is an acknowledgment that they do not exist. The left-wing forces' lack of an economic program that is adequate for the current realities is the basic reason for their inability to carry out their political plan. Hence the inevitable stage in which the left-wing forces are "in the tail end" to a certain extent and the revolutionary forces are "rolled back" to the rearguard of the social reformist forces... Objectively this also stems from the fact that national-democratic programs have now been advanced to the forefront (instead of tasks in the class struggle). And social democracy, it appears, is the real force capable of carrying them out. It is capable of regenerating enthusiasm and mobilizing the broad strata, since it has influence among the masses, primarily the organized proletariat. It alone is able to support an unpopular plan for modernization (further intensification of production) now without being deprived of the masses' support in the process. Finally, it enjoys the international confidence of transnational circles. Incidentally, the other left-wing forces still do not have a clear-cut program for dialogue with these circles—and it is unavoidable.

Yu. A. Zubritskiy: We sometimes attach too much significance to the economic factor, particularly by expecting changes in business conditions to have an immediate effect on the political situation. But it is unrealistic until fluctuations in market conditions lead to corresponding shifts in social consciousness. The same may be said of the programmed objectives of political parties. If they do not reflect the social consciousness and psychology of the majority of the people, they cannot be carried out.

In other words, there can be no victorious revolution without the revolutionization of social consciousness. Why was the October Revolution victorious, and most importantly, why was it able to defend itself in spite of the most burdensome economic problems? Because the social consciousness and social psychology of an absolute majority of Russia's population had been revolutionized.

Why did the revolutionary policy of National Unity suffer defeat? Chiefly because vast sections of Chilean society were not included in the revolutionary consciousness. And today the fact that a significant number of Chileans intend to vote for Pinochet, according to a recent public opinion poll, is causing alarm.

At present, all the strata of social consciousness may be considered as revolutionary if they are aimed at the overthrow of Pinochet and the dismantling of Pinochetism.

I would like to point out that social consciousness is shaped under the influence of a great number of objective and subjective factors, including political education work among the masses. That is the factor which the Chilean progressive forces are not devoting sufficient attention to, in my view.

Yu. N. Korolev: I will take the liberty of maintaining that the only real alternative to Pinochet and Pinochetism in Chile now may be social democracy. I am not referring to any specific party; a broad spectrum of forces may come forth (and be united) under the slogans of a social democratic program at this specific stage.

Yu. A. Zubritskiy: In attempting to predict the situation, we cannot lose sight of the relationships between nationalities, either. In the end, without taking into account the role and importance of the Mapuche (Araucanian) people and their attitudes and fighting spirit, it is impossible to discuss Chile's prospects in the near and long-term future. S. Allende underestimated the importance of "the Indian question" in his time; granting autonomy to the Araucanians could have strengthened the positions of National Unity.

The Mapuche people have been inspired with the spirit of liberating traditions and the liberation struggle. They are always ready to act, and some strong point for the antidictatorship forces may emerge in the territory where they live, especially in the event of an armed

uprising, a possibility which the communists are not rejecting. And it is important that the Araucanians appear as a united front today, of course.

At present, about 200,000 people, that is, one-quarter of the Indian population, are now under the active supervision of the ADMAPU (the national organization of the Mapuche people). The Mapuche people actively oppose the dictatorship's plans, which are actually aimed at annihilating the Indians as a race. Now on their traditional ("ngilyatun") holidays the Mapuche Indians do not pray to their gods so much for rain as for another blessing—the dictator's departure. Unfortunately, problems such as dissociation and lack of unity have affected the Indian movement as well.

O. P. Proselkova: In my view, it is incorrect to compare the processes taking place in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and so forth with what is taking place or may transpire in Chile. These countries have gone through a stage of armed struggle. This does not exist in Chile and I don't think it will. Chile is one of those Latin American countries where democratic traditions are very strong; they have taken shape over many decades and have not disappeared among the people over the 15 years of rule by the junta. This is a country with strong democratic parties which have considerable experience in political struggle and it has a strong, organized working class which no repressions can break down. I think that the opposition forces will find a milder "Chilean way" to get out of the crisis situation.

P. N. Boyko: Speaking about the immediate future and specifically about development of the political situation in Chile, I would like to direct your attention to the fact that certain circles in Chile and outside the country would be inclined to reject Pinochet in order to retain the regime itself. To retain Pinochetism without Pinochet. If they managed to do this, of course, Pinochetism without Pinochet would be no sweeter for those who are suffering from it than Pinochetism with Pinochet would be; I recall the Russian saying about horseradish and radish here...

It seems to me that such an alternative—Pinochetism without Pinochet—is unlikely. Historical experience has shown that Francoism without Franco did not turn out, just as Salazarism without Salazar did not turn out. I daresay even Haiti without Duvalier is not the same as Haiti with Duvalier. Exactly the same applies to the Dominican Republic, where Trujilloism without Trujillo did not turn out. In all probability this stems from the very nature of such regimes. And especially because these times are altogether different. And this is one of the reasons why those who would very much like Chile to remain a "staunch ally" of transnational monopoly capital, that is, those very circles who would like to create a democratic facade for the dictator's regime after removing Pinochet, are not very zealous about this intention, because they are taking real historical experience into account.

V. M. Gavrilo: So the dictator continues to "experiment," to select a different set of political and legal tools to maintain his regime of personal power. And this is in spite of the dictatorship's obvious unpopularity and the loss of former allies. The tactic of a "smooth" transition from tyranny to democracy—the tactic recommended by Washington—is obviously not working in the Chilean case. At the same time, the repressive system is too refined and technically perfected to hope for an upsurge of "mobilized democracy" today.

The key to an escape from the blind alley is in the hands of the opposition leadership. But there is an obvious lack of unity among the dictatorship's opponents. Meanwhile, the situation requires new political thinking, freedom from intolerance, and a combination of ideological superiority and the skill to coordinate positions with potential allies. A kind of national reconciliation policy is needed, which by no means stands for any movement "halfway" between the democratic forces and the dictatorship. By including all the opposition forces, all those who are still wondering if they should break with Pinochet once and for all may be enlisted in the antidictatorship front.

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18070175 Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in
Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 81-83

[Interview with Roberto Dias, a director of the Brazilian company Constructora Norberto (Odebrecht), S. A., by LATINSKAYA AMERIKA's Rio de Janeiro-Buenos Aires correspondent P. P. Yakovlev: "Our Partner, the ('Odebrecht') Concern"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] In Brazil, as in a number of other Latin American countries, the effort by some of the local business circles to remove themselves from the custody of the TNK's [transnational corporations], to determine their own rightful place in the world economy, and to become firmly established as equal partners in the international division of labor is persistently making itself felt. This process, which did not begin yesterday by any means, is being developed under complicated domestic and foreign conditions and is running into many barriers and obstacles. Nevertheless, it is carving its way by having a beneficial effect on Latin America's economic development. The restructuring of the foreign economic sphere which is taking place in our country is opening new opportunities for reinforcing this positive process. The organization of business contacts between appropriate Soviet organizations and leading private firms in the region's countries is one of the indicators of the regeneration that has begun. The materials sent by our correspondent in South American countries, P. P. Yakovlev, illustrates the specific features of this process.

The Brazilian ("Odebrecht") group, one of the country's largest, occupies a prominent place among our Latin American partners. It is sufficient to say that its holding company—"Odebrecht" S. A.—is the third largest of the Brazilian private companies of this type. The group's activities include heavy industrial and civil construction, oil drilling and petrochemicals, the manufacture and installation of metal structures, and the like. The concern's companies (there are over 30 of them), which employ over 50,000 workers and employees, carries out technically complex projects which have given ("Odebrecht") a strong reputation in the business circles of Brazil and other countries. It is not without reason that its management has promoted the slogan "Nothing is impossible for ('Odebrecht').".

We are discussing the group's activities and the prospects for its cooperation with Soviet foreign economic organizations with Roberto Dias, one of the directors of the key company Constructora Norberto (Odebrecht), S. A., and a young, energetic and attentive person.

[Answer] Our basic activity is construction. ("Odebrecht") employees are justifiably proud of the many projects built by us or with our participation. They include the Itaipu Hydroelectric Power Plant, the world's largest; the Almirante Alvaro Alberto Nuclear Power Plant in Angra dos Reis; the international airport and seagoing ship anchorage in Rio de Janeiro; highways in the states of Bahia, Sao Paulo and Par; an 860-kilometer railroad from the iron mining region of Carajás to the Atlantic coast; the Colombo (Salles) bridge, over 1,200 meters long, in Santa Catarina state; a uranium enrichment center in Resende; and blast furnaces, plant and factory buildings, residential and commercial centers in the country's largest cities, mines and tunnels, oil drilling platforms on the continental shelf, and so forth.

[Question] Please tell us about the projects that ("Odebrecht") has completed or is working on in other countries.

[Answer] Indeed, the group has already crossed the country's borders. Thousands of our workers and engineers are working abroad. I will mention the ("Charkani" V) hydroelectric power project in southern Peru, 1,000 kilometers from the capital. It is hard to overstate the value of this GES for the development of this region. The project is extremely complex, and work is under way in the mountains, in a seismically active region. In particular, we have to build a nearly horizontal 10-kilometer tunnel. Operations are now coming to an end, and we hope that ("Charkani" V) will work well in the interests of our neighboring country's economic development.

("Odebrecht") is also working on projects in Ecuador, Paraguay and Chile. Quite recently we won international tenders and received orders totaling 220 million dollars; in Ecuador we will build an irrigation system on the Santa Elena peninsula, and in Chile we will build a

spillway for the future ("Peuenche") Hydroelectric Power Plant together with the Argentine ("Techint") and "Benito (Roggio)" firms. And if we "transfer" to another continent, I would mention that ("Odebrecht") is building in Angola. Incidentally, it is precisely there that cooperation between our group and Soviet foreign economic organizations has taken shape and is being fruitfully developed.

[Question] Evidently this is the ("Kananda") hydroelectric power complex?

[Answer] Absolutely correct. In my view, this is an excellent example of Soviet-Brazilian-Angolan trilateral cooperation. The 520-megavolt complex, which is being built on the Kwanza River 400 kilometers from Luanda, will be put into operation in the 1990s and will serve as the base for agricultural and industrial development over an extensive area in the central part of the country. This important project for Angola is being carried out by a consortium made up of the All-Union Association "Tekhnopromeksport" (it is responsible for the planning, delivery and assembly of equipment) and the company Constructora Norberto (Odebrecht), S. A., which is engaged in civil engineering and development of the infrastructure. I should say that we are satisfied with the way our cooperation with Soviet specialists is developing and we believe it is expedient to significantly extend it. Business circles in Brazil are closely watching your restructuring of the economy, and the concept of combined enterprises is a subject of particular interest. Reports of plans to open a supermarket of the Brazilian "Pan de Azucar" company in Moscow were a pleasant surprise. I am certain this will serve as a good example.

[Question] What are the specific directions in which collaboration between ("Odebrecht") and Soviet organizations could be developed?

[Answer] There are quite a few such directions, I think. In construction first of all, of course, in building large enterprises and other national economic projects, in oil drilling and refining, in the chemical industry, and in developing communications systems. As far as Brazilian territory is concerned, our group is interested in building metallurgical enterprises, railroads, irrigation projects, and gas pipelines with the assistance of the USSR.

In the Soviet Union, we could form associations and consortiums, cooperate within the framework of combined enterprises, and build "turn-key" projects. There are also good opportunities for carrying out projects jointly in third countries—Nigeria, Algeria, Zimbabwe, and Peru. We are placing much hope on the development of Brazilian-Argentine integration, where I believe there is a place for trilateral projects with the USSR's participation as well.

("Odebrecht") is a dynamic group; from year to year, the scope and volume of our operations are growing and their geographical distribution is expanding. I am confident that cooperation with the Soviet Union will provide additional impetus to our continued growth and will provide you with tangible benefit as well. It has to be taken into account that business competition in the international markets is becoming more intense, and cooperative activity and a mutually beneficial partnership are needed to conduct business successfully, otherwise one cannot hold out in the competitive struggle.

[Question] Are there factors which hamper ("Odebrecht's") activities?

[Answer] We can name two in general: political and economic instability in Brazil, as well as obvious opposition to autonomous integration processes in the region from the transnational corporations, which are attempting to assign the role of "junior partners" to Latin American firms, to deprive them of their independence, to limit their growth, and to prevent them from entering promising new sectors of the economy. Your journal has already written about the conflict between American and Brazilian companies in the field of computerized information processing. But this is just one example, though it is also the one that is most revealing. For this reason, I repeat, we Latin Americans need cooperation and the closest collaboration. Otherwise, the prospects for growth of our national industry will remain problematical.

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U.S.-USSR Symposium on Regional Conflicts
18070175 Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 140-142

[Report by V. P. Sudarev and S. V. Tagor on U. S.-USSR symposium on regional conflicts organized by the International Center for Development Policy, held in Washington in October 1987: "Visiting American Colleagues"]

[Text] A U. S.-Soviet symposium on regional conflicts in Central America and southern Africa, organized by the International Center for Development Policy (ICDP), was held in Washington in October 1987. The authors, along with researchers from a number of institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, took part in it.

The ICDP was formed in 1977, although it has already acquired a reputation. Its anti-Reagan orientation and close ties with a number of influential figures in the Democratic Party have enabled the center to actively associate itself with the Democrats' attempts in the 1980's to work out alternative directions for U. S. policy with respect to regional conflicts, particularly the problem of the Central American crisis. The fact that R. White, the former ambassador to El Salvador who

became one of the first victims of the State Department "purge" of opponents of a "strong" approach, is the director of the ICDP has contributed to this to a considerable extent.

The emergence and activity of the center reflect the process of strengthening the role of nongovernment social and political organizations in U. S. political life and their growing influence on formation of the country's political course and public opinion. Thus, the ICDP has not only associated itself with investigations of the "Irangate scandal," but it has also conducted its own, exposing new cases of ties between the Contras and drug smuggling and crimes committed against peaceful residents in Nicaraguan territory. In particular, the center established contacts with one of the former Contra leaders, E. Chamorro, and actually paved the way for his return to Nicaragua in October 1987.

The center engages extensively in the practice of "nongovernment diplomacy." Its emissaries often travel to crisis areas and conduct an expert assessment of the situation on the spot, which is subsequently reflected in appropriate published works. The ICDP is now actively seeking to look at ("Eskipulas-II").

Our trip turned out to be extraordinarily interesting and instructive in a certain sense. Our hosts tried to fill it with as many measures as possible. There was practically no lack of coordination in the program, which was scheduled literally by minutes. The workload was somewhat unusual (though our colleagues who had had the experience of trips to the United States assured us that "Americans are always this way"). In a certain sense, we had the occasion to become aware of "capitalist exploitation." The point is that our hosts sought to get an idea of the USSR's new approaches in Latin America, including in the area of practical policy. In this connection we were convinced that the visit by E. Shevardnadze to Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay had created the keenest interest in the United States and given rise to many new questions about Soviet policy in this region. An avalanche of them came down upon us in literally the very first meetings.

Our trip was accompanied by flattering "publicity," although it was also obligatory for many things. As a rule, we were presented as the bearers of new political thinking and unorthodox approaches, who very nearly were not issued a license to "speak freely" on questions of Soviet foreign policy. Interest in the results of restructuring and glasnost in the discussions with Soviet scientists was sincere and continuous, regardless of the nature of the audience.

In bombarding us with questions, the Americans were not inclined to satisfy our intellectual curiosity, it seemed. The impression was created that our hosts do not like to answer questions in general; at times we

thought that this was simply not interesting to them, and that they did not want to lose time to no purpose. It is another matter to ask, and particularly to attempt to put an opponent on the spot.

Nevertheless, we clashed only once in frankly aggressive ill-disposed terms. At the Carnegie Fund, a very influential nongovernment organization which brings representatives of political and business circles together, we were given the opportunity at the start of the meeting to set forth our views on the Central American conflict and the prospects for its settlement, after which each person in the hall could either ask us questions or express his own views on the problem. Usually this provided food for fruitful discussions on the role of the foreign factor in settling regional conflicts. But this time everything took another turn. When the business came to the questions, one of the guests who spoke in the hall introduced himself as a CIA employee; having equipped his statement with an abundance of "departmental statistics," he depicted the Soviet Union as the principal culprit responsible for the crisis in Central America and its militarization. Obviously it would have been naive to expect a different approach from a representative of this department, although the harsh and frankly aggressive tone of his statement, which was clearly out of tune with the overall spirit of our meetings, was unexpected. We did not fail to respond to this statement, of course, stating in an ironic tone that it is not easy for us to compete in being well-informed with a functionary of an organization which is taking such an active part in the events in Central America. Our response evoked animation in the hall.

In the course of the meetings, we had the opportunity to become acquainted with representatives of the "new wave" in American Latin American studies. After a difficult period in the early 1980's, when the approach from a position of strength proposed by the Reagan administration enjoyed considerable support among the public, they have been declaring their positions more and more vigorously. This refers to scientists such as (T. Karl, U. Leogrande, M. Blackman) and (K. Sharp), whose views may be described as liberal democratic. One of the principal distinguishing features of their approach to the Central American crisis is virtual repudiation of the traditional link between instability in the region and U. S. national security interests. While those who have represented American political thinking in the past decades have differed in explaining the instability—some saw its cause as "Soviet expansionism" and others explained it by internal factors, they have essentially shared a common view in conclusions about its significance for U. S. national security. But now the majority of American members of the seminar were adhering to a different viewpoint. The view was also expressed that the opportunity for a political settlement in El Salvador is extremely limited.

Our positions, concluded as were those on a number of aspects, particularly with respect to the fact that one of

the basic conditions for overcoming the Central American deadlock is rejection of military-political and economic actions aimed at destabilization; ("Eskipulas-II") is a fragile process anyway. The American participants, who were generally skeptical in assessing the prospects for bringing about mutual understanding between the United States and USSR under the Reagan administration, noted at the same time that it could play an important role in normalizing the situation in the subregion in the future.

The American participants' high level of professionalism, the fact that they were very well-informed about the events taking place in the subregion, their many areas of scientific interest and their in-depth specialization made an important impression. According to articles in the journal *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA*, they are quite familiar with the work of Soviet Latin American specialists. For this reason, they basically expected us to set forth new approaches, and they sought in particular to bring us to the topic of practical changes in the USSR's Latin American policy in light of the new political thinking. The question of Latin American specialists' influence on practical policy evoked considerable interest in this connection. We had to acknowledge that we still have untapped resources here.

It was completely natural that the opinions of the Soviet participants themselves did not always coincide during the seminar discussions. At times we argued with each other. Later R. White said he could not imagine any differences arising among Soviet scientists. For us, this declaration was both funny and sad. It forced us to think once again about the persistent stereotypes in perception which we evidently had a hand in forming at one time.

At the conclusion of the seminar we had the opportunity to become familiar with a number of universities in Washington and New York, and our familiarity was not limited to "roundtable" meetings with the teaching staff. At Johns Hopkins University, they invited us to take part in a seminar on the topic "Communism in Latin America." I will make no secret of the fact that we had virtually no doubt in going to the seminar that we would "have our backs against the wall" here. This opinion was reinforced when they told us that the seminar would be conducted by none other than W. Smith, who headed the American mission in Cuba at one time. However, everything actually turned out quite differently. Smith kindly gave us the floor, and for an hour and a half we responded to all kinds of questions, beginning with our conception of democracy and ending with the prospects for Soviet purchases of coffee from Honduras.

The Americans are closely following events in Cuba. The number of questions on the subject of Cuba was somewhat unexpected. The question of our assessment of the process of "correcting mistakes" in Cuba, which the overwhelming majority of American scientists and political figures have nicknamed "anti-perestroika," was unavoidable. It was not simple to respond to it. We had

to remind our American colleagues that the levels of development and the specific situations in the USSR and Cuba are very different, and also that history has provided many examples where the artificial transfer of reforms from one set of conditions to substantially different ones not only did not produce the desired results, but ones that were directly opposed to them.

The trip convinced us that there are favorable opportunities under the current conditions for broader Soviet-American cooperation, and that the important role which can be played by nongovernment groups and commissions in settling regional conflicts makes such cooperation especially important, in our view. Not to overstate the results of the seminar held in Washington, we hope that it will become a starting point for joint scientific research.

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Latin American Foreign Policies

18070175 Moscow *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA* in Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 143-144

[Report by correspondent P. P. Yakovlev on foreign policy symposium in Brasilia: "Foreign Policy Problems in the Center of Attention"]

[Text] The substantial increase in the foreign policy activity and role of Latin America in the world arena over the past 15 years is attracting more and more attention from international affairs scientists in the region itself, as well as outside it. We were convinced of this once again in the course of the international symposium on the topic "The Formation of Foreign Policy: the Developed Countries and Latin America," held in Brazil's capital in December 1987. The symposium was organized by the well-known association "The Program for Joint Research on Latin America's International Relations" (RIAL), which brings together a large group of scientists from Latin American, European and other states and seeks to develop and coordinate the study of a broad range of problems related to the foreign policy of the continent's countries. (For more details, see *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA* No 5, 1987.) Participants in the symposium in Brasilia were received by President Jos Sarney, who gave a high assessment to RIAL's contribution to study of the many pressing problems in the international relations of Latin American countries.

More than 50 prominent international affairs specialists took part in the Brasilia symposium. Along with plenary sessions, they conducted their work in seven sections, which made it possible to thoroughly examine a wide range of questions and to bring out the coincidences of views and differences. On the whole, the symposium was distinguished by the high scientific level of the discussions and by the participants' effort to interpret new phenomena and trends in Latin American countries' international relations from the standpoint of both the

processes under way in the region as well as changes in the world arena as a whole. Another feature was the considerable amount of attention devoted to the mechanism of shaping the foreign policy of Latin American countries and its motive forces, which are becoming more and more complex in composition. In particular, it was stressed that the influence of different political, social and other institutions on the process of working out and adopting foreign policy solutions has increased in recent years.

Particular attention was devoted to the foreign policy of the region's largest countries in recent years. The extended range of their international ties and contacts and the concentration of efforts on three main areas of foreign policy activity were noted: strengthening nationality and regional autonomy, promotion of economic development, and relations with the United States. Most of the symposium participants pointed out that the area of inter-American contradictions, which involve more and more new aspects of relations between the United States and leading countries in the region, has been broadened. Thus, the "traditional sore points" were supplemented by new ones in the 1980's: the Central American and Malvinas conflicts, the foreign debt crisis, contradictions within the GATT in connection with the problem of trade services, the clash of interests in the field of information science, and so forth. All this intensifies the differences between the United States and Latin America, prompting the latter's governments to look for new foreign policy and foreign economic alternatives. This process is not developing without difficulty, however, inasmuch as the region's "attachment" to the United States is still very strong, chiefly in the economic and financial area.

In the view of a number of participants in the discussions, the sharp deterioration of the economic situation in most of the region's states during the 1980's has resulted largely from Latin America's "lack of material and moral preparedness" for the present stage of the scientific and technical revolution. It is a sad but natural paradox resulting from dependence: an essentially progressive phenomenon has been turned into difficult socioeconomic consequences for the Latin American countries. The urgent need for unity and concentration of efforts by countries in the region to speed up scientific and technical progress and for Latin America's interest in broad international cooperation was particularly emphasized in this connection. A thesis was formulated in the symposium on the new nature of the current stage of Latin American integration; in the view of a group of researchers, private institutions, not state organizations, are playing a more and more active role in the integration process, unlike the period of the 1960's and 1970's.

The symposium clearly reflected an understanding that putting the principles of new political thinking into practice more rapidly and giving unequivocal priority to joint constructive efforts by all states and peoples to

bring about peace, disarmament, and mutually beneficial and equitable cooperation are vitally necessary. At the same time, along with the theses which adequately reflected the USSR's goals and actions in the world arena, propositions were advanced in a number of cases which misrepresented or oversimplified the Soviet state's foreign policy activity and its course with respect to Latin American countries. In particular, a certain amount of attention was given to the thesis that the USSR will reduce aid to Cuba and Nicaragua, guided by a "more moderate" approach to the struggle by Latin American and other developing states to strengthen their national sovereignty and consolidate their political independence. Such an interpretation, which voluntarily or involuntarily distorts the essence of the matter, attests to the need to organize broad scientific collaboration between the international affairs specialists of Latin America and their colleagues in the USSR in order to ensure that conceptions of the essential nature of the Soviet Union's present foreign policy course are more accurate.

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RED STAR Assails U.S. Nicaraguan Policy

18070215 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian on 24 July 1988 carries on page 3 an article by Senior Lieutenant S. Sidorov entitled "Escalation of Interference" assailing U.S. Nicaraguan policy. Sidorov accuses the United States of attempting, over the past 9 years, to strangle the young sovereign Nicaraguan republic through economic and political blockades, starvation, terrorist acts, and military provocations. He claims that the positive trends aimed at a peaceful settlement of the Nicaraguan problem (the Guatemalan Agreements) outlined a year ago have come to naught as a result of the activities of the Contras and their patrons. "They even went as far as American diplomats, including Ambassador R. Melton, openly beginning to incite forces of internal reaction in Nicaragua to disturbances and insubordination." Sidorov claims that the so-called Melton plan, intended to create broad domestic opposition to the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and Nicaragua's revolutionary government, became public, resulting in the expulsion of some American diplomats who were declared *persona non grata* for interfering in Nicaraguan internal affairs.

Sidorov claims that American policies toward Nicaragua are characterized not only by aggression but tremendous hypocrisy. "Acting in the traditional spirit characteristic of all American policies regarding national liberation movements, the White House urges the Contras to break off negotiations, while accusing the FSLN of attempting to do the same." He accuses the U.S. administration of

"following the method of the Holy Inquisition- first putting forth accusations and then forcibly compelling the accused to admit their guilt."

The article notes that the Contras continue to expand their campaign of terrorizing and intimidating the peaceful population. "Washington, evidently, does not intend to retreat from applying military or any other pressure on Nicaragua. The United States recently again spurned a Nicaraguan Government proposal to resume direct Nicaraguan-American negotiations." Sidorov blames the U.S. administration for the rupture in Contra-Sandinista negotiations, contending that "under pressure from Washington, the Contras broke off the latest negotiations with the Nicaraguan Government." He quotes the newspaper BARRICADA (the FSLN organ): "The current arrangement of forces in the counterrevolutionary leadership reflects the U.S. administration's intention to hinder, in every way possible, a political resolution of the conflict and to continue military aggression against Nicaragua."

The futility of the Reagan administration's efforts to isolate the Sandinistas internationally is pointed out. Quoting from the Argentine journal NUEVO PERIODISTA, Sidorov notes that at a recent Organization of American States (OAS) meeting, the majority of the region's countries supported the Nicaraguan position. The White House's schemes to transform the Contras

into a military-political organization have not been realized. NUEVO PERIODISTA reportedly noted that the new U.S. administration, whether democratic or republican, ought to consider the will of the Latin American peoples, to renounce a policy of blackmail and pressure, and to leave Nicaragua in peace.

Sidorov praises Nicaragua's constructive policy as demonstrated by President D. Ortega's calling upon the U.S. administration (during celebrations marking the 9th anniversary of the Sandinista revolutionary victory) to renew the dialogue it had broken off with Nicaragua for normalization of relations between the two countries. Sidorov views the Nicaraguan Government's extension of the cease-fire positively, and considers it a sign of Nicaraguan readiness to achieve a firm peace and a speedy end to the war.

Sidorov concludes the article by stating that the Soviet position on the problem of the Central American peace settlement is unambiguous and well-known. "It is necessary, taking into account today's realities and relying on the Contadora process and Guatemalan agreements, to give the opposition forces themselves in Nicaragua, with the participation of other Latin Americans, an opportunity to resolve this question. Attempts to resolve it through military aggression from outside did not produce results in the past and are doomed to failure in the future."

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Academic on Prospects for Soviet-Chinese Relations

18070142 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 9 Jul 88 p 5

[Interview with Academic S. L. Tikhvinskiy, president of the central board of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent I. Nekrasov: "Open Windows—The Future of Soviet-Chinese Relations"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Here our correspondent interviews the president of the central board of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, Academic S. L. Tikhvinskiy. Mr. Tikhvinskiy headed a delegation of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies and Cultural Liaison With Foreign Countries which returned recently from China.

[Question] Sergey Leonidovich, interest in the People's Republic of China has increased noticeably in our country. The Soviet people want to know more about our neighbor. Relations between us have included not only years of fruitful cooperation, but bitter periods as well. How are the consequences of these periods being overcome in Soviet-Chinese relations?

[Answer] Today we are truly seeing a new discovery of China. Articles are appearing more and more frequently in the pages of our newspapers and magazines dealing with the most diverse aspects of this country. A great deal has to be made up for, since the unwillingness to understand one another over the years of the "cultural revolution" led to too much being neglected. Works by Russian and Soviet authors were not published in the PRC during that period. Moreover, people expressing sympathies towards our country were subject to persecution and repression. The "cultural revolution" generation actually lived in ignorance of its northern neighbor. I would like to note that, for our part, such a "break" did not take place—all the most significant dates with respect to the history of the Chinese people were observed, books by poets and authors were published, training and preparation of skilled Chinese area experts and specialists continued. It is to a great extent thanks to Soviet scholars, for example, that a unique Chinese literary work, "Slumber in the Red Tower-Room," was able to be restored, one manuscript of which is preserved in Leningrad.

[Question] How did national traditions manage to be preserved in China under the conditions of the "cultural revolution" without losing their original character?

[Answer] The Chinese themselves talk about that time, when "a billion people were educated under conditions of chaos." Their unique traditions were preserved all the same by virtue of the country's colossal cultural heritage. You know, for example, that the period of continuous recorded history in China covers about 4500 years. The country's cultural roots could not be torn apart over the course of one decade, even when subject to the harshest

derision. All this is in the past, fortunately, and the period of the so-called "cultural revolution" has been justifiably condemned by the Chinese Communist Party. The current period may be termed a true boom of creativity—interesting books are being published and home cinema is announcing itself. Quite recently the film "The Red Gaoliang" was awarded high marks at the prestigious West Berlin Film Festival.

Travelling across the country you are struck by the growth of foreign and domestic tourism. A great number of hotels are being built in China. Artistic and historical monuments are being restored. New museums have been opened to the public. Unique treasures are enriching the collections of those presently in operation. A remarkable monument of ancient Chinese architecture, the Yellow Stork Pagoda in Wuchang, has been completely restored. A number of new sections of the Great Wall near Beijing have been reconstructed.

[Question] Prior to meeting with you I conducted my own little sociological study and asked pedestrians on the Moscow streets what ideas came to mind upon mention of China. They thought of the Great Wall and China's capital, Beijing. They named well-known Chinese goods like thermos products and towels, but almost every one of those questioned mentioned the word "reform"...

[Answer] And quite justifiably so. It must be said that the tasks of economic reform in a formerly semi-feudal country with a population in the billions—some Chinese provinces contain more than a hundred million people, an entire large nation!—are incredibly complex, a fact well recognized by today's leaders in the central committee of China's Communist Party. As Deng Xiao Ping noted, "China finds itself at the very outset of building a socialist society."

I was strongly impressed over the course of this trip by the fact that China is consistently implementing a policy of attracting foreign capital, engineering and technology as one of the key elements in its course of pursuing the "four modernizations."

Four "special economic zones" appeared in the country in 1985. Earlier I had managed to visit the most prominent of these—the Shenzhen Zone. Labor productivity here is several times greater than the country average. Such "open windows" to the outside world bear witness to the policy of "one nation—two systems" being pursued, which implies a gradual joining of Chinese territories to the People's Republic of China, primarily those of Hong Kong and Taiwan. The economic zones give China—as yet not very rich—access to modern technology and enable it to train highly qualified personnel.

[Question] Sergey Leonidovich, the India Festival is presently taking place in the USSR and enjoying great success. Can we expect a China Festival in the USSR in the foreseeable future?

[Answer] That would be wonderful and I would fully support such an initiative. International forums whose participants represent the most diverse cultural spheres make it possible to become even better acquainted with the customs and traditions of a neighboring country. But I am also aware that the extent of our contacts is, for the time being, extremely negligible. Again we have to look at the bitter lessons of the "cultural revolution" and the rule of "the Great Helmsman." We must now seek new forms of contact with the Chinese side, find ways of diversifying our mutual exchanges.

Today more than 600 students and researchers from China are working in the USSR, and about as many Soviet counterparts are engaged in studies at PRC universities and institutions. The friendship society's plan of cooperation that we signed in Beijing calls for an exchange of USSR and PRC delegations on the republic, region, district and city levels. Our friendship societies are continuing to work on promoting mutual acquaintanceship with the significant events and notable dates in the lives of both countries, with celebrations of public figures, scholars and cultural workers. The plan envisages the exchange of exhibits and periodicals.

The president of the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society, Wu Xiuquan, is coming to the Soviet Union. This party and military figure, well-known in China, has outstanding command of the Russian language and is also president of the Association of Russian Philologists. I hope that meeting with my Chinese colleague will help us in our combined search for deepened and broadened contacts between the two countries.

Beginning in autumn of this year, the Znaniye [knowledge] Society is organizing a series of lectures on Chinese culture, to include discussions on the country's art, literature and architecture.

[Question] You have been to China many times. Tell us, how great is their interest in the Soviet Union?

[Answer] People of the older generation, many of whom studied in the USSR, have very warm remembrances of the fifties. The plants and factories which were built at that time with our country's technological assistance provide the best testimony to Soviet-Chinese friendship. Another example can be seen in the wreath-laying our delegation performed during a trip to Wuhang at the carefully guarded graves of pilots who perished during the war against Japanese militarists. Then, in Shanghai, flowers were placed at a restored monument to Pushkin.

Our Chinese colleagues are expressing a tremendous, unconcealed interest in the restructuring which is taking place in our country. Professor Wang Ziping, director of the USSR and Eastern European Countries Institute, informed us that a permanent seminar is conducted at the institute on issues raised in M. S. Gorbachev's book

"Restructuring and a New Thinking for our Country and the Entire World." This book, incidentally, has already been published in four independent editions in the PRC.

Interest in the Russian language is also appreciable. A special Russian language course is being taught this year on television in Shanghai. The PRC has outstanding Russian philology specialists and translators able to acquaint their readers with contemporary Soviet authors. But it is also necessary on our part to effect a quicker "turnover," making our significant new writers and poets available to the Chinese.

One can discourse forever about China, the country of a thousand riddles. And I say this primarily as an individual who knows and loves the Chinese people. For that reason, the more intensive and saturated our cooperative plans and programs are, the better it will be for both countries. We are neighbors and must live in peace, knowing one another and helping one another.

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Economics of Fujian Province Examined

18070170a Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Jul 88 p 14

[Article by Arkadiy Udaltsov: "China—A Special Area"]

[Excerpts] I lost him 28 years ago. I lost him one dry cold autumn evening in 1960 on the dimly-lit Yaroslavskiy Station platform. We were seeing our Chinese friends off. I had lived side by side with one of them—Li Jiangnang—for five years in the same room of a student dormitory. I had studied with the other—Feng Jiangting—for the same period in one study group.

At that time, we had tried to get to know the distant fraternal country. The song "Stalin and Mao listen to us..." was popular at the time. We memorized some Chinese words and learned about the customs and habits of our friends, and even got used to Chinese cooking....In short, we discovered and came to understand China, unaware at the time of the sorts of events which were beginning to develop there. The distant threatening echo of the approaching "cultural revolution"—which was similar to ours of 1937, only with a specifically Chinese nature—had already started rolling through the country. We did not know, but they, our friends, knew a little, but held their tongues. Apparently, that's the way it had to be.

Only two or three minutes remained until time for the train to depart. We all embraced in parting, and I said to Li, "It's all right, we'll get together soon. We will come and see each other often." But he answered, "No, we'll probably never see each other again. They are sending us off to the countryside for reeducation." He said it as if the matter were settled, and then entered the railcar. Slowly the train started moving and I stood there with no understanding at all of what was going on.

I received only one letter from them after that. We soon learned quite a bit, though not everything, about what had happened, and no longer wrote them letters, for fear of causing them harm.

That is how I lost China. How a country lost a country, and a state—a state.

I found him 28 years later, during the spring of this year. I got lucky, and was allowed fifteen days in China. But where only two or three years ago I could literally write what I pleased about this country which had been closed to us for so long—and everything about it is interesting—a great deal has been written about it these days, and topics have to be chosen carefully.

I chose to write about a "special area" of China. More precisely, a "special economic" area.

There are several of them. One of them is the island city of Xiamen. Another—the Fujian Province. So I will try to tell you about this city and this province. Whatever else I find out or notice, or want to explain about things I feel we have covered inadequately in print, or by and large insufficiently elucidated, is treated in my notes in the sketches entitled "From My Notebooks."

After the teeming European-Asian Shanghai, the city of Fuzhou—the province center—seemed like a peaceful southern city surrounded by high hills thickly overgrown with vegetation. At the almost patriarchal airport they gave us our baggage directly from a truck, but the passenger cars which had been put at our disposal and which started off with a jerk for the city—a Soviet Volga, a Japanese Toyota and a Sangtan, which is produced jointly by the Chinese and Volkswagen—looked perfectly modern. And the typical Chinese city with its predominantly single-story buildings surprised us with its many ultramodern hotels, the like of which you won't see in our country's capital, much less in the provinces. And there were not just one or two of them, but several. What purpose did they serve? To bring in foreign entrepreneurs, tourists, and rich emigrants who were born in China and who, as we were told, live in 92 countries in the world.

So this is Fuzhou. Near the small single-story stone houses which comprise the city's basic housing stock, folding tables and chairs have been set up right on the sidewalk and the people of the city are having their dinner of rice, stewed vegetables and a little meat. And you need not look anywhere special, you simply walk along the sidewalk around them.

So what sort of "special economic area" is this?

The rapid technical development of neighboring Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong has begun gradually influencing Chinese thinking. Here, they have had to come to an

understanding of the fact that if the country wants to attain the level of its neighbors, it must change the path of its development. The "special areas" experiment conforms to this thesis.

To quote Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Li Peng: "We have had notable successes in the area of expanding and constructing open coastal and special economic areas. Our economy, which has been oriented towards the foreign market, has begun developing intensively. Our opportunities for obtaining foreign currency from exports have been expanding continuously. The coastal and special economic districts we have opened up have become like windows to the outside world and have played a crucially important role in attracting foreign capital, in adopting advanced production methods and experience in scientific control, in learning about the international market, and in transmitting economic information and training the labor-force."

Shi Xiulin, an economist and deputy director of one of the institutes of the local academy of social sciences used the example of the Fujian Province to develop these ideas. I should probably mention that every province in China has an impressive academy of social sciences with 15 scientific research institutes, each of which is oriented to a local specific subject of investigation.

I'm not going to tire you with scientific figures, especially since converting them was fraught with definite difficulties.

FROM MY NOTEBOOKS: This is astonishing! The Chinese of one province do not understand the speech of their fellow citizens from another province. But they use the same written characters. So they carry notebooks and write everything down, so as to understand the gist of what is said. This is a major social problem. And so is mechanization (or is it machinization?) of the printed characters. There are some 60,000 of them. An intelligent person has to know 6,000 of them. Some 2,500-3,000 are used in the newspaper vocabulary. But just try and put them together on a typewriter! It is true that these machines have been around, but until recently, all the newspaper and book texts were hand set. The matter has changed with the advent of computers. The meaning for each character is derived from matching letters in the Latin alphabet. Type-setting is now done on computers.

Comrade Shi told me that China's reform began in the countryside, where the family contract was introduced. The system of agreed-upon contracts, by which the peasants sell 70 percent of their output to the state at purchase prices which have been raised considerably during the years of the reform, and sell 30 percent on the free market, has become firmly entrenched. Surplus laborers in the countryside work in settlement enterprises. Some 280,000 of these enterprises were set up in the province during the reform. Many of them are involved in export operations, and some solely in export.

Here, assets from Chinese emigrants are used extensively. The infrastructure, which is tax-free in the "open zones", has developed rapidly with their help.

The international airport in Xiamen began operating in record time—only 22 months after the beginning of the zero cycle. A number of foreign companies were involved in building this facility.

A unified agency was set up to manage foreign capital investments. Prior to this, up to 100 seals had to be collected in order to begin attracting foreign investments. This number has now been reduced to one.

FROM THE NOTEBOOKS. Thus, the reform in China began in the countryside. Almost all the communes were disbanded, except for the most advanced, the best organized and the most highly mechanized. We visited one of them near Shanghai. It was thriving. All the more, given the new economic conditions, the introduction of the brigade contract and sales of a strictly prescribed portion of its output in the market. In the remaining locales, the land was distributed to the peasants for family use. This boosted the production of agricultural output sharply. It peaked out in 1984, after which there was a marked slowdown in growth.

Some economists feel that this is what killed the family contract. The process of the elementary unification of several peasant farms into, so to speak, informal cooperatives is under way, but so far this has not further increased output volumes nationally. Thinking of their problems incites me to mention that 80 percent of China's population live in villages. In spite of restrictions on their birth rate, there are still large and very large families here. There is a surplus of man-power in the Chinese countryside.

Having done with the figures and general points, let us to move on to the enterprises and take a look, touch and inquire.

Plant after plant gleams in the sun. We only have time to walk through the shops and talk for a bit with the management in one place, which has the tables with the traditional Chinese tea in covered mugs sitting one atop the other.

We drive out to the central square, where we are greeted by a huge statue of Mao. Is capitalism, as they are saying, going to penetrate even to here, to the "special area"?

FROM MY NOTEBOOKS. In the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, I asked:

"What is the attitude in China towards studying Mao Zedong?"

"We accept the useful and reject the erroneous."

"And how do you determine what is useful and what is erroneous?"

"Everyone uses the criterion of practice."

End of conversation.

Somewhere near Peking, I saw a large billboard with one of Mao's sayings: "If we climb the Great Wall, it means we are brave fellows." (literal translation). There is no signature. Perhaps because every Chinese knows who the author is? In our country during the 1950s, when the melody of the song, "Moscow Is Peking" was, perhaps a popular "Lily of the Valley," some lyricist translated these words something like this: "If we don't get to the Great Wall of China, it means we don't love China enough." Not only did we get there, we were part of a huge crowd of tourists atop one of China's mountain-tops.

Each plant has something unique to it alone. There is an experiment under way throughout China to set up a multifaceted economic structure, which I would define more precisely as an experiment to set up enterprises on a multiple-alternative organizational basis. The Chinese assert that during the experiment, that which turns out to be useful is reinforced and that which is harmful falls away. The Fumang Automatic Toy Plant was set up jointly with Japanese entrepreneurs. They invested some of the capital and China (the state sector) invested some, as did Chinese emigres from Hong Kong. Some 74 percent of the plant's products are exported to the USA and Japan. No taxes are levied for two years, after which time the first order of business will be to pay the debt to the State. The plant director and his deputy are Japanese.

We moved on.

The settlement enterprise. Here, all the capital for equipment for a radio manufacturing plant was invested by the plant director's wife (which is why he's the director), who borrowed the money at a 16 percent annual interest rate from 6 overseas relatives. The workers, who are peasants, earn 160 yuan per month in round figures, and the director receives 300 yuan plus 260 in profits plus various other bonuses. The director took us to his home. To the Chinese, and to us as well, a three-story private home is almost a palace.

And here's another settlement plant. This one makes stuffed toys. All its output is exported. I ask whether the workers won't leave the village. "Never," answers the director. "There wages are higher here and the work is, so to speak, cleaner." What will happen when the limited birth-rate causes a "demographic pit"? Won't the village have a manpower shortage? The director replies that when that time comes, the policy will be reexamined.

I was interested in whether the plant had a party organization. No. Several similar plants have one. The party rakkom does not interfere in their production affairs. And no one from there has ever been here.

FROM MY NOTEBOOKS. I have been asking a great many questions about the division of state, administrative, production and party power. From what I was told, I gathered that this principle has been solidly enunciated and that they were trying to adhere to it, but that the official organs, particularly in the "non-special areas" frequently continue to interfere in the work of the enterprises.

After the plants—the "highlight of the program"—a visit to a huge trade center in which, without any exaggeration, one could get lost. Under a single cooperative roof (it has its own governing board) are gathered state and privately-owned stores and cooperatives. And up above, as an enticement, a street from a medieval Chinese city has been set up. Rickshas with customers shuttle back and forth. Little shops sell antiques. Here is an ancient eating-house with its unchanged meat dumpling-type fritters and rice wine. We tried it: delicious.

FROM MY NOTEBOOKS. In Shanghai, just as in Fuzhou, the stores and shops stretch for kilometers, jammed against each other, occupying all the ground floors with their well-arranged displays and bored salespersons. No first and no second-hand stores. But if you go in and look, then of course you'll see that the synthetic-fiber shirts and jackets, and some of the radios and electronic watches, are generally too expensive for the normal Chinese, and the array of products is still far from being West European or Japanese, for example.

As for liquor, there is a riot of selections. Up to 20 brands of vodka in a single store. And next there are containers of beer: Coca-Cola, Fanta etc. One costs 2.5 yuan and you can purchase a bottle of vodka—0.75 liters—for 2 yuan. However, the Chinese drink hardly any vodka. There are colorful and beautiful women standing about, abandoned and dirty. This is related to the problem of the struggle against alcoholism. And it's apparently not just a matter of the drink, but also something else as well. What about prostitution?

It is also difficult to understand who can buy these containers of Coca-Cola when the prices of basic food products continuously rise. In some provinces, one kg of meat now costs 10 yuan. But if the containers of Coca-Cola are here, doesn't that mean someone is buying them?

By and large there are enough products, but in many provinces rice, vegetable oil and meat are sold by coupon. If you want other items, you pay a lot more in the market or in cooperative trade.

In his report to a session of the VSNP (All-China Meeting of People's Representatives, Li Peng said, "Price increases are a large part of our economic life. This has lowered the

urban population's actual standard of living." The PRC Premier feels that some industrial and trade enterprises, taking advantage of their monopoly position, are willfully, openly, though in some cases covertly, increasing their prices unjustifiably. He also brought up the machinations of the profiteers, who are wreaking chaos in the market place in each of these instances.

A complex of measures aimed at restructuring the inefficient pricing system are presently being worked out.

From Fuzhou it is a 300-km jump by bus to Sun Zi, ancient city of the sages, where missionaries from the far corners of the globe use to gather.

The roads are unimportant. By and large, they are about like ours. But on the other hand, we get to observe the rural life of China for several hours.

We can see how diligently the peasants work. But it is all manual labor. I may have seen the gleam of one small tractor.

Here is the ancient 12th century temple of Kai Yuan with its four huge gold statues of Buddha. (The temples usually have two of them, and on rare occasions—three.) A few people are offering prayers. Two ancient pagodas, symbolizing the union of East and West, and a recently-opened museum with a 8th century Chinese trading ship embody the country's present-day economic endeavors.

FROM MY NOTEBOOKS. We could feel China's wish to draw nearer to the outside world on the first evening. In Beijing they took us to a church. The address was given not only in Chinese, but in English as well. Then I saw the CHINA DAILY, a daily English-language newspaper which is obviously oriented towards the western businessman. On the front page, in large print, it said: "IBM Begins Installing Computers in China." I flip the television dial and get a special program in English. The tennis matches on this program are covered as extensively as what we see during Wimbledon. In addition, every trading company, plant or scientific-research institute with any self-respect whatsoever gives its name in English on its signboards and company forms.

There are manufacturing plants in Sun Zi once more. The deputy mayor of the city emphasized: "Socialism in China is at the initial stage of development. So we are searching and experimenting, not primarily in the area of politics and ideology, but in economics. Prior to now, we have borrowed a great deal from you, and now we are studying the experience of Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, but naturally we are taking our own specifically Chinese features into account.

We asked the deputy mayor:

"Can a peasant who has concluded a family contract hire workers?"

"Yes, he can, according to the terms of a contract approved by the authorities. Up to 100 workers can be hired, but so far this practice is not widespread."

"And are party cadre workers becoming owners of enterprises?"

"There are instances of this. But they do not become capitalists—they themselves work 11-12 hours per day. This is a particularly Chinese type of socialism."

FROM MY NOTEBOOKS. China is presently working up a Law of State White Collar Workers. From now on, people applying for work in government organs at all grades (in China, local authorities are also given the "government" designation) will be hired, in compliance with the statute on state white-collar workers, on the basis of competitive selection of the best candidates.

Now let's see what there is of interest in Sun Zi, city of the sages. What did they philosophize about?

Here is a plant which produces special clothing and gloves used for the most diverse types of work (medicine, metallurgy, mining, motor vehicle drivers etc.). It employs 1,800 workers and has 15 affiliates in villages. All its output is meant for export, mostly to western Europe, where, as we were told in the plant, the Soviet Union buys up their output at double or even triple the price, since they don't produce anything similar. Perhaps we don't know how...or don't we want to?

The capital comes from foreign sources or the state, and is also invested by all the plant's workers and associates, without exception.

In addition to their wages, up to 25 percent of the enterprise's profits are distributed among the workers. The wage comes to 300-400 yuan per month.

The enterprises have been getting independently involved in the foreign market since 1985 and have trade contacts with 18 countries. As part of the reform, the plant pays no taxes to the state in currency.

In spite of the fact that the 8-hour workday has been officially approved in China, here in the "special area", the co-workers themselves can decide how long they are to work. At this plant, they work 9 hours per day, with 2-3 days off per month and a 9-day paid vacation. They have introduced a system of fines—for defective output, talking at the work-place and tardiness.

There are 60 leading workers. Their portraits are being painted in a "red corner"-type room. Poor workers can be fired by the director, but only with the agreement of the trade union. However, this happens very seldom. Everyone values his position. Remember—the average Chinese wage is 100 yuan. Here, it is 300-400 yuan.

We asked whether this system weren't a unique type of exploitation of the workers. The response was that the workers earn much more than in most state enterprises. How can this be construed as exploitation?

FROM MY NOTEBOOKS. I looked in on a workers' canteen at one of the plants. Everything was interesting, and I tried to see it all. I succeeded. Chinese cooking is a sort of art. A good cook has to know how to prepare at least 250 dishes, where a normal cook can prepare 20-30. For lunch or dinner, they served us as many as 18-20 dishes, and the meal usually lasted about two hours. Shark fin soup, frogs' legs or young clover salad are still not the most exotic dishes. But this is in the restaurant for foreign guests. What do they eat at the plant?

The line of 20 people moved up to the serving window very quickly. Each person held a small enamelled bowl in his hands. A scoop of rice, and atop that, a tablespoon of meat gravy, a tablespoon of fish sauce and another of stewed vegetables. It seems to be enough. If they used only a part of what we use, I don't think the subject of grain exports from China could even be brought up. Our lunch cost 1-2 yuan. These people do not frequent expensive restaurants. But I saw—I saw—some people strolling about there in groups, almost like Russians. I asked the friends accompanying us who they were. They shrugged. Maybe rich merchants or white-collar workers of foreign companies and perhaps taxi drivers who are not poor in China.

Farewell, peaceful and comfortable Sun Zi! Ahead is the most special of the "special areas"—Xiamen. It is an island in the Pacific Ocean—more precisely, the East China Sea. We are going to take a bath! The trip organizers, who have scheduled our time down to the minute, are disagreeing. We insist. We had our bath. A 15-minute bath "as a souvenir."

An accident occurred on the highway.

There are almost no privately-owned motor vehicles in China. The ultimate dream is to have a motorcycle. The bicycle is the king of the streets. The speed at which a motor vehicle travels while pressed by a solid stream of bicyclists on both sides, is not even determined by its, so to speak, forward speed, but by the speed at which the cyclists cross the road from the right and left immediately in front of the motor vehicle. I've never seen anything like it.

FROM THE NOTEBOOKS. China is a country of symbols and conventions. And the people are so unhurried, so staid. They say that this prolongs life. And why are they this way? Perhaps because as far back as ancient times, the emperors understood this wisdom and built 40-centimeter-high thresholds in their palaces and temples? If you get lost in contemplation, you'll fall down. The same thing happens if you hurry. And so don't be lost in thought and don't hasten, official, as you come in bowing to the emperor, but conduct yourself with measured steps. As for myself, I call these thresholds "thresholds of dreams and

confidence." And I have never once tried to avoid tripping on them. It worked, and in fact I've stepped over them a hundred times, inspecting the eternal peace of the imperial palaces in Beijing.

I have written that I have seen no accidents. But this.... It would have been better not to have seen it. Right before our eyes, in front of our bus, which was speeding to Xiamen, a small tractor pulling a cart loaded with stones ran over a small boy.

The poor boy had gotten carried away in conversation and had unexpectedly stepped back right under the wheels. It seems like the first time during the entire trip that we interrupted the program, and despite the protestations of our escorts ("there are foreign guests here"), the victim was dragged onto the bus. By the way, our escorts did not object to this. Is it not the first duty of any traveller on any road to help others in trouble?

After a couple of km, there gleamed a building with a red cross. We drove up to it. Long conversations and...alas. This hospital provides only traditional Chinese medicine. Our newspaper has already written a great deal about quack doctors, herb teas and folk medicine, but when it is a matter of broken ribs, or a ruptured liver, then pardon me, but it's not a folk medicine hospital which is needed, but a public hospital. That is where we took him.

A couple of words about Chinese medicine. We were in a plant which produces medicines from herbs, stones, bones, horns, mushrooms etc. Many of these medicines have been awarded high international prizes. They include a tea for losing weight, which was awarded the Gran Prix in Paris during a show of remedies helpful in promoting physical slenderness and grace. They presented each of us a tin of this tea, upon which it was written: "Drink constantly—and you won't need any kind of diet!" If anyone wishes to obtain this tea through friends, I emphasize the word "constantly." You'll never get enough of it. You'd be better off jogging and eating less, like they do in China.

Xiamen greeted us with a mixture of heat and a cool sea wind.

And it immediately became clear that civilization (whether European, American or Japanese) is crowding this genuinely Chinese city. There are increasingly fewer of the residential flats which typify this country, and increasing numbers of the buildings one can see in any country in the world. These include the ultramodern apartment houses in which a flat costs up to 30,000 yuan per month. Who is going to live in them? Most likely returning emigres and successful merchants. The prices in the markets are lower than in mainland China. The people here behave casually and dress in foreign fashions. However, it should be pointed out that there are other places in which one no longer sees the blue or gray uniform. Young men and women walk along with their

arms about each other's waists and are not ashamed to do so, as once was the case in China. And what are these sheer things the young women are wearing? Half skirts, half shorts—generally something downy with hemlines far above the knees. Any fashion-conscious woman of Moscow would envy the look. Only our climate is different, and isn't often similar to this one.

FROM MY NOTEBOOKS. Left the excellent hotel in Beijing at 8:00 am, walked 20 meters, turned a corner and ended up in a street of small one-story wattle-and-daub houses, 8 square meters each. The door was veiled by a screen, and people with mugs stand in every doorway brushing their teeth. There is one public toilet for the entire street, and the houses have no indoor plumbing. And somewhere, over there on the outskirts, new construction is going up. But when will they solve the housing problem? Alas, not soon I think.

The deputy mayor of Xiamen explains: "Many people would like to move here, but there are residence registration restrictions."

We set off for the enterprises.

The first is a plant which manufactures ceramic and china dishes and bathroom fixtures. The bathtubs are splendid, better than any I've ever seen. The enterprise uses combined American and Chinese capital, with the Americans investing 40 percent of the capital and the Chinese—60 percent. The profits are divided up in the same proportions; and so are the losses, should there be a shortfall.

The management is comprised of 3 Americans and 4 Chinese. All the output is exported. A 20-year contract was signed with American entrepreneurs. Plants in the "special economic area" are not taxed for two years and during the third year pay half the tax rate used in China.

And here's a plant which manufactures television sets and high-grade radio-tape recorder combinations. It has been operating since 1984. The products are manufactured under the technical control of the leading Japanese firms Toshiba and Matsushita. The plant exports 70 percent of its output and 30 percent, most of which is defective, is sold on the domestic market.

Management representatives explain: "At first, the Chinese and the foreigners each invested 50 percent of the capital. Now 81 percent of the capital comes from a business owner in Hong Kong who receives the same percentage of the profits. The plant pays rent to the state for the plant site, the building and the work-force, and pays back the initially-borrowed capital. The components for the products usually come from Japan and Hong Kong."

The workers earn a basic wage of 160 yuan per month plus 40 percent of the receipts, or a total of approximately 230 yuan per month.

Management earns twice the above, but their bonuses are smaller and are received on a one-time basis—based on the year's results.

The management can dismiss a worker without the trade union's agreement. (Remember the special clothing plant? There, the trade union must agree to a worker's dismissal. What a great diversity of management methods!). The 8-hour working day, one day off per week and a 9-day vacation every year. Every two weeks, two hours are donated for public work. The enterprise's owner lives in Hong Kong and rarely visits the plant. Four of his representatives are Chinese. The plant's products are sold in 14 countries of the world: the USA, Canada, Sweden, England, India et al. But at prices which are 20-30 percent lower than for similar goods manufactured in those countries. In time, the plant hopes to raise its prices. I personally believe this will happen—these electronics products are of the highest quality.

FROM MY NOTEBOOKS. Only in our country and here in China have I seen the abacus used. None of your electronic calculators, much less computers. And the electronics they have here! But the Chinese do know how to count. Here, they have begun issuing shares of stock for their enterprises which anyone who wishes may purchase and thus receive a portion of the revenues. At a Shanghai petrochemical combine we were told that on the day the enterprise's stock shares were issued, people were lined up for them, but that there simply weren't enough of them for many of the combine's employees who were on duty at the time.

More than once I asked: "What exactly are you building here in Xiamen—socialism, capitalism or some third thing?"

A prominent economist, after repeating ten times that this was only his personal opinion (which means that there are others—I have heard about these types of debates), said, "What exactly is socialism? It's not a dogma, and it is constantly developing. Not everything which increases production need be immediately declared capitalism. We are building socialism with specifically Chinese features. Stagnation and dogmatism are not the best ways to develop socialism. You have to experiment."

One of the entrepreneurs gave a different answer to this question: "Right now, we don't have to think about what we're building. We're gaining experience (particularly in the scientifically intensive sectors), accumulating currency, training a work-force, and these are also ways to build socialism."

And at the television manufacturing plant, they answered simply: "The very existence of an enterprise such as this is a fulfillment of the party line."

The observation made by General Secretary of the Chinese CP Central Committee Zhao Ziyang provides the key to understanding why the Chinese leadership has created "special economic areas." In December of last year, he visited Fujian Province—with us practically walking in his footsteps—and at almost every enterprise which they suggested we visit, they had hung large photographs showing the general secretary's visit there. So I think we were not shown the worst enterprises.

So it was that Zhao Ziyang noted that at the present time in the international arena, labor-intensive industry is moving to where the lowest wages are paid. He went on to say that in order to make timely use of this opportunity the coastal areas have to work out a suitable development strategy. They must, under the proper guidance, proceed step by step and in accordance with a planned procedure, towards international exchange, and towards competition, and must expand their export-oriented economy by all means possible.

Just recently a resolution to set up a new "special area" on Hainan Island, next largest to Taiwan, was adopted. It has been given the status of a province. The resolution stated: "Enterprises based on foreign capital will pay no taxes for the first two years after they begin showing a profit. The importing of building materials, machines, equipment, raw materials, families and livestock for those enterprises using foreign investments will not be subject to customs duties."

Liang Xiang, deputy head of the group setting up Hainan Province, informed the journalists that "a special policy will be carried out in Hainan, which provides for capital to be freely imported and exported, for people to freely come and leave, and primarily for freely transporting goods." He also said that in a period of 6 months, some 150,000 people had submitted applications requesting that they be taken on to work on Hainan Island. Moreover, 26,000 people have already arrived on the island. Only 2,600 of them can be hired. In response to the question set by one of the journalist on whether a private newspaper will be allowed to be published in Hainan, Liang Xiang said, "The following principle applies to printed publications: the publication of useful literature is encouraged, harmless literature will be permitted, harmful literature will be boycotted, and illegal literature will be stringently prohibited. Possibly the publication of a newspaper paid for with the population's money will be permitted on this island."

12659

Kampuchean Party Delegation Visits USSR

18070208 [Editorial Report] Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian on 12 July 1988 carries on page 1 a 400-word KAZTAG report noting that a party delegation from Kampuchea, headed by Politburo member and Secretary of the Kampuchean

People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) Central Committee Men Sam-an, visited Alma-Ata on 11 July. The article states that the workers of Kazakhstan, as well as all Soviet people, highly estimate and support the efforts of Kampuchea and of other Indochinese countries, directed at creating a healthy environment in Southeast Asia and transforming the region into a zone of peace,

stability, and good-neighborliness. During the visit, Men Sam-an reportedly noted that the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union and by other socialist countries is exceptionally important to the Kampuchean people.

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Chances for Angolan Settlement Assessed

18070193 [Editorial Report] Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian on 24 July 1988 carries on page 5 a 400-word article by M. Aleksandrov noting the chances for success in settling the conflict in southern Africa. Aleksandrov points to the document "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in South-West Africa," which the governments of Angola, Cuba, the United States and South Africa accepted during the quadripartite talks held in mid-July. He claims that "two factors made a change in South Africa's position possible: the large-scale Angolan-Cuban troop offensive in southern Angola, which inflicted not only military but significant moral damage to the racist regime's occupying units, as well as the strong internal conflicts within the UNITA leadership—South Africa's black mercenaries." Aleksandrov states that "the final agreement is to be achieved in September of this year."

/6091

OAU Chairman, Malian President on Soviet-Malian Relations

18070209 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 10 August 1988 carries on page 4 a 1400-word article presenting an interview with OAU Chairman and President of the Republic of Mali, Moussa Traore. President Traore discusses questions concerning the OAU's role and participation in resolving cardinal world and regional problems, as well as Malian foreign and domestic policy and Soviet-Malian relations. He comments on the excellent results of Soviet-Malian cooperation which arose from the time of Mali's independence. "The USSR rendered invaluable assistance to us in various areas of development, such as industrialization,

geological exploration, public health, and the training of cadres. Currently, we have a number of cooperative projects concerning modernization of the "Kalana" goldmining enterprise, mastery of some areas of an agroindustrial complex, and a study of the prospects for constructing the [Tossay] dam." President Traore reportedly expressed hope that the Soviet Union will provide assistance in constructing the dam.

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Archbishop Tutu Interviewed During Millennium Celebrations in Moscow

18070127 [Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian publishes on 16 June 1988 a 500-word article by S. Mushkaterov and G. Charodetev on page 4 interviewing Archbishop Desmond Tutu during his recent visit to the Soviet Union in connection with the commemoration of the millennium of Christianity in Russia. The authors note that on 14 June Archbishop Tutu met with the Moscow public in the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries. In his speech, Tutu expressed gratitude to the Soviet people for their moral, political and diplomatic support for those South African forces which favor eliminating the shameful apartheid system. When asked how official authorities will regard his visit to the Soviet Union, D. Tutu replied: "It is possible to assume that someone will write in the newspapers that I receive money from the KGB (laughter in the hall) or something in this vein. You know, this does not bother me. I have my own position on this score. I enthusiastically accepted the invitation from the Russian Orthodox Church. Such an event happens only once in a thousand years."

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3 OCT 1988